United States Agricultural Policies Affecting the Wheat Industry 1914-1954 by Briscoe, Nellis Austin
UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
AFFECTING THE WHEAT INDUSTRY 
1914-1954 
By 
NELLIS AUSTIN BRISCOE 
I/ 
Bachelor of Science 
Fort Hays Kansas State College 
Hays, Kansas 
1948 
Master of Science 
Fort Hays Kansas State College 
Hays, Kansas 
1952 
Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of the 
Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOC TOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
August, 1955 
UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
AFFECTING THE WHEAT INDUSTRY 
1914-1954 
Thesis Approved: 




An inquiry into agricultural policies and programs affecting the 
wheat industry of the United States must start at some date. It could 
start in 1938 when the concept of price supports within a specific range 
of parity was written into legislation. However , there have been earlier 
attempts to help farmers which have cast a profound and enduring 
influence upon the philosophy regarding the role of Government in the 
economic affairs of agriculture. Thus, such an inquiry might properly 
start in the 1920 1s when the McNary-Haugen proposals became a contro-
versial issue in farm legislation. It appears to be more logical, 
however, to begin the study with the outbreak of World War I because 
the advent of that war marked a significant turning point in American 
agricultural development and in public policy affecting agri culture. 
The wheat industry could be studied independently of other agri-
cultural enterprises. However, an approach to the study in this 
restricted sense could not provide the most useful perspective of the 
true situation. It is also erroneous to assume problem s ituations 
confronting the wheat industry to be independent of those confronting 
nonagricultural industries. A study of past polic ies and programs 
provides a frame of reference for formulating future governmental 
measures designed to alleviate current and future problem s ituations 
in that industry. 
iii 
The objective of this study is to review and appraise the more 
important measures which have been proposed or adopted to alleviate 
problem situations in the whe.at industry.,, to analyze major changes in 
policy, and to appraise the influences of the various measures. It is 
hoped that this study will serve as an aid toward the analysis of the 
constantly changing farm program developments. 
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criticisms, and their interest in the preparation of this study and in 
all matters pertaining to my work. My appreciation is also extended 
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am grateful to Professor Raymond D. Thomas and Professor Franklin 
Graybill for serving as members of the Advisory Committee. 
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CHAPTER I 
A GENERAL VIEW OF 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
The role of government as a promoter of agricultural development 
is not a recent one in the United St ates. The attempt to shape national 
policy with a view to protecting and promoting agricultural interests 
began with the formation of our Federal system. The sphere of govern-
ment activity in agriculture, however, has been vastly extended in the 
last 35 or 40 years. Behind the evolution of this expanding activity is a 
long story of agitation and organization on the part of both agricultural 
and nonagricultural groups operating through political parties . 
The Nature of Policies a nd Programs 
A country rs total agricultural policy is not stated in a single law, 
or in a system of laws dealing di rectly with current agricultural prob-
lems. Rather, it is expressed in a complexity of laws and attitudes 
which are constantly subject to change and displacement. The present 
policies which reflect the national attitude toward agriculture have 
emerged by a process of evolution of ideas and beliefs , and have been 
taking shape throughout the nation' s h istory. 1 They are expressed in a 
1 Murray R. Benedict, Farm ]?olicies of the United States, 1790-
.!J!§.Q (New York, 1953) , p. xi. 
2 
!--'-
great mass of legislation dealing' with matters such as landholding, 
conservation of natural resources, transportation, credit, and marketing. 
Policies cannot be static in a highly dynamic world. Conditions at 
home and abroad which policy is required to meet are constantly chang-
ing; therefore, a nation cannot have a fixed and complete agricultural 
policy. Agriculture is currently faced wffh complex problems that were 
~ 
undreamed of a few decades ago. Our system of agricultural laws and 
organizations must be subject to change if we are to lfsol.ve 11 ou,r farm 
problems. 
John D. Black of Harvard University has defined the term llpolicy11 
as '\ . . a more or less carefully considered and fundamental course of 
1 
action followed consistently for a period of years. H.L Agricultural poH,-
cies may be thought of as slowly evolving mass attitudes, stemming from 
social, political, and economic pressures, wh.ich reflect the philosophy 
of the people throughout the complete perfod of a nation's agricultural 
development. If they are to be successful, they must be based on sound 
1 John. D. Black, ''The Problem of Determining an Economic Policy 
for American Agriculture, 11 Economic Policy for American Agriculture, 
Edward A. Duddy, editor (Chicago, 1931), p. L 
3 
principles and designed t o achieve ends compatible with general economic 
welfare .1 
Economic welfare has been evaluated with respect to two basic 
norms or ideals, namely, m aximum social product and optimum income 
distribution. According t o Professor Schi.ckele, these norms are 
achieved under the following conditions: 
Maxi mum social product, or national income, i s achieved if a 
certain kind of labor, capital, or land resource yields the same marginal 
returns or, roughly, the same wage, interes t, and rent in every line of 
production to which it is suited. Socially and economically the most seri-
ous violation of the productive norm i.s unemployment. Any specific 
economic policy should inc rease or, at least, not seriously depress the 
social product . 
Optimum income distribution is achieved (a) if everyone has access 
to an adequate minimum standard of subsistence regarding food, clothes , 
housing, medical care, and education, the subsistence norm; and (b) if 
everyone can earn incomes above this m inimum living floor commensurate 
with his efforts and abilities contributed to the production process, the 
contributive norm. 
Any specific econom:i"C policy should reduce or, at least, not 
increase the number of families living below adequate subsistence 
1 According to a noted British economist, A. C. Pigou, the concept 
of economic welfare is " ... restricted to that part of social welfare that 
can be brought d irectly or indirectly into relation with the measuring-rod 
of money." By restricting economic welfare to this concept, it becomes 
possible to give it empirical content. P i gou points out that 11 • • • though 
no precise boundary between economic and non-economic welfare exists, 
yet the test of accessibility to a money measure serves well enough to set 
up a rough distinction. Economic welfare, as loosely defined by this test, 
is t he subject - matter of economic science. 11 A. C. Pigou, The Economics 
of Welfare (London, 1924), p. 11. 
standards and should assist and induce individuals to earn incomes 
proportional to the i.r actual or potential productivity. 1 
Public policies pertaining to agriculture should be shaped and 
4 
directed to improve not only the economic welfare of farmers and rural 
communities, but of all society. In a complex soc iety such as ours, 
however, not all policies are complete ly in t he public interest. There 
are usually some policies in effect which are more or less beneficial to 
special groups and, at the same t ime , detrimental to the interests of 
others. The fact that not all policies are in the public interest does not 
invalidate the principle that the end of any economic program should be 
compatible with general economic welfare. Rather , it gives specific 
reason and purpose for studying public policies and detecting those 
which, in the aggregate , tend to depress the social product or worsen 
the income distribution. 2 
Notwithstanding imperfections , the fundamental intent of public 
policy, of which agricultural policy is only a part, is presumed to be 
1 Rainer Schickele, Agricultural Policy (New York, 1954), 
pp. 56~57. Schickele explains that although these two norms belong to 
distinctly separate kinds of problems, they are closely interrelated. 
The productive norm refers to problems of resource allocation, and the 
distributive norm refers to problems of distributive justice. However, 
in most practical situations and in modern industrialized economies, 
these two policy ends complement, rather than conflict with, each other. 
lbid., p. 57. For further discussion of this problem, see T. W. Schultz, 
''Economic Effects of Agricultural Programs," American Economic 
Review, XXX (February, 1941), pp. 128-131. See also T. W. Schultz, 
Production and Welfare of Agriculture (New York, 1949) , pp. 20-29. 
2 
Schickele, Agricultural Policy, p. 61 . 
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the improvement of the economic welfare of all society. This is the 
master ... end or ultimate objective. Failure to completely achieve this 
objective does not necessarily m.ark a policy as a poor one or as a 
failure. Achievement of the ultimate objective is not a matter of .all 
or nothing. Rather, it is a matter of degree. The succes.s of a policy 
depends upon whether or not the problem situation has improved as a 
result of the specific measures employed to implement the policy. 1 
In order to achieve its goal. or to approach it, general policy is 
broken down into specific units or acts designed to achieve somewhat 
narrower objectives or ends. These specific acts are commonly 
referred to as programs. A program is r1_ •• a single act or a group 
of related acts, ordinarily extending over a rather short span of years, 
which commonly reflects some so.rt of policy, and gives concrete 
expression to it. it 2 
The choice of programs .. and in turn the choice of measures to 
implement them. largely determines the degree of success of a policy. 
Regardless of the soundness of a policy, i.t may be judged a failure if 
the program measures chosen are inappropriate or insufficient. In 
such an instance a sound policy may be unduly criticized, whereas the 
l Ibid. , p. 61. 
2 Black, nThe Problem of Determining an Economic Policy for 
American Agriculture, 11 Economic Policy for American Agriculture. 
p. 5. 
6 
real trouble lies in the prograJrneasures employed to implement it. 1 
A variety of different programs, each with its own specific objective, 
is usually necessary to give expression to general agricultural policy. 
All the various program objectives should converge toward the dominant 
public policy end of promoting and i.mprovi.ng the general economic 
welfare of society. 
There may be several proposals, or programs, for attaining 
what is essentially the same objective. Our own experience with farm 
legislation indicates that sharp differences often arise as to methods 
when there is little sig'nificant disagreement about the specific or basic 
objective itself. For example , during the ten-year period, 1923-33, 
several proposals were made to achieve a specific policy objective, 
namely, "equality for agriculture. n · The supporters of the McNary-
Haugen plan, the Federal Farm Board, and the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, all hoped to raise the prices of agricultural products. 
1 Schickele points out that since policies and programs are made 
in the face of uncertain expectations, their failure may be due to 
.external, as well as internal, causes. They may fail, not because they 
were iH-conceived, but because external events, that is events external 
to the policies themselves, turned out otherwise than expected. The 
Steagall amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, for 
example, was based upon the assumption that farmers would be reluctant 
to expand their operations because of fear of a postwar slump in the 
prices of those products in which they were asked to make an all-out 
production effort during the war. Although this expectation did not 
materialize , the policy makers responsible for the Steagall amendment 
cannot rightfully be blamed for the unexpected turn of events in the 
immediate postwar period. Schickele, Agricultural Policy, pp. 242-
244; 254. 
7 ./ 
However, the various methods or progra!Ils proposed or used were 
quite different. 
The American people are desirous of and need public policies 
7 
that are conducive to an expanding and prosperous national economy. 
Agricultural policies and farm programs should be designed with these 
objectives in mind. Farm programs should be constructed in such a 
manner that they will help maintain prosperity in the whole economy, 
not in agriculture alone. They must be based on sound principles and 
fairly represent the interests of both producers and consumers in order 
to reduce the risk of failure. If they are to be successful, the American 
people, both city and farm, must understand, desire, and give them 
their wholehearted support. The problem of maintaining prosperity in 
agriculture is broad and complex and involves many different lines of 
action, not only in agriculture but also in other segments of the economy. 
In general, all national public policies have some degree of effect 
upon the farming industry. Government policies in respect to interna-
tional trade, for example, affect the export markets for agricultural 
products. These effects are eventually reflected in the prices that far-
mers receive for their products. Policies adopted to meet wartime 
needs have pronounced effects upon the agricultural economy. During 
periods of wa~ the government may en.courage the expansion of agricul-
tural production, especially with respect to specified "basic" commodi-
ties. On the other hand, with the return of peace and the loss of a good 
portion of the foreign outlets for the increased production, addita.onal 
8 
production may be discouraged, or at least not encouraged. As a result) 
agriculture is required to make drastic production and price adjustments. 
Since agriculture has a vital interest in general economic stability, 
another public policy of grave importance is that of stabilizing the gen~ 
era.I. price level. Violent fluctuations i.n the general price level which 
contribute heavily to economic uncertainty can be tempered by appro-
pri.ate fiscal, credit, .and monetary policies. Changes in the general 
price level may be amplified in the fluctuations of farm prices; there~ 
fore, these policies are extremely important to agriculture, as well as 
to other sectors of the economy. 1 
The greatest market by far for the United States" farm production 
is the American Consumer. Farmers are going to have better prices 
when employment is at a high level than they will at low levels. Any 
public policy, agricultural or otherwise, which encourages production 
and employment in either agricultural or nonagricultural lines, or both, 
will be of benefit to farmers. On the other hand, anything that tends to 
lower the general economic level, either tn industry or in business, will 
have a tendency to depress agriculture. 
Discussing the need for high-level employment and production, the 
Committee on Postwar Agricultural Policy of the Association of Land-
Grant C alleges and UniversHies reported: 
1 For a concise discussion of the importance of fiscal policy to 
agriculture, see William H, Stead, 11Your Stake in Fiscal Policy, 11 
Farm Policy Forum, II (January, 1949), pp. 29-33. 
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Towering above all other considerations is our need for .. . full 
employment and unrestricted production. These are important t o every-
one , and not the least to farmers. The amount of money that urban 
people have t o spend largely determines how good customers they are 
for farm products. In addition, high-level industrial production brings 
a large supply of goods t o farmers at reasonable prices, and it also 
provides job opportunities for those who are not needed in agriculture. 
Urban people i.n turn are benefited by good farm income and high- level 
farm production. 
High-level employment in non-agricultural industry means very 
much more to farmers than any irfarm-program11 the government may 
attempt . Manipulations of agricultural production and prices are no 
substitute for good consumer markets. 
Enlightened self ..,interest for a ll economic groups makes it e ssen-
tial that they promote continuously large employment and production, 
even though t o achieve it sometimes may require reductions in certain 
prices and wages. 1 
Political Implications of Farm Programs 
Farm programs, which are designed to give concrete expression 
to farm policy, are both political and economic in nature. They are 
economic in that they involve such things as prices, markets, allocation 
of resources , stocks, and the distribution of inc ome. They are political 
in that they require government action to become laws. Under a rep re-
sentative government such as ours . governmental decisions are reached 
through politi cal processes, and farm programs are effectuated by 
legislative action. 
Farmers have always been an important factor in the political life 
of our nation. They have had much to do with the shaping of our public 
1 Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, Postwar 
Agricultural Policy (October, 1944) , p. 8. 
10 
policies, especially those pertaining to agriculture and the agricultural 
industry. Earlier in our history the farm population was so thoroughly 
predominant that those in public position were keenly sensitive to the 
needs of agriculture. In more recent years, however, the urban indus-
trial groups have gained a marked prepon,derance, and there has been a 
growing political divergence between their interests and those of agricul-
ture. 1 However, the farm vote is still an important one, occasionally 
crucial, in national politics. 2 
Henry C. Wallace, writing in 1924, was very much aware of the 
political importance of the agricultural group. He pointed out that if for 
no other reason than because of the size and latent power of this group, 
the manner in which their interest and welfare may be affected by national 
policies, legislative or administrative, always should be considered. 
He stated: 
It is not in the national interest to disregard so important a group 
or to give it merely such attention as will keep it at work. Such an 
attitude is insufferable and is certain to stimulate a group conciousness 
which soon develops into group prejudice. As this feeling gathers power. 
the group attracts smaller discontented elements, and finally compels 
action much more extreme than would have satisfied it a short time be-
fore. Failure to give needed assista,nce to such a group, whether 
engaged in farming or any other industry. when it is struggling under 
economic difficulties, especially when such difficulties are due in part 
1 
Wilson Gee, The Social Economics of Agriculture (New York, 
1954), pp. 18-19. 
2 For a stimulating discussion of the role of farmers in politics, 
see Carl T. Schmidt. American Farmers in the World Crisis (New York, 
1941 ) , pp. 9 8 ,-119 . 
fo national policies, is a sure way tb breed discontent and resentment 
not conducive to the national good. 1 
11 
It is difficult to separate any national farm program from politics 
because, after all, the farm laws are written by Congress. We elect 
our representatives to Congress, and law making is t~eir responsibility. 
Presumably, all laws are made with the welfare of the natio~ at heart; 
therefore, even legislation pertaining to farm price supports should take 
consumers into consideration. 
There is general agreement that no particular group such as 
farmers, for example should be permitted to write its own farm program. 
But even if farmers were allowed to develop their own farm program, 
they probably would never arrive at a workable one. At least progress 
would be slow. For example, how would a special interest group such 
as some cattlemen, which opposes price supports, reconcile its views 
with those of farmers who are clamoring for high guaranteed prices for 
corn and wheat? It is obvious that the problem can best be handled by 
Congress. We must recognize and accept the political implications of 
farm programs. 
The Dominant Question 
The obstacles that face the American farmer of today are formida-
ble ., but they are not completely new. Likewise, program proposals to 
alleviate agriculture's problems are not new. The nation-wide debate on 
1 Henry C. Wallace, Our Debt and Duty to the Farmer (New York, 
1925) , pp. 11-12. 
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how to support prices and the extent of the Governmenflis responsibilities 
to give direct assistance to the farming industry embody some of the 
same arguments, both pro and con, that were ca.rried on back in the 
1920"s when the McNary-Haugen proposals were the controver,,sial issues. 
The dominant question then, as now, was how to get "equality for agricul-
ture. t-t Similarly, the reason for the debate then, as now, was that no one 
had come up with the ideal answer to the problem. 
Then came the Great Depression and the severe drought of the early 
1930 1s. This created a different, and more difficult, situation than that 
of the l 920f's. There were vari.ous attempts to support farm prices dur-
ing the early part of this period. Finally, the lo'i:m program and ever 
normal granary were placed into effect just before the outbreak of the 
last war. 
During the period of World War II the Government made urgent 
appeals to farmers to produce more and more so as to meet adequately 
current needs and prepare our country for a prolonged war or any even-
tuality that might develop from the war. The need for agricultural pro..-
.duction was the greatest that we had ever experienced, and goals were 
set that challenged our productive capacity. Encouraged by support 
prices which were to extend well into the postwar period, farmers re-
sponded favorably and record levels of production in some commodities 
were reached. After the war was over Congress was reluctant to with-
draw the support provisions even though the war demands had ceased. 
The outbreak of the Korean conflict in June, 1950, again changed 
the need for some agricultural commodities. Once more the Government 
13 
,, 
urged farmers to pr oduce more and mor e so as to m eet curr e nt a ddi-
tional r equirements and build surpluses as a safeguard in the event of a 
large-scale and prolonged war. As a r esult , a surplus of farm J)'I'Oduct s 
was acquired . 
Surplus Wheat 
The agricultural industry in this country i s currently character-
ized by surplus1 stocks of some commodities , especially wheat. This 
commodity constitutes the Government ' s most serious current agricul-
tural surplus problem. At the pr esent time the Gover nment has more 
than 2. 5 billion dollars invested in surplus wheat . This accounts for a 
third of all the money that the taxpayers have tied up in surplus farm 
products. 2 
Additional supplies are soon to appear on the market. This will, 
of course, cause surpluses to soar to even higher levels. Even if 
1 The principal connotation of the t e rm "surplus , 11 as used here, 
is economic ; that i s , a market surplus as distinguished from a physical 
surplus. Surplus. in this usage , is the amount by which supplies offered 
for sale are greater than the amount that will bring producers a "normal" 
i?come. A normal inc ome is one that wi ll bring comparable reiWards to 
producers of like ability in both agriculture and industry over a period 
sufficient in length to make adjustments t o major changes in technology 
and demand, but excluding extreme peaks of boom and depression. See 
J. P . Cavin, Hazel K. Stiebeling, and Marius Farioletti, "Agricultural 
Surpluses and Nutritional Deficits , " Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940 
(Washington, 1940) , pp. 329-341. For an additional discussion of types 
of surpluses , see E . A. Stokdyk and Charles H. West . The Farm Board 
(New York, 1930) , pp. 57-68. 
2 "Too Much Wheat , More Coming, " U. S. News and World 
Report (March 11 , 1955) . p. 46. 
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~armers did not harvest any wheat this year, there would be plenty to 
meet our present requirements for' flour and bread, livestock feed, seed, 
and exports. At the current rate of disappearance, all of these require-
ments could be met by utilizing Government owned wheat how on. hand. 
Since 1953 the Gove:t>nment h~s cut wheat acreage seeded from 179 
million acres 1 to 55 million acres 0 2 a decrea.se of almost one third. 
Still we are faced with a surplus. It i.s estimated that the carry-over 
on July 1, 1955, will be around 975 million bushels., 75 million bu.shel.s 
larger than the previous year. 3 Total wheat supplies for the 1954-55 
marketing year are estimated at 1877 million bushels, consisting of 
902 million bushels c~rried over from ! 954, new production of 970 
million, and an allowance for imports of about 5 milli.on bushels .. 4 
To,t.al domest:i,c disappearance is estimated at between 64.0 and 660 million 
bushels and exports at 250 million, a total demand for approximately 
900 million bushels. 5 This means that the carry-over on July 1, 1956, 
will be approxim,ately 975 million bushels, more than a years supply at 
current rates of usage. 
1 United State.s Department of AgJ;"iculture. The Wheat SituaUon 
(Washingtcm, December, 1954), p. 5, 
2· United Stiltes Department of. Agriculture, The Wheat Situationt 
June, 195.4 p. ~-
3 United States Department of AgI"iculture, The Wheat Situati.on,, 
Februa.ry~ 1956., p. 3. 
4 . 
Ibid .• pp. 3" 6. 
5 Ibid .• p. 3. 
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Extent and Degree of Control 
There is general agreement that some kind of wheat program is 
needed to cope with the acreage-price-surplus problem which now con-
fronts the wheat farming industry. There is much disagreement, 
however. concerning the type of program that would best serve the 
interests of all concerned. It is doubtful. if a farm program can be 
developed that will be the perfect solution to all the problems of all the 
farmers. On the one extreme, some urge the abandonment of all 
attempts to control wheat prices. This group believes that free-market 
prices continuoµsly adjust current consumption of farm products to the 
available supplies. That is, in periods of scarcity prices rise and con-
sumption decreases, and, conversely, i~ periods of abundance prices 
drop enough to induce consumers to purchase larger quantities. There-
fore,. since free-market prices vary inversely with production, they 
result in fairly stable incomes to farmers. 
At the other extreme, others contend that free-market prices are 
often inadequate guides in making production plans and cannot be relied 
upon to "solve" the probl~m. Furthermore, the problem is complicated 
by the uncertainties of weather and other uncontrollable factors affecting 
production. They point out that when the price of a commodity is high, 
a preponderant percentage of the farmers decides to expand production. 
Thi.s results in overproduction1 and low prices by the time that the 
1 Overproduction, in this usage, means production greater than 
the market will absorb at satisfactory prices. 
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increased output can be marketed, which may be a year's time with 
most crops, or as much as several years with livestock products. Con-
versely when prices of a particular commodity are low, a great 
percentage of the farmers decides to contract their production. As a 
result supplies drop to low levels, prices increase sharply, and con-
sumers complain that they are being penalized. Even though prices are 
at a high level, farmers suffer because their volume of production is so 
low that they cannot realize a high total return. 1 
This group recommends strict Government production and market-
ing controls and guaranteed m inimum prices. Carried to its extreme 
limits, this theory would result in the Government eventually becoming 
the only market and the source of all farm income. As the only market, 
the Government wo~ld be forced to control production. In between .these 
two extremes--free-market prices and completely controlled prices--
are several proposals with various degrees of control for meeting the 
overall problem of surplus wheat production. 
The current wheat surplus .is not without its advantages, as well 
as its disadvantages. Both of these aspects must be carefully considered 
in the formulat i on of an overall wheat program. Cer.tainly, a surplus is 
not the curse that a scarcity would be. Agricultural surpluses , as long 
I/ 
as they are not allowed to reach unmanageab.le magnitudes, may prove ·; 
1 
Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universit ies , Postwar ; 
Agricultural Policy, pp. 24-25. 
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to be assets, not liabilities. T hey constitut e valuab le nat ional insurance 
against the extraordinary demands of famine and war . We were thankful 
for heavy surplus supplies of wheat, as well as certai n other comm,odi-
ties, to help meet the crucial food demands of World War II. 
On the other hand, if surpluses are allowed to grow beyond normal 
substantial reserves, they will have a depressing influence on prices . 
Regardless of the particular measures adopted, a farm program will 
have a better chance to function if the surplus is maintained at a manage-
able size. It would, of course , be illogical to adopt a nati onal farm 
program directed toward maintaining wheat stocks at a dangerously low 
level, and extremely illogical to adopt one dedicated to c ompletely 
abolishing reserves of a raw-food product as universally important as 
wheat. The development of new outlets and the expansion of old ones, 
both foreign and domestic , along with a reallocation of resources in 
agriculture so as to adjust production to fit the market demand that 
actually exists, would be more logical measures to consider as possible 
means to a solution of the current wheat surplus problem. 
The core of the dominant issue in the farm-price controversy is 
whether to adopt a more or less permanent system of governmentally 
administered prices , or whether to allow more and more opportunity for 
free-market prices to function, eventually completely abandoning all 
government price controls in the agricultural industry. In any serious 
consideration of this gr ave problem, it i s i mporta nt t o r emember that 
there is no compelling force demanding an all -or-nothing approach in 
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respect to government controls. Fortunately, neither complete control 
nor complete absence of control of production and prices are our only 
alternatives. Neither approach will give absolute, or even reasonable, 
assurance of a practical and workable solution to the wheat problem. 
Objective thinking and calm consideration of the complete problem, 
along with alert and unbiased minds for discovering solutions to fit ot,her 
problems that are constantly occurring, are badly needed if an answer 
is to be arrived at, or even if the situation is to be ameliorated. A 
complete and thorough understanding of all phases of the overal.l prob-: 
lem and the wise adaptation of lessons gained from past experiences are 
fundamental measures for a meaningful and effective farm program. 
Efforts to hold prices on any commodity too high, when there is no real 
economic reason for doing so, have a tendency to complicate, :rather 
than solve or simplify, the problem situation in respect to that particular 
commodity .. A synthesis of freedom and control, tempered by unbiased 
judgment and constant adjustment to fit changing needs, is probably the 
best approach to our wheat problem. 
CHAPTER II 
WHEAT IN THE WORLD WAR I PERIOD 
Early Economic Influences of the War and 
Adjustments to Wartime Demands 
The advent of World War I marked a significant turning point in 
American agricultural development and in public policy affecting agri-
culture. Although the United States did not enter the conflict until 191 7, 
economic influences began to bear upon American farmers with the out-
break of hostilities in 1914. The war introduced an urgent need for 
great quantities of food and fiber, and military developments soon made 
America the Allied Powersr chief source of these supplies. The war-
ring European nations ': demands for munitions and other supplies stimu-
lated our manufacturers and placed a premium upon labor which was felt 
on the farm. The withdraw! of farm labor was among the first effects of 
the war upon our agriculture . In an extremely short period of time our 
agricultural industry was forced to adjust itself to an altered pattern of 
trade and consumption. 1 
1 The major agricultural problems of the pre-war period, 1900-
1914, were production problems. At that time we were still a debtor 
.nation and service charges on the debt were met largely through the 
export of agricultural products. The production of an exportable sur-
plus was not only of great importance to our economy in general, but 
was considered to be a cornerstone of our agricultural system. 
·A. B. Genung, "Agriculture in the World War Period,"' Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1940 (Washington, D. C., 1940), p. 278. 
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At first only s light and t emporary a djustments in our agriculture 
appeared as a consequence of the war stimulus . However, as the war 
progressed and developed into a gi gantic and world-engulfing struggle, 
the lure of high prices and the possibility of exceptionally great profits 
caused these changes to assume a deeper and a more complex character. 
General farm production was stimulated by wartime demands. 
There was a great increase in demand for basic foods and fibers such 
as flour , heavy meats, fats , sugar, and wool. These products were 
considered imperative for the successful prosecution of the war. How-
ever, of all the agricultural ent erprises s timulated by the war, the wheat 
industry received the first and by far the greatest impetus . 
In the decade preceding the outbr eak of World War I this country 
had harvested annually an average of about 47 million acres of wheat. 
The United States had been a wheat exporter ever s ince the founding of 
the country, and the acreage and yield had increased steadily from 18,66 
until about 1900. From that year to the outbreak of World War I, how-
ever, wheat acreage had shown some tendency to decline . Also, wheat 
and flour exports had declined considerably during this period. The 
peak of wheat and flour exports had been reached in 1901 with 239 mil-
lion bushels being exported. Exports of these commodities dipped t o 
146 million bushels in 1913 , but had been as low as 44 million in 1904 
and averaged less than 80 milli on during the three year period, 1909-1911. 1 
1 United St a tes Department of Agriculture , Agricultural Statistics, 
1936 (Washington, D. C. , 1936) , pp. 5-6. 
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Although wheat exports had dropped off considerably in the decade 
preceding World War I, in 1914 we were one of the four chief wheat-
exporting countries. Russia, Canada, and Argentina were the other 
three. For the period 1909-1913 , Russia had been exporting about 162 
million bushels a year, Canada 92 million, the United States 105 million, 
and Argentina about 90 million. 1 The countries of Western Europe were 
and had been the great import market. 
Bread is a basic component of the diet of the people of Western 
Europe. Major interests with respect to foodstuffs, therefore, centered 
around wheat and wheat products. With the exception of Russia, Rumania, 
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, all of Europe was highly dependent on 
imported wheat and other small grains before World War I. Early in the 
war Great Britain's supply of wheat from Russia was completely cut off 
by the Central Powers. At the sa:rne time, Germany's submarine war-
fare was reducing shipping to a point where vessels could not be spared 
for the long hauls from India, Australia, and Argentina. Furthermore, 
grain production had been greatly reduced in France, Italy, and Belgium. 
These countries, along with the United Kingdom, produced slightly less 
than 350 million bushels of wheat in 1917. This was about 60 per cent of 
their average total production during the pre-war period, 1909-1913. 2 
1 Frank, M;. Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War (New 
York, 1928), p. 22. 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook, 1920 
(Washington, D. C. , 1921) , p. 548. 
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To have bread rations equal to those to which they had been accus-
tomed, the Allied Powers would have had to import about 600 million 
bushels of wheat. None of this could be obtained from Russia or the 
Balkan countries and only comparatively small amounts from India, 
Australia, or Argentina. Thus an urgent demand was to be placed upon 
the United States and Canada to supply every possible bushel of wheat. 1 
At the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1914 the Unit ed States was 
blessed with a bumper crop. Other countries were not so fortunate. 
Europe had a short crop, the A ustrali.an crop was almost a complete 
failure, and sub-normal crops prevailed in Canada and India. Argentina 
had a big crop, and the Russian crop was fair. 2 Wartime conditions, 
however, made shipments from these countries extremely difficult . As 
a result wheat exports from the United States in 1914 rose to an all time 
high of 355 milli on bushels and comprised over 60 per cent of all 
international shipments. 3 
The bountiful harvest and heavy exports at good prices stimulated 
sowings for the next crop. Acreage harvested increased from 55 million 
in 1914 to over 6 0 m i llion in 1915. The inc re as ed acreage, along with 
a record breaking yield of 16. 7 bushels per acre, produced our first 
1 Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War, p. 21. 
2 For production figures see United States Department of Agricul-
ture, Agricultural Statistics, 1936, p. 11. 
3 Joseph Stancliffe Davis, Wheat and The AAA (Washington, D. C. 
1935), p. 4. 
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1 billion bushel wheat crop. Our bumper c r op, however, was not an 
exception. The 1915 wheat crops were good in most of the exporting 
countries and Europe also produced a fai r crop. Consequently our 
exports dropped to 240 milli on bushels and prices declined to about 
their pre-war level. 2 Our agriculture had not yet felt its strongest 
economic impact from the war. 
Because of adverse weather affecting both acreage harvested and 
yield, the United States ' 1916 wheat crop was very poor. Acreage 
harvested dropped to 53 m illion acres and the yield was a mere 11. 9 
bushels per acre ; total production was only 634 m illion bushels. 3 With 
a short world crop and an increased demand for wheat from abroad, 
prices advanced sharply i.n the fall of 1916. The bi g surplus carried 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1952 (Washington, D. C., 1952) , p. 2. Since 1915 we have produced 
several wheat crops exceeding one billion bushels. Also, yields have 
exceeded that of 1915. See United States Department of Agriculture, 
Agricultural Statisti.cs, 1953 (Washington, D. C ., 1953) , p. 1. 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics , The Wheat Situation (Washington, D. C. , September-Decem-
ber, 1949) , p . 21 ; United States Department of Agriculture , Agricultural 
Statistics, 1936 , p. 6. 
3 The average y ie ld per harvested acre was lower i n 1916 than in 
any other year between 1890 and 1933. See United States Department of 
Agriculture , Agricultural Statis tic s , 1952 , pp. 1-2. 
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over from the crop of 1915 was s oon absorbed and by July, 191 7, we had 
only 80 million bushels of wheat in stocks. 1 
-
In the early spring of 1917 each of the European Allies , as well as 
several of the neutral countries , was constantly in the American market 
placing competitive bids for all of the cash wheat and flour available. 
The price of wheat received by farmers advanced from an average of 
about $1. 55 per bushel in December, 1916, to nearly $2. 50 in May, 
1917. 2 
Competitive bidding for our rapidly declining supply of wheat, 
however, was not the only factor responsible for this spectacular advance 
in price. At the same time that the Allied Powers were bidding for cash 
wheat, they entered the futures market and purchased heavily in May 
futures on the Chicago Board of Trade. They desired delivery o'f the 
grain in fulfillment of their contracts. Futures dealers were frantic in 
an effort to cover their "short sales" and, in consequence, prices of spot 
grain rose to hitherto unknown values. On May 11 , No. 2 Red Winter 
wheat sold in Chicago for $ 3. 45 per bushel. On the following day the 
Chicago Board of Trade suspended operations in May futures and forced 
the settlement of outstanding contracts at agreed upon prices. 3 
1 The average carry-over for the five-year peri od 1909-1914 was 
105 million bushels. The carry-over from the 1915 crop was 225 million 
bushels. United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situation, 
September-December, 1947, p. 11. 
2 United States Department of Agriculture , The Wheat Situation, 
January-March, 1952, p. 2. 
3 Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War, p. 28. 
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This sharp increase in price was not indicative of farmer profits. 
Farmers had marketed the bulk of their crop before the price advances 
occurred. Out of a total of 620 million bushels of the 1916 crop leaving 
the farms, 570 million bushels had been marketed by April, 1917. Thus 
about 90 per cent of the 634 m illion bushels produced was out of wheat 
growers I hands before the spectacular rise in price began. During May 
and June, 1917, when wheat prices were at their peak, only 5 per cent 
of the 1916 crop was marketed by farmers. 1 Consequently they realized 
only a small part of the profits from the high prices of May and June. 
The United States Enters the War 
The United States entered the war in Apr'il, 1917. Our entry more 
definitely crystallized public policy with respect to food supplies. The 
economic stimulus to produce more wheat was reinforced by official 
propaganda which was designed to induce concentrated efforts to increase 
our production. The slogan was, "Food will win the war." But the 
1917 growing season for wheat was poor and only 46 million acres were 
1 Urtited States Department of Agriculture , Yearbook, .1918 
(Washington, 1919), p. 680. The average price received by farmers 
for wheat ~ose from 93 cents per bushel in July, 1916, to nearly $1. 65 
in February, 1917. During this time farmers marketed 545 million 
bushels, 88 percent of total marketings from the 1916 crop, at an 
average price weighted by sales of $1 . 29 per bushel. See Ibid., pp. 468, 
680 . I --
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harvested. Total production was a mere 620 million bushels, even less 
than the poor crop of 1916. 1 
Although wheat growers realized only small profits from the high 
prices that prevailed in the spring of 1917 , these same prices caused 
consumers to suffer severely. The price of flour, as would be expected, 
closely followed the price of wheat. The average wholesale price of 
flour in Chicago advanced from $ 8. 30 per barrel in December, 1916, to 
slightly over $16. 00 in May, 1917, an increase of better than 90 per cent. 2 
Surface has estimated that consumers in this country paid $ 200 million 
more for flour during the first half of 1917 than would be justified by 
reasonable margins above the price which the farmers received for their 
wheat. 3 These price advances emphasized the importance of wheat in the 
war program and demonstrated clearly the immediate necessity for 
measures to protect consumers from any unscrupulous speculation 
which might accompany skyrocketing prices. 4 
1 United States Department of Agriculture , Agricultural Statistics , 
1952., p. 2. Abandonment of fall-sown wheat was exceptionally heavy in 
191 7, 31 percent of the acreage sown was not harvested.. See United 
States Department of Agriculture , Yearbook, 1917 (Washington, D. C., 
1918), p. 620. . 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook, 1917, p. 622. 
3 Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War, pp. 28-29. 
4 The six months preceding the passage of the Food Control Act had 
been a period of uncontrolled speculation in all foodstuffs. In 1917, when 
the Act was passed, the retail cost of food was 52 per cent higher than in 
1913 and 35 percent high than it was in 1916. Frank M. Surface, The 
Stabilization of the Price of Wheat During the War and Its Effect Upon the 
Returns to the Producer (Washington, 1925) , p. 12. 
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The Food Control Act 
The Food Control Act was passed on August 10, 1917. Through 
this Act the President was given extensive powers to control the entire 
food supply of the nation. On the same day that the Food Control Act 
became a law, the President issued an executive order creating the 
United States Food Administration. An appropriation of $150 million 
was made for use by the Food Administr.ator. 1 
The Food Control Act contained a multitude of regulations and 
provisions. Surface states: 
Among other things this Act provided for co-operation with the 
Allied Governments in food supply; the control of profiteering in food 
trades; a guarantee of a minimum price of $ 2. o,o per bushel for wheat 
of the 1918 crop, and authorized the President to purchase, to store 
and to sell for cash nwheat, flour, meal, beans and potatoesn and to 
carry out the provisions for a guaranteed price for wheat. ... 2 
Section 2 of the Food Control Act authorized the President for the 
purpose of implementing the Act 11 • • • to create and use any agency or 
agencies .... 113 Section 11 authorized him 11 ••• from time to time 
to purchase, to store, to provide st.orage facilities fo:r and to sell for 
cash at r·easonable prices, wheat, flour, meal, beans and potatoes. 
n4 
1 This appropriation was inadequate to meet the needs of the Grain 
Corporation, It was necessary to raise $385 million of priv1;1te ca.pita! 
in addition to the original appropriation. Ibid. , p. 17. 
2 1· b 0 d 11. . -2..:..· , p. 
3 Surface, The Grain Trade During theWorld War, p. 496. 
4 n)id., p. 499. 
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Acting under this authority the President, in order t o check speculation 
and bring wheat supplies and prices under control, issued an executive 
order on August 14, 1917, creating the Food Administration Grain Cor-
poration. This corporation was to serve as part of the administrative 
machinery necessary to carry out the provisions of the Food Control Act. 
The Food Administration Grain Corporati on was capitalized at $ 50 mil-
lion out of the $150 milli on appropriated to the Food Administrator. 
This capital was increased from time to time by later executive orders. 
The essence of the plan under which the Grain Corporation operated 
was to establish definite government buying prices at the terminal markets 
and then, by cooperation with the trade, to insure that wheat growers 
' 
would receive a fair reflection of this price at their local elevators. As 
soon as adequate supplies had been accumulated, the Grain Corporation 
stood ready to sell or buy wheat at the established price, thus effectively 
stabilizing the price at that particular level. 1 In order to put this plan 
1 Murray R. Benedict, Farm Polieies of the United States, 1790-
1950 (New York, 1953), p. 166. While a primary purpose of the Grain 
Corporation was to provide a method of putting into effect the Cqngres-
sional guarantee of the price of wheat to the producer, it also had other 
objectives. "The Grain Corporation also undertook to see that wheat 
supplies were equitably distributed to American mills, and to control 
the prices at which flour and other products were sold by the mills to the 
consumer. It also controlled cereal supplies for export to Allied and 
neutral governments. This control was handled through the War Trade 
Board, which would not issue export licenses unless these were approved 
by the War Food Administration and by the Treasury, which had a com-
mittee to coordinate all Allied buying in the United States. The Grain 
Corporation sold its cereals and cereal products (for export) to the Wheat 
Export Company in New York, which was a part of the Allied Wheat 
Executive established by the Allied governments in London." Ibid., 
p. 166. --
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into operation for the ~91 7 wheat crop, the Grain Corporation fac ed t he 
problem of determining the price at which Government agencies would 
purchase the crop. 
Congress, i n the Food Control Act , had provi~ed a definite guar-
anteed minimum price of $ 2. 00 per bushel at the principal interior 
markets for the 1918 wheat crop, but no reference was made to the 1917 
crop . However, because of efforts on the part of the Allied Govern-
ments to fix prices for American wheat, it was soon evident that price 
provisions had to be made for the 1917 crop. 1 Section 14 of the Act 
authorized the Pres ident , whenever he found an emergency existed 
requiring the stimulati on of wheat production, to fix a reasonable guar-
anteed price in order to insure producers a reasonable profit. 2 However, 
since the Act was not passed until August, 1917, it was impossible to 
stimulate producti on for that year. Consequently there was no direct 
authority by which the Presi dent could set a guaranteed minimum price 
for the 1917 wheat crop, but indirect authority did exist. Indirect 
1 Before we came into the war the Alli ed Governments had consoli-
.dated their purchasing of world wheat into a single buying agency, thus 
abolishi ng competition among themselves. Since they had control of world 
shipping, this agency was the sole buyer of our export wheat. The domes-
tic pric e of our wheat was fixed by the price which could be realized for 
the export surplus. Since export buying was all in one hand, the price of 
wheat to our farmers was, therefore, determined by the price which the 
Allied Powers f agency determined was necessary to insure continuing 
supplies. Domestic prices start ed falling rapidly toward that level. 
Surface, The Stabilization of the Price of Wheat During the World War 
and Its Effect Upon the Returns to the Producer , pp . 7-8. 
2 
Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War, pp. 501-502. 
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authority was found in the provis ions of the Food Control Act which gave 
the President power to buy and sell wheat and flour ; to enter into volun-
tary agreements and to license and prescribe regulations for licenses; 
to requisition food and other supplies needed for public use. 1 On August 
30, 1917, the Pr,esident announced a "fair" price for the 1917 crop. 2 It 
was set at $ 2. 20 per bushel for No. 1 Northern Spring wheat and equi-
valent grades at Chicago with differentials for other grades and markets. 3 
The Congressional guarantee of $2. 00 per bushel for the 1918 crop 
stimulated fall seeding of wheat. The seeded acreage of winter wheat 
rose to 43. 3 million acres as compared with 37. 9 m illion the preceding 
fall and an average of 32. 9 million for the five-year period, 1909-13.4 
However, early in the spring of 1918 the food situation of the Allies was 
so serious that it was considered advisable to extend additional induce-
ments to further stimulate the seeding of spring wheat. It was also 
believed that the price of $ 2. 20 determined by the President's committee 
for the 191 7 crop would be a fairer price for the 1918 crop than would the 
l Ibid. , p. 64. 
2 The fair price was defined as one which was high enough to yield 
a-- reasonable return to the producer but which would not cause the consum-
ing public to suffer unduly. This price was determined by an independent 
committee of twelve men, none of whom were connected with either the 
Grain Corporation or the Food Administration. For an excellent discus-
sion of the determination of the "fair" price for the 1917 wheat crop see: 
Ibid., pp. 64-75. 
3 Ibid., p. 72. 
4 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1936, p. 7. 
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lower price of $2, 00 authorized by Congress. Therefore the President, 
in February, 1918, issued a proclamation extending to the 1918 crop the 
same prices that had been in effect for the 1917 crop. 1 
In order to offset increased operating costs, the railroads, in 
June, 1918, were granted a horizontal increase in freight rates of 25 
per cent. This increase would have penalized wheat growers to the 
extent that freight had to be paid to terminal markets. To minimize the 
effect of this advance on wheat growers, the President increased the 
guaranteed price at the principal. markets. This raised the basic price 
of No. 1 Northern at Chicago from $ 2. 20 to $ 2. 26 per bushel. 2 There 
were, of course, proportionate increases at other markets and for other 
grades. 
A record breaking acreage of some 61 million acres was harvested 
in 1918. Total production was some 904 million bushels, our second 
largest crop up to that date. 3 It appeared that we had wheat enough to 
meet our own needs and those of the Allies. We exported about 277 mil-
lion bushels that year. 4 This was a situation completely different from 
the one that had confronted us in 1917. It was possible, therefore, to 
1 Surface, The Grain Trade Duri.ng the World War, pp. 113-114, 
520-521. 
2 Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 166. 
3 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1936, p. 6. 
4 
Ibid., p. 6. 
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make fundamental changes in wheat control and production policy. How-
ever, since there was reason to believe that the war might continue for 
many months, or even years, it was considered advisable to accumulate 
a substantial wheat reserve to meet possible future needs. 
In July, 1918, the President requested the Agricultural. Advisory 
Committee to study the wheat situation and to make recommendations 
regarding a price guarantee for the 1919 crop. The Committee, on 
August 9, 1918, submitted a resolution proposing that a. minimum price 
of $2. 46 per bushel for No. 1 Northern Spring wheat or its equivalent, 
based on Chicago delivery, be fixed for the 1919 crop. This proposed 
increase over the Congressional guarantee of $ 2. 00, as had been pro-
vided in the Food Control Bill for the 1918 crop, was opposed by consumer 
groups. It was their opinion that the farmer was receiving a fair return 
for his efforts and that such an increase in price would constitute an 
undue burden upon consumers in this country and, also, upon the Allied 
Powers. Herbert Hoover, Food Administrator, suggested that the Presi-
dent compromise by extending the 1918 Chicago market guarantee of 
$2. 26 to the 1919 crop instead of the $2. 00 as provided in the law under 
the Food Control Bill. On September 2, 1918, President Wilson issued 
a proclamation extending the price guarantee of $2. 26 per bushel based 
on No. 1 Northern at Chicago to all wheat harvested in 1919 and marketed 
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before June 1, 1920. 1 The Armistice was signed in less than thre~ 
months after this proclamation. was issued. 
Early Postwar Developments 
The extension of the guaranteed price, backed by its success in 
two previous years and the increased returns to farmers, along with 
war propaganda calling for more production, :tesulted in a greatly 
increased seeded acreage for the 1919 crop, The area planted to all 
wheat (winter and spring) amounted to over 77 million acres, by far the 
largest ever seeded in the United States. 2 Wartime demands stimulated 
expansion of wheat growing and led to a marked revival of wheat culture 
in sections where wheat land had beer! converted to other uses. This 
expansion was accomplished at the expense of other small grains, flax-
seed, and corn; also by ubreaking1·1 grassland i.n the west.' 3 
In the spring of 1919 the prospects were for a. record .. breaki.ng 
crop. With large stocks of wheat in Australia and Argentina, along with 
a release of shipping facilities making it possible to place it on the market. 
1 Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War. pp. 146-147. 
For text of this proclamation see pp. 525-526. For a detailed account 6f 
legislative attempts to raise the guaranteed price of wheat for the 1919 
crop above the guarantee for the 1918 crop see Ibid~, pp. 315-355. 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistks, 
1952, p. 2. 
3 Henry C. Wallace, ''The Wheat Situation, 11 Agriculture Yearbook, 
1923 (Washington. 1924), pp. 130-137. 
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it appeared t hat t he world p rice of wheat m i ght fall be low the guaranteed 
price . The Government, if it were to maintain its pledge to the wheat 
producers, would lose considerable money and would need additional 
storage facilities to handle the crop . This situation resulted in Congress 
passing the "Wheat Guarantee Act." This Act amplified the powers of 
the President in respect to controlling the marketing and distribution of 
wheat and provided an appropriation of one b i llion dollars for carrying 
out the price guarantee for the 1919 crop. 1 
The Food Administration Grain Corporation had been designated to 
carry out only the guarantee for the 1918 crop; this guarant ee expired on 
June 1, 1919 . It was therefore necessary for the President to create or 
designate an agency to carry out the 1919 guarantee. On May 14, 1919, 
the President issued an executive order creating the position of United 
States Wheat Director . The Director was given such powers as might 
be required to effectuate the 1919 wheat price guarantee. This executive 
order also discontinued the Food Administration Grain Corporation, 
effective June 30, 1919, and created its successor, the United States 
Grain Corporation. 2 
1 Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War, pp . 149-155. 
The official title of the "Wheat Guarantee Act" was : ''An Act to enable 
the President to carry out the price guarantees made to producers of 
wheat of the crops of 1918 and 1919 and to protect the United States 
against undue enhancements of its liabilities thereunder . " Ibid., p. 154. 
2 Surface, The Stabilization of the P rice of Wheat During the War 
and Its Effect Upon the Returns to the Producer, pp . 36-37. 
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The 1919 harves t of 952 million bushels was our s econd lar gest, 
though far from the 1, 250 m illion bushels predicted early in t he growing 
season. At the high prices prevailing in 1919 thi s crop had a farm value 
of over $ 2 billion, more than twice the dollar value of the 1915 record 
1 crop. This relatively large crop was marketed with fewer problems 
than had been anticipated. Foreign markets were more r eceptive than 
had been expected, and, since shipping was not released from war 
activities as rapidly as had been anticipated, the movement of accumu-
lated wheat stocks from the Southern Hemisphere was delayed. 
Another factor which contributed to the successful disposal of the 
1919 crop was a temporary increase in domestic consumption of wheat 
and wheat products. 2 After the Armistice , partly as a reaction against 
the restrictions of the war peri od, there was a greatly increased demand 
for wheat flour, especially of the better grades. This was augmented by 
the high purchasing power of consumers during the post-war boom. Total 
domestic consumption of wheat for food rose from a pre-war average of 
474 million bushels to 566 m i llion. 3 Net exports of wheat and flour were 
1 United States Department of Agriculture , Agricultural Statistics, 
1952, p. 2. 
2 In 1919 domestic cons umpti on of wheat was 6. 9 bushe ls per capita, 
. 7 bushel more than the preceding year. By 1920 the per capita consump-
tion had dropped to 4. 6 bushels . U. S. Congress, House, The Agricul-
tural Crisis and Its Causes, Report of the Joint Commission of Agricul-
tural Inquiry, 67 Congress, 1 s es,s., House Report No . 408, Part I, 
October 15, 1921 (Was hington, 1921) , p . 157 . 
3 Surface, The Grain Trade During the Wor ld War, p. 159. 
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equivale nt to about 216 million bushels. 1 These factors enabled the 
Grain Corporation to dispose of a considerable portion of our surplus 
wheat and to maintain the guaranteed price without any loss to the 
Treasury. 2 However, without the support of the guarantee the price 
would have fallen. Surface points out that 
... the Grain Corporation found it necessary, in the protection of the 
guaranteed price, to purchase more than 138,000,000 bushels of wheat. 
If this quantity of wheat had been offered on the market, without the 
protecti on afforded by the Grain Corporation buying, the price would 
inevitably have gone well below the guaranteed level. 3 
The Wheat Guarantee Act had provided " ... that after June first, 
nineteen hundred and twenty, neither the President nor any agency act-
ing for him shall purchase or contract for the purchase of wheat flour. 114 
In order to comply with the law it was, therefore, necessary to terminate 
the functioning of the United States Grain Corporation as of June 1, 1920. 
After a three-year period in which individual interprise had been highly 
restricted, the wheat market was returned to commercial channels. 
Trading in futures on the Chicago Board of Trade was resumed on 
5 July 15, 1920. 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1936, p. 6. 
2 Surface, The Stabilization of the Price of Wheat l)uring the War 
and Its Effect Upon the Returns to the Producer, p. 18. 
3 Ibid., p. 18. 
4 Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War, pp. 512-513. 
5 Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 166. 
CHAPTER III 
AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS AND 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE EARLY 1920 1s 
The Postwar Boom 
During 1919 and the first half of 1920 many of the wartime forces 
continued to operate in the agricultural market. Europe, hungry and 
ill clothed, presented an enormous demand for our agricultural products. 
European purchasing power, supported by generous extensions of credit 
from the United States, provided an effective and active market for many 
of our agricultural products. Farmers continued to produce in abundance 
and, despite large crops, prices continued to rise. Prices of farm pro-
ducts reached their highest level in July, 1919, when they rose to 246 
per cent of the 1913 base. Approximately a year later, May, 1920, the 
highest point of the all-commo<;iity index, 272 per cent above the 1913 
1 
base, was reached. 
Domestic trade flourished and farmers bought expensive cars, 
trucks, tractors, and farm machinery. Farm land was in great demand 
and active speculation carried prices to extremely high levels. This was 
accompanied by a heavy increase in the amount of mortgage debt. There 
1 U. S. Congress, House, The Agricultural Crisis and Its Causes, 
Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 67 Congress, 
1 sess., House R e port No. 408, Part I, Oct obe r 15, 1921 (Washington, 
1921), p. 29. 
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was a s imilar boom in the purebred livestock industry and fantastic 
prices were paid for breeding animals. 1 
The Postwar Slump 
In the fall of 1920, the postwar boom-market which had endured 
while credits granted to Europe remained unexpended and while, at home, 
citizens were using bonds to buy goods, came to an end. 2 European buyers 
not only reduced their purchases in this country, but they also turned to 
other sources of supply. Agricultural prices in the United States dropped 
severely and land values plunged downward. Farmers had used credit 
freely in buying more land and equipment and had set aside little as a 
surplus to offset any possible losses in commodity prices. They found 
themselves, shortly, with over - expanded acreages and heavy burdens of 
debt and taxation. 3 
The Secretary of Agriculture reported a shrinkage in the total 
value of all crops from $ 16 billion in 1919 to nearly $ 13 billion in 19 2 0. 4 
1 Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-
1950 (New York, 1953), p. 168. 
2 Chester C. Davis, "The Development of Agricultural Policy Since 
the End of the World War, n Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940 (Washington, 
1940) , p. 299. 
3 For an excellent discussion of the causes and extent of the depres-
sion which began in 1920, see Henry C . Wallace, Our Debt and Duty to the 
Farmer (New York, 1925), pp. 26-89; also see G. F. Warren, 11 The Agri-
cultural Depression, " Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXVIII (Feb:vuary, 
1924), pp . 183-213. 
4 United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook, 1920 (Wash-
ington, 1921), p . 17. 
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At the same time there was a tremendous increase in taxes which, along 
with smaller incomes , added a burden that was extremely difficult for 
farmers to carry. In 1921 taxes were approximately one-third of the 
farm receipts less expenses other than taxes . In 1913, they were only 
about one-tenth of these farm receipts. 1 Furthermore, old debts had to 
be paid with income from products th~t brought sharply lower prices. 2 
Confronted with this array of contracting economic perspectives, farmers 
began to turn to the Federal Government for relief. 
The Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry 
In June, 1921, Congress created a Joint Commission of Agricul-
tural Inquiry which was directed to investigate and report to Congress 
upon the following: 
(1) The causes of the present conditi on of agriculture. 
(2) The cause of the difference between the prices of agricultural 
products paid to the producer and the ultimate cost to the 
consumer. 
(3) The comparative condition of industries other than agriculture. 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook, 1922 
(Washington, 1923), p. 7. 
2 The farmer's condition in 1920, measured by the purchasing 
power of his dollar (including food and farm products with all other pro-
ducts), was only 89 per cent of its 1913 magnitude. This V{as worse than 
in any other year since 1901, with the exception of 1903 and 1906. U. S. 
Congress, House, The Agricultural Crisis and Its Causes, Report of the 
Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, p. 31. By April, 1921, the 
purchasing power of all farm products in terms of all commodities 
(excluding food and farm products), was down to 63 per cent as compared 
to prewar. Ibid., p. 27. 
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(4) The relation of prices of c ommodities pther tha n agricultural 
products to such product s. 
(5) The banking and financial resources and credits of the country, 
especially as affecting agricultural credits. 
·(6) The marketing and transportation facilities of the country. 1 
In October, 1921, the Commission submitted a voluminous analysis 
of the situation. The inquiry was divided into four main parts: The 
Agricultural Crisis and Its Causes; Credit; Transportation; and Marketing 
and Distribution. 2 
The Commission attributed the distress of agriculture primarily to 
the general business depression which began in 1920. Overproduction or 
overmarketing of farm products in 1920 was not deemed to be an impor-
tant cause of the subsequent price decline. 3 In its report the Commission 
remarked that "business cycles of alternating great prosperity and sue-
ceeding great depression, such as that from which we are now emerging, 
have occurred in a more or less regular way among all modern highly 
organized nations. 114 Commenting upon the Commission11s interpretation 
1~., p. 9. 
2 U. S. Congress, House, Report of the Joint Commission of 
Agricultural Inquiry, 67 Congress, 1 sess., House Report No. 408, 
Part I, October 15, 1921 (Washington, 1921); Part II, October 14, 1921 
(Washington, 1922); Part III, October 15, 1921 (Washington, 1922); 
Part IV, October 15, 1921 (Washington, 1922). 
3 Chester C. Davis, "The Development of Agricultural Policy 
Since the End of the World War," Yearbook of Agricultu.re, 1940, 
p. 300. 
4 U. S. Congress , House, The Agricultural Crisis and Its Causes, 
Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, p. 11. 
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of the difficult ies in terms of business cycle phenomena rather than of 
world-wide disorganization resulting from war, Benedict states: 
The Commiss ion ... missed the point of the whole inquiry .... 
It had not yet recognized that this was no ordinary business cycle nor 
that farmers would have little patience with proposals to let the situation 
be worked out through the s low and painful process of uncontrolled 
economic forces. 1 
The Commission submitted recommendations for legislation which, 
i n its opinion, would tend to remedy the existing difficulties. The recom-
mendations placed emphasis upon a c onservative long-term program of 
agricultural legislation, not upon measures to deal with emergency 
situations. The Commission 's foremost recommendations were for 
I 
clarification of the legal pos ition of farmers' cooperatives beyond that 
provided by the Clayton Amendment of 1914, legalizing c ooperative com-
binations of farmers , for the creation of intermediate credit banks, and 
the lowering of fre ight rates on a gricultural pr oducts. 2 It was the Com-
mission's belief that improvement in conditions could not ". . . be 
brought about by legislative formulas , but must be the result for the 
most part of the interplay of economic forces. 113 
1 Benedict , Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 201. 
2 For a summary of the Commission ts findings and their recom-
mendations see .u. S. Congress, House, The Agricultural C risis and Its 
Causes, Report of the Joint Commiss ion of Agricultural Inquiry, pp. 10-
25. The legislative proposals made by the Commission were in keeping 
with those of the major farm organizations, possibly in the main merely 
a reflecti on of the views then held by the leaders of the various farm 
groups. See Benedict , Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, 
p. 201. 
3 U. S. Congress, House, The Agricultural Crisis and It s Causes, 
Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, p . 11. 
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The Farm Bloc 
Although organized farmers were not a significant factor in policy 
making during the years of World War I, the increasing severity of dis-
tress in farm areas during the early postwar years soon brought the 
farm organizations to grips with the f~rm problem. Seeking a panacea 
for the farmers"' plight, they did not overlook the possibility of federal 
aid. 
In May, 1921, Grey Silver, Washington representative of the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, met wit,h a group of senators from 
the dominantly agricultural states to consider ways of effectuating the 
legislative programs desired by the agricultural organizations. This 
meeting resulted in the formation of a nfarm bloc, 11 which was to wield 
much power and exert a powerful influence upon the course of farm 
legislation in the succeeding years. 1 
Pressure from the Bloc resulted in the enactment of a number of 
measures which farm leaders hoped would promote the more profitable 
1 Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley 
& Los Angeles, 1953), p. 57. 
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~arketing of agricultural products. 1 Ace to Hicks, pr:Lncipal 
measures promoted by the B Ioc had as their purpose either the easement 
'"l 
of rural credits or the promotion of cooperative marketing.,:, 
The Capper-Volstead Act 
As a result of wa.rtime overexpansion of productive capacity and 
the subsequent loss of foreign markets; as well as other factors, agri-
culture was faced with readjustments of major proportions after the 
price collapse of 1920. This situation precipitated a crisis in agricul-
ture which led to a multitude of attempts to improve and stabi.lize agri-
cultural prices. In the early 192oirs the idea of 11 orderly marketing" had 
become popular in agricultural circles. This interest was given further 
impetus by the widely publ:icized 11Sapiron campaign for the organization 
of cooperative selling agencies on regional, national, and commodity-
wide bases. 3 The attack on the California Associated Raisin Company 
in 1920, under the Sherman law, along with the elements of monopoly 
1 Farm group pressure was strong and the Bloc soon became 
important politically. Within a period of only three months after its 
organization, five measures advocated by the Bloc were passed. These 
were: (1) The Packers and Stockyards Act; (2) The Futures Trading Act; 
(3) The Emergency Agricultural Credits Act; (4) An amendment to the 
Farm Loan Act raising the interest on Federal Land Bank bonds., to the 
investor, from 5 to 5 1 / 2 per cent, with.out lncreasing the rate to the 
borrower; (5) Another amendment to the Farm Loan Act increasing the 
capital of the Federal Land Banks and authorizing an increase in the 
maximum size of loan. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 
1790-1950, pp. 182-183. . . 
2 John D. Hicks, The American Nation (Boston, 1949), p. 547. 
3 Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, pp. 
184, 194·.:.195_ 
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principle embodied i.n the Sapiro approach, gave ri.se to the demand that 
agricultural cooperatives be given greater protection against the opera-
tion of the antitrust laws and that the legal standing and limitations of 
cooperative associations be more clearly defined. 1 
These influences were instrumental in the pas~age of the Capper-
Volstead Act in February, 1922. This Act strengthened the legal posi,-
tion of cooperatives with respect to antitrust legislation and set forth 
the conditions under which they might engage in interstate commerce~ 2 
To reap the benefits of the Act, it was necessary that members conform 
to one or both of two requirements: (1) that no member be allowed more 
than one vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital 
owned by him, and (2) that the association not pay dividends on stock or 
membership capital in excess of 8 per cent per annum. It was also 
necessary that the cooperative association should not deal in the products 
of nonmembers to an amount greater in value than that which was handled 
for members. The Secretary of Agriculture was to administer the Act. 3 
The Agricultural Credits Act 
Agitation for marketing reform was paralleled by demands for 
further improvement in credit facilities for agriculture. Agricultural 
1 Dudley F. Pegrum, The Regulation of Industry (Chicago, 1949), 
pp. 255-256. 
2 Henry H. Bakken and Marvin A. Schaars, The Economics of 
Cooperative Marketing (New York and London, 1937), pp. 281-283. 
3 For a copy of this Act see Ibid., pp. 555-556. -·.-
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leaders contended that contraction of credit had been a principal factor 
in the drastic price decline of 1920 and 1921. They were strongly of the 
opinion that the farmers' financial problem could have been alleviated 
substantially if operating credit, providing loans for terms correspond-
ing to the length of the production period, and at rates comparable to 
those paid by businessmen, had been available. This resulted in the 
passage of the Agricultural Credits Act in 1923. 
This Act provided for the estabUshment of twelve Federal Inter-
mediate Credit Banks designed to tap the money market of the nation 
through the sale of short -term debenture bonds secured by the general 
assets of the Banks and chattel mortgages on farm property. The pro-
ceeds from the sale of these debentures were to be loaned to commerci.al 
banks and other credit agencies on the security of agricultural paper 
held by the local lenders. These banks were to be intermediate not only 
in the sense of standing between the investment markets and the local 
lending agencies but intermediate also in the maturity terms of the loans. 
Commercial banks up to this time had been able to rediscount agricul-
tural paper with Federal Reserve Banks with maturities not to exceed 
six months. The Intermediate Credit Banks were empowered to make 
loans having maturities from six months to as long as three years to 
meet the liquidation characteristics of farming and also to make, loans to 
agricultural cooperative business associations. 
The basic function of the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks was 
soundly conceived but in their early years they failed to provide the 
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degree of assistance to agriculture which had been expected of them. 
They could not lend directly to :i.ndividual farmers. Loans had to be made 
through local agencies such as finance corporations, commercial banks, 
or livestock loan companies. The Act made specific provision whereby 
local groups could form agricultural credit corporations for the sole 
purpose of obtaining funds through the Intermediate Credit Banks, but 
comparatively few were formed. 1 This was partly because the capital 
stock requirement was rather high for farmer groups and partly because 
commercial bank credit became more readily available s.oon after the 
passage of the Agricultural Credi.ts Act. 
The volume of loans made by the Intermediate Credit Banks to 
commercial banks was small. Murray cites four reasons for this:· 
(1) Many of the loans in the commercial banks were not suitable for pur-
chase by the Intermediate Credit Banks; (2) the commercial banks were 
not interested in having their profit margins limited to the 1. 5 per cent 
limit at first provided by the Act; (3) the practice of submitting to cer-
tain examination requirements of the Intermediate Credit Banks was not 
entirely acceptable to the comme.rcial banks; (4) commercial banks which 
could meet the conditions imposed by the Intermediate Credit Banks could 
usually obtain credit from other banks, 2 and, most important, the Act 
1 Emil Samuel Troelston, The Principles of Farm Finance (Saint 
Louis, 1951), p. 198. 
2 William G. Murray, Agricultural Finance (Ames, Iowa, 1953), 
pp. 320-322. 
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which created the Intermediate Credit Banks also amended the Federal 
Reserve Act to allow Reserve Banks to rediscount agricultural paper 
having maturities up to nine months instead of the original six. 
Although in the 1920 1s these banks did not succeed in lending the 
volume of funds which had been anticipated, they nevertheless did make 
up part of the deficiency in farm production credit and eventually pro-
vided an important channel through which funds from the central. money 
markets were made available for non,-real estate credit needs. 
A More "Radkal11 Approach to the Farm Problem 
During the early 1920 6s, action on the part of legi.slatot's and farm 
leaders was along traditicmal lines. The Administration did not encour-
age di.rect assumption of responsibility for the well-being of agricultural 
interests by the Federal Government. In Ms opening address to the 
National Agricultural Conference which was held in Washington in 
January, 1922, President Harding said: 
It cannot be too strongly urged that the farmer must be ready to 
help himself. Thi.s conference would do most lasting good if it would 
find ways to i.mpress the great mass of farmers to avail themselves of 
the best methods. By this I mean that, in the last analysis, legislation 
can do little more than give the farmer the chance to organize and help 
himself. 1 
Such was the philosophy of the Admi.nistration so far as the farm 
problem was concerned. 
1 U. So Congress, House, Report of the National Agricultural 
Conference, 67 Congress, 2 sess., House Document No. 195, Vol. 115., 
March 3, 1922 (Washington, 1922), p. 10. 
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Throughout the early 1920lis, farm production remained high and 
foreign markets continued depressed. To many it seemed logical that 
American farm markets should be insulated from the depressing effects 
of these foreign markets. Pressure from t'epresentatives of the western 
farmers resulted in the enactment of the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921. 
This Act provided for sharp increases in the duties on wheat as well as 
several other agricultural products. It also prohibited the dumping of 
foreign goods i.n the United States. This Act was merely a stopgap 
measure. A more thoroughgoing tariff revision was effected by the 
Fordney-McCumber Act, passed in 1922. This particular Act pl.aced 
the tariff on wheat at 30 cents per bushel. 1 
These measures, however, did not seem to be alleviating the 
farmersi problems. Agrarian leaders began to search for a nscheme" 
that would boost prices and help the farmer receive a fair share of the 
national income. It was apparent that more radical measures were 
needed--Federal Government ai.d directly available to farmers--to cope 
with the maladies of the agricultural industry. 
During the early ye~rs of the decade, there was a continuous 
attempt to get the Federal Government to shoulder responsibility for aiding 
. commodity markets. It was the belief of many that the exportable surplus 
was the chief cause of the farmers'( problems. The wheat surplus w;;ts a 
1 For discussion of these Acts see Hicks, The. American Nation, 
p. 529; Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, 
pp .. 202-205. 
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prime example of this belief. Wheat production in the United States 
greatly exceeded amounts required for domestic consumption, and the 
surplus had to be sold on the world market in competition with other 
wheat producing nations. Consequently, prices received by wheat 
farmers were dependent upon world-wide conditions of demand and 
supply. Prices in the United States differed from world prices only by 
the cost of transportation to a given foreign port. 
It was recognized that an adjustment of farm production to the 
new conditions of demand was in order. At the National Agricultural 
Conference of 1922, the committee on agrkulture and price relations 
reported in part: 
The manufacturer has in the past quickly adjusted his production 
to price recessions while the farmer has not. When farm production 
is so large that the product can not ~anno!] be sold for prices that will 
maintain a. reasonable standard of living on the farms, the supply is too 
large. We recommend that the farmers and the farm organizations 
consider the problem of world supply and demand and make comprehen-
sive plans for p:roduction programs so that they may be able r'io advise 
their members .as to the probable demand for staples, and to propose 
measures for proper limitation of acreage in particular cropsJ tt as 
pointed out by the President of the United States. 1 
Thus it was recognized that demand had shrunk fr·om its w.artime 
level. However, little effort was directed toward reducing output, at' 
'·, 
to increasing the food-buying power of our awn low-income groups, or 
to :making possible larger nonagricultural imports so as to .increase the 
1 
U. S. Congress, House, Report of the National Agricultural 
Conference, pp. 137'."'138. 
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purchasing power of still hungry foreign nations. 1 Instead, the main 
emphasis of the proposed legislation was on artificial supports for the 
weak foreign market which was confronting farmers. 
A number of legislative proposals for raising farm prices were 
put forward during the early years of the 1920ls. Among them wer'e the 
Norris Bill which proposed establishing .a Gover·nment. corporation to 
buy farm products in the United States for cash and sell them abr:oad on 
time; the Christopherson Bill which proposed that the Government 
establish a price for each major farm product~ and buy up any surplus; 
·. not sold at that price;. the Ladd-Sinclair Bill which proposed that the 
United States G~ain Co'rporation buy up sufficient quantities of specified 
commodities to make it possible for producers to sell at fixed minimum 
prices (which were to cover production costs plus a nreasonable" profit); 
the Gooding Bill which proposed the formation of a Government capital-
iz:ed corpor13,tion to buy wheat produced in 1923, 1924, and 1925; p;nd the 
Little Bill which proposed the appropriation of Federal funds with which 
the Secretary of Agriculture was to buy and store wheat ,at a price of 
$1. 40 to $1. 50 per bushel, providing the price fell below that leyel. 2 
There were also others. 
The most publicized proposal for ~n advantageous disposal of our 
exportable surplus, however, was embddied in a price-raising plan 
1 Benedi.ct, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, ,.p. 207. 
2 For a summary of the proposals provided in these bills see Ibid., 
pp. 198-199, 207-208. ---
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developed by George N. Peek,, president of the Moline Plow Company, 
.a:nd Hugh S. Johnson, his assistant and general counsel. Peek and 
Johns.on believed that they had developed a plan for "equality fo:r agricul-
ture.'' Their ideas, outlined in a p~mphlet entitled Equality for Agr1:-
culture. later became the basis for the celebrated McNary-Haugen 
Bills which we.re highly controversial issues. in farm legislation during 
the .second half of the dec~de of the 1920As. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE McNARY-HAUGEN PROPOSALS 
The Plan 
Peek and Johnson emphasized that agricultural tariffs did not affprd 
protection to farm crops of which the United States produced a surplus. 
In order for a tariff to be effective, they argued, domestic producers 
had to be able to determine prices behind tariff walls. Our tariff was 
not giving that kind of protection. Fite explains their point: 
For instance, the world price of wheat determined the dome.stic 
price, despite the tariff, because American surpluses forced the home 
m.arket down to world levels. But while producers of surplus farm 
commodities had to take world prices, they were required to buy manu-
factured goods in a protected market, where industrial tariffs were 
effective and caused higher prices. In other words, farmers were buy-
ing in a protected market and selling in the competitive markets of the 
world. The result was a marked disparity . between agriculture 
and industry. 1 
Peek and Johnson proposed a two-price plan for surplus agrlcul-
tural products. They .summari.zed the principal features of their 
proposals as follows: 
The doctrine of protection must be revi.sed to insure agriculture 
equality of tariff protection and a fair exchange value with othe.r com-
modities, on the domestic market., or the protective principle mµst 
perish. 
1 Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity 
(Norman, Oklahoma, 1953), pp. 38-39, 
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It can be so revised only by some plan, in respect of surplus crops, 
to equalize supply with demand on the domestic market, at not to exceed 
fair exchange value with other commodities, to protect that value by a 
tariff, and to divert surplus to export and sell it at world price. 1 
The McNary-Haugen plan which proposed a legal framework for 
the ideas outlined by Peek and Johnson, was designed to make the agri-
cultural tariff effective by establishin.g a two-price system for American 
agricultural products, a tariff-protected price for the home market and 
a world price for the foreign market. An agricultural export corporation, 
working with a capital of $ 200 mill.ion supplied by the Government, was 
to be established. This corporation was to be empowered to buy and to 
sell specified surplus agricultural commodities2 on a scale great enough 
to raise the domestic price up to the ''ratio-price. n 
The ratio-price was to be based on pre·-war averages and was 
defined as the amount which would bear the same relation to the general 
price level as the price of the commodity supported had borne to the 
general price level in the period just prior to the World War. The ratio-
price was free to increase or decrease as the general price level 
increased or decreased. Prices were free to go as much above the ratio-
price as supply and demand would deter·mine. Thus, in the strict sense 
1 Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-
1950 (New York, 1953), p. 209, quoting from George N. Peek and Hugh 
S. Johnson, Equali.ty for Agriculture, 2nd edition (Moline, Illinois, 1922), 
p. 3. 
2 In the first McNary-Haugen Bill, the commodities specifi.ed were 
wheat, flour, corn, raw cotton, woot, cattle, sheep, and swine--or any 
food product manufactured from cattle, sheep or swine. See Darwin N. 
KeUey, ''McNary-Haugen Bills, 1924-1928/1 Agricultural History, XIV 
(October, 1940), p. 174. 
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of the term., the plan was not a price-fixing scheme as was claimed by 
some of its opponents. However, it was price-fixing to the extent that 
prices were not to be allowed to fall below the ratio-price in the home 
market. 
Whenever the domestic price of a basic farm commodity, wheat 
for example, became lower than the ratio-price, the corporation was to 
purchase the surplus at the ratio-price. By buying on large enough 
scale., the domestic price of wheat would be brought up to the ratio-price. 
The corporation would then sell the wheat abroad at whatever price pre-
vailed in the world market. The corporation would suffer a loss on the 
wheat exported by an amount equal to the difference between the domestic 
price (the ratio-price) and the world price. The loss sustained was to be 
paid by the farmers themselves through the payment of an equalization 
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fee on each bushel of wheat they sold. 1 The plan included a flexible 
tariff provision which authoriz ed the President to raise the rate suffici-
ently to protect the corporation in its operations. The tariff was to be 
at least equal to the difference between the domestic ratio-price and the 
1 The ori ginal McNary-Haugen Bill, as introduced in the House , 
provided a scrip device fo r collecting the equalizat i on fee. According 
t o this plan, the purchaser of each basic commodity was required to pay 
the amount of the fee in scrip, which could be purchased at any postoffice. 
However, before Congress ional debate started, the House Committee 
voted t o e lim inate the scrip provision. Instead of forcing buyers of farm 
commodities to purchase scrip with which to pay part of the selling price, 
farmers were to be paid cash for their products and receive an "equali-
zation certificate" for the amount of the fee. If the losses incurred 
through exporting the surplus were less than the corporation had esti-
mated, they (the far mers) would be paid a pro rata amount on their 
c e rtificates. Actually, the subs titution of equalization certificates for 
scrip made little diffe r ence in the final analysis. In either case the 
objective r emained t he same- - to provide farmers the "ratio-price" less 
a proportionate share of the loss on the quantity exported. According to 
F ite, " ... the change was made for political reasons, s ince there was 
bitter opposition to the t erm 'script' ~cri:e} . 11 F ite, George N. Peek 
and the F ight for Farm Parity, p. 63. Also see Ibid., p. 61. For an 
excellent descripti on of how the scrip p lan was to operate see Benedict, 
Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, pp . 213-214. 
The second McNary-Haugen B ill, as introduced, dropped the pro-
vision for the use of scrip as the means of c ollecting the equalizati on fee. 
This bill did not come to a vote in Congress. See Black, Agricultural 
Reform in the United States, pp . 71, 234. 
The third McNary-Haugen B i.11, 1926, often referred to as the 
11Committee Bill, 11 provided that losses from surplus di sposal operations 
were to be financed through an initial revolving fund of $375 million. This 
fund was to be maintained by means of equalization fees assessed against 
each of the commodities handled, either when sold t o first handlers or 
when processed. Unde r this plan a tax would be levied on each unit of the 
commodity sold. The proceeds of these "taxes" would go into a fund t o 
be used in absorbi ng losses resulting from sales abroad at less than the 
domestic pric e. See Benedict, Farm Polic ie s of the United States, 1790-
1950, pp. 224- 22 5. 
56 
price on the world market. 1 Thi s provision was essentia l , otherwise 
wheat could be imported at a profit. The proposal made no provision for 
control of production of surplus commodities . 
The McNary-Haugen plan was complicated, but Peek had a "knack" 
of making it sound both s imple and convincing, especially when applied 
to the marketing of wheat. Explaining how wheat growers could secure 
the advantage of the tariff in the domestic market, i.e., world price plus 
the amount of the tariff, Peek wrote : 
'' ... America raises about 800 , 000 , 000 bushels of wheat. Of 
this production we use at home about 650, 000, 000 bushels. The remain-
i ng 150, 000, 000 must be marketed abroad. If the world price is $1 a 
bushel, then the farmer gets not merely $1 on 150, 000, 000 bushels, but 
on 800, 000, 000 bushels. His total crop revenue is $ 800, 000, 000 and the 
1 Peek had at first emphasi zed the principle of making the tariff 
effective for agriculture, but the first McNary-Haugen Bill stressed the 
ratio-price i dea. Proponents of the bill were not anxious to raise the 
general tariff problem (whic h was political dynamite at that time) and 
hoped to avoid it by concentrating on principles of equality and fair ex-
change· value. Fite , George N. Peek and the F i ght for Farm Parity, 
p. 61. 
In the second McNary-Haugen B i.11, 1925, the price objective 
shifted from the rat io-price p lan to the policy of making exi s ting tariff 
duties effective in domest ic prices . Thi s would s imply give fa r mers 
the world price, plus the tariff. The ratio - price feature was dropped 
in hope of avoiding charges of pri ce -fixing. Peek explained later that 
the change was made for political reasons. However, he (Peek) was 
never satisfied with the change because domestic price plus tariff might 
not be equal to the ratio-price and, in his estimation, nothing less than 
the ratio-price was fair t o American agriculture. Ibid ., p. 108. Also 
see Black, Agricultur a l Reform in the United States~ 234. 
( 
Commenting on this change, Benedict states: "'World price plus 
the tariff m i ght be higher or lower than the "ratio - price, ' but was more 
easily understood and more in keeping with the prevailing policy of tariff 
protection for American indt.stri.es" Benedict, Farm Policies of the 
United States, 1790 - 1950, p. 225. 
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existence of a 42-cent tariff does not alter the case practically. But let 
us assume that the McNary-Haugen plan is operating, that the surplus i s 
segregated i n the market, and that the price rises to $1. 40 a busheL 
The total revenue now would be $1,120,000,000, an improvement of 
$320,000,000. However, there would still . .. [baj 150, 000,000 
bushels of wheat that would have to be sold abroad at $1 a bushel, the 
assumed world price . It i s plain that a loss would be suffered on this 
surplus wheat of 40 cents a bushel, or $ 60 , 000, 000 in all, plus costs 
of administration. Now the question arises where this money is to be 
found. . .. A charge would be placed against each bushel of wheat 
brought to market at the most convenient point of collection . . . . To 
arrive at this charge , costs and losses would be spread out over the 
whole crop . A total loss of $ 60 , 000, 000 on 800, 000, 000 bushels means 
that each bushel is liable for 7 1 /2 cents. A fee of 8 cents a bushel 
would be ample to cover all possible costs and losses on the operation. 
The elevator man, therefore, being subject to a charge of 8 cents a 
bushel, would be able to bid, not the full $1. 40, but only $1. 32 . The 
farmer would thus get $1. 32 for his wheat, instead of only $1 and his 
crop would be worth $1, 056, 000, 000 instead of $ 800 , 000, 000, a net 
gain of $256 , 000,000 . 1 
It can readily be seen that under this plan the average price 
rece ived by wheat farmers, so long as a surplus was produced, would 
have been less than the world market price plus the tariff. However, if 
no more wheat was produced than that required for domestic consump-
tion, wheat growers would have received the world price plus nearly all 
the tariff. Thus the tariff would have been effective. 
Endorsement of the Plan 
On November 14, 1923, the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry C. 
Wallace, gave his first public endorsement of Peek ls export proposal 
in an address before the Chicago Association of Commerce. 2 Additional 
1 George N. Peek, " The McNary-Haugen Plan for Relief, 11 Cur-
rent History, XXIX (November, 1928) , pp . 275-276. 
2 Fite , George N. Peek and the F ight for Farm Parity~ p . 57 . 
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and stronger endorsements were to follow. 1 On November 23, the 
Secr etary delivered to the Presi dent a report on the wheat situation in 
which he officially recommended that the Government set up an export 
corporation to handle surplus agricultural crops. The closing para-
graphs of the report stated: 
Inasmuch as the first step looking toward increasing the domestic 
prices requires the dispositi on of t he surplus over and above domestic 
needs, and inasmuch as the facts presented in the foregoing pages 
indicate that the world production of wheat will probably be over-large 
for another year or so, the suggestion that the Government set up an 
export corporation t o aid in the dispositi on of this surplus i s worthy of 
the most careful consideration. Such a corporation necessarily would 
need rather broad powers. It would not be necessary t hat it should 
undert ake to handle the entire crop, and it could probably carry on its 
activities in cooperation with exi sting private agencies . If it should be 
found necessary to arrange for the sale of the surplus exported at a 
price much lower than the domestic price, the loss so incurred would 
properly be distributed over the entire crop. 
The prime duty of such an export corporation would be to restore, 
so far as possible, the pre-war ratio between wheat, and other farm 
products of which we export a surplus , and other commodities. Its 
activit ies would therefore expand or c ontract according as the relative 
prices for farm products varied with other c ommodities, and it would 
cease to function as pre-war ratios become fairly well restored. 2 
1 See Henry C . Wallace, Our Debt and Duty to the Farmer (New 
York, 1925) , pp . 192-213. 
Wallace, later, received severe criticism from a colleague for 
his endorsement of the McNary-Haugen proposal. Herbert Hoover, who 
thought of the bill as a dangerous change in the traditional relationship 
between economics and government, wrote in his Memoirs, "My col-
league, the Secretary of Agricu lture [Henry C. Wallacaj, was in truth 
a fascist , but di d not know it, when he proposed his price-and di stri-
bution-fixing legislation in the McNary-IJaugen bill." See Herbert 
Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, The Cabinet and the Presi-
dency, II (New York, 1952) . p . 174. 
2 Henry C . Wallace, "The Wheat Situation," Agriculture Year-
book, 1923, p . 150. 
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The McNary-Haugen Bills in Congress 
The McNary-Haugen proposals were repeatedly before Congress 
during the Coolidge Administration. The bills, in one form or another, 
were intro.duced in Congress five times. 1 Due to committee discussions, 
group pressures, and presidential vetoes, the mechanism for implement-
ing the plan varied considerably in the several bills. However, at no 
time did the advocates of McNary-Haugenism abandon what they consid-
ered the essential ideas; (1) that the centralizing power of the Federal 
Government should be used to assist farmers to dispose of the surplus 
abroad and raise prices to the desired level in the domestic market, and 
(2) that the loss on the segregated exports was to be paid by the farmers 
themselves by means of an equalization fee. 2 
Although earlier drafts of the McNary-Haugen Bill met defeat at 
the hands of Congress, the last two versions, introduced in the 69th 
Congress, 2nd session, 1927, and the 70th Congress, 1st session, 1928, 
were passed by both the House and the Senate. 3 President Coolidge, 
1 The. bills were intr0duced as follows: First bill, 68th Congress, 
1st session, 1924; second bill, 68th Congress, 2nd session, 1925; third 
bill, 69th Congress, 1st session, 1926; fourth bill, 69th Congress, 2nd 
session, 1927; fifth bill, 70th Congress, 1st session, 1928. Benedict,. 
Fa.rm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 212. 
2 Chester C. Davis, 11The Development of Agricultural Policy 
· Since the End of the World War,''· Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940, p. 307. 
3 The first and third McNary-Haugen Bills, 1924, and 1926 respec-
tively, were voted down in Congress. The seco.nd McNary-Ha,ugen Bill, 
1925, did not come to a vote. See Benedict, Farm Policies of the United 
States, 1790-1950, p. 219; Black, Agricultural Reform in the United 
States, pp~ 70-73, 234-236. · 
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however, condemned both bills in blis t ering ve t o messages t o the 
Congress. 1 
In his veto message of the fourth bill, February 25, 1927, the 
Pres ident stated: 
It is axiomatic that progr ess is made through building on the good 
foundat ions that already exist. For many years--indeed, from before 
the day of modern agricultural science--balanced and diversified farm-
ing has been regarded by thoughtful farmers and scientists as the safe-
guard of our agricu lture . The bill under consideration throws this 
aside as of no consequence. It says in effect that all the agricultural 
scientists and all the thinking farmers of the last 50 years are wrong, 
that what we ought to do is not to encourage di.versified agriculture but 
instead put a premium on one-crop farming. 
The measure discriminates definitely against products which 
make up what has been universally considered a program of safe farm-
ing. The bill upholds as ideals of American farming the men who grow 
cotton, corn, rice, swine, tobacco, or wheat, and nothing else. These 
are t o be given special favors at the expense of the farmer who has 
toiled for years to build up a constructi ve farming enterprise to include 
a variety of crops and livestock that shall, so far as possible, be safe, 
and keep the soil, the farmeris chief asset, fertile and productive . 
The bill singles out a few products , chiefly sectional, and pro-
poses to raise the prices of those regardless of the fact that thousands 
of other farmers would be directly penalized. If this i s a true farm 
relief :measure, why does it leave out the producers of beef cattle, 
sheep, dairy products, poultry products, potatoes, hay, fruit, vege-
tables, oats, barley, rye , fla« and the other i mportant agricultural 
lines? So far as the farmers as a whole are concerned, this measure 
i s not for them. It is for certain groups of farmers in certain sections 
1 Although Presi dent Coolidge was quick to veto the McNary-
Haugen Bills , he was reluctant to state what kind of a farm relief plan 
he wanted. In respect to this point, Gil.fond states: "Since the Presi-
dent turned down the McNary-Haugen plan of farm relief, some of its 
sponsors tried to find out what he did want. Nothing could have been 
less fruitful : the P resident was not one to relish other people·'s jobs. 
~Let Congress do what ever they want, 1 he replied, aand send the bill 
over. Jfll look at it and either sign it or veto it. '"' Duff Gilfond, The 
R ise of Saint Calvin (New York, 1932), p. 251. 
of the country. Can it be thought that such legislation ~ould have the 
sanction of the rank and file of the Nation's farmers? 1 
Following this vigorous condemnation of the bill, the President 
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continued with further objections to the measure. They were: (1) that 
it involved governmental fixing of prices; (2) that the plan would be 
impossible, o:r at least difficult, to administer; (3) that the equalization 
fee was not a true tax, but was a tax for the special benefit of pa:t"ticular 
groups and represented an unconstitutional delegation of the taxing 
power of Congress. 2 
A revised measure of the bill, the fifth McNary-Haugen Bill, was 
introduced in the spring of 1928. It was designed to meet the objections 
raised in the Pr,esidenPs 1927 veto message. Despite the objections of 
the President, the equalization fee mechanism for exporting the surplus 
was retained. However. it was to be assessed only if it was impossible 
for the cooperatives to cope with the situation through other methods. 
Also, the legislation was to cover all commodities, not merely those 
designated as basic. 3 
The new proposal was passed by the Senate and House, but, just 
as its predecessor, was vetoed by the President. In his veto message 
1 . 
U. S. Congress, Senate, Surplus Control Act, message from the 
President of the United States, 69 Congress, 2 sess., Senate Document 
No. 214, February 25, 1927 (Washington, 1927), pp. 1-2. 
2 Ibid. , pp. 2-23. 
3 Benedict,. Farm Policies in the United States, 1790-1950, p. 2~9. 
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the President stated that although the bill was less objectionable than 
its predecessor, it still contained the equalization fee and othe.r features 
which were " ... prejudicial ... to sound public policy and to agricul-
ture .... r-il Furthermore, he declared that the revised bill in its 
entirety was 11 ••• little less undesirable than the earlier measure. n2 
He further stated that the measure was unconstitutional, and was '1. . . 
as repugnant as ever to the spirit of our institutions, both political and 
commercial. 11 3 Some of his arguments against the bill, undoubtedly, 
were valid. On the other hand, many of them were irrelevant and 
somewhat naive. 4 Regardless of the validity of his arguments, the veto 
message refllicted a definite point of view regarding the function of 
\ . 
government in economic affairs; namely, the Federal Government should 
not meddle with agricultural prices. 
The President believed that we should avoid seeking in laws the 
solution to the ills of agriculture. "This mistake, 11 he said, "leads 
away from a permanent solution, and serves only to make political 
1 U. S. Congress, Senate, Veto Message Relating to the Agricul-
ture Surplus Control Act, message from the President of the United 
States, 7.0 Congress, 1 sess., Senate Document No. 141, May 3 (calen-
dar day, May 23), 1928 (Washington, 1928)., p. 1. 
2 Ibid., p. L 
3 Ibtd., p. 2. 
4 John D .. Black, ''The McNary-Haugen Movement,'' American 
Economic Review, XVIII (September, 1928), pp. 411-412. 
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issues out of fundamental economic problems that can not ~anno!] be 
solved by political action. 11 1 He advised Congress to follow his farm 
program. In his own words: 
I have believed at all times that the only sound basis for further 
Federal Government action in behalf of agriculture would be to encour-
age its adequate organization to assist in building up marketing agencies 
and.facilities in the control of the farmers themselves. I want to see 
them undertake, under their own management. the marketing of their 
products under such conditions as will enable them to bring about 
greater stability in /prices and less waste in marketing. but entirely 
within unalterable economic laws. Such a program, supported by a 
strong protective tariff on farm products. is the best method of effect-
ing a permanent cure of existing agricultural ills. Such a program is 
in accordance with the American tradition and the American ideal of 
reliance on the maintenance of private initiative and individual respon-
sibility, and the duty of the Government i.s discharged when it has 
· provided conditions under which the individual can achieve success. 2 
The President summarized the billfs major weaknesses as follows: 
(1) its attempted price~fixing fallacy; (2) the tax characteristics of the 
equalization fee; (3) the widespread bureaucracy which it would set up; 
(4) its encouragement to profiteering and wasteful distribution by middle-
men; (5) its stimulation of overproduction; (6) its aid to our foreign 
. agricultural competitors. 3 
One of the strongest and most impelling reasons for the veto was 
stated by Secretary Mellon in June, 1926, and was scarcely mentioned 
by Coolidge in either of his veto messages. 
1 U. S. Congress, Senate, Veto Message Relating to the Agricut,-
ture Surplus Control Act, p. 10. 
2 Ibid. , p. 10 (italics not in the original). 
3 Ibid .• p. 2. 
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Foreign consumers under the proposed plan will secure American 
commodities at prices below the American level. European labor could 
purchase American products at a lower price and could live more 
cheaply than American labor. Foreign industrial costs would be lowered 
and the foreign competitor assisted in underselling American products 
abroad and in our home market. 1 
Thus, the position of industry should not be subjected to any possible 
increase in competition which might result from legislation to relieve 
an agricultural crisis. 
Although the second veto was not a surprise, the finality with 
which it was accomplished, along with the tone of the message, com-
pletely stunned farmers and agrarian leaders. Clearly, the veto sane-
tioned the position of industry--it was both the political and the economic 
boss--and denied that the Federal Government had definite responsibility 
for maintaining a prosperous agriculture, 
Criticisms by Economists 
The McNary-Haugen proposals received considerable criticism 
from professional economists. For the most part, they argued against 
the bill''s economic feasibility. As would be expected, some were 
extremely critical of the measure, while others were more sympathetic 
to its aims and purposes. 
One of the earliest critics of the bill was Eric Englund, then of 
Kansas State College. In an article entitled "Fallacies of a Plan to Fix 
Prices of Farm Products by Government Control of the Exportable 
1 Quoted in John D. Black, Agricultural Reform in the United 
States, p. 248. 
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Surplus, n Englund cited a heavy burden on the public treasury, higher 
taxes, higher cost of living, public opposition, and over stimulus in 
certain lines of agricultural production as major short comings of any 
government program to increase farm prices. 1 He warned that 1\ • 
the proposed plan of fixing prices of farm products, instead of being 
helpful to the farmer, would be a boomerang to him and harmful to 
society as a whole . . ~nc!J would be worse than the disease which it 
is designed to cure. n2 
Rexford G. Tugwell, who was more favorable to social planning 
than were many of his professional colleagues, admitted that the protec-
tive features of the tariff favored manufacturers and that the agricultural 
industry needed special consideration. However, he criticized the 
McNary-Haugen plan because it aimed at extending the same favoritism 
to agriculture as was already being enjoyed by the manufacturing industry. 
He did not feel that the status quo, which was unfair to agriculture, could 
long be maintained. Attacking the economic nationalism implicated in 
the bill, he declared: 
The fundamental mistake of the McNary-Haugen bill 1s proponents is 
their failure to see the implications of the idea.s embodied in it. A closed 
national system, defiance to the world, legi.slative jobbery for industrial 
advantage with the burden of expense falling on unrepresented consumers, 
are the most obvious of these implications. Nor would the system 
1 Eric Englund, "Fallacies of a Plan to Fix Prices of Farm Pro-
ducts by Government Control of the Exportable Surplus, 11 Journal of Farm 
Economics, V (April, 1923), pp. 86-101. 
2 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
introduced by the bill ultimately strengthen the farn1ers except at the 
expense of some other class. We may seek to make progress at the 
expense of our fellows; but in the modern interrelated world we shall 
not find it. What is needed is the statesmanship that looks across 
industrial lines, even across national boundaries, and legislates for 
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the welfare of the peoples. But the McNary-Haugen bill is not that kind 
of legislation. 1 
Some four years later, 1928, Tugwell modified his views to a con-
siderable extent. He believed that the McNary-Haugen plan might have 
succeeded if a way could have been found to prevent higher prices from 
increasing production. "I should have liked to have seen it tried as a 
beginning, n he said, ''. . the more I study the Bill of 1928 the deeper 
my admiration becomes. As a piece of social legislation it surpasses 
anything an American Congress ever framed." 2 
As stated previously, some economists were more sympathetic to 
the McNary..,Haugen plan than were others. Although he did not officially 
and openly endorse the plan, John D. Black of Harvard University was 
one of its more sympathetic critics. Discussing the merits of the plan, 
Black states: 
A form of attack commonly employed by the administration is to 
call the plan "economically unsqund. 11 The answer made to this is some-
thing upon which economists may well ponder. It is that economic 
soundness may be taken either to assume certain ends as given, in 
which case the issue is whether the measure in question will obtain 
these ends; or it may go clear back to the question of the value of the 
1 Rexford Guy Tugwell, 11The Problem of Agriculture, 11 Political 
Science Quarterly, XXXIX (December, 1924), p. 591. 
2 R. G. Tugwell, 11R eflections on Farm R eHef, 11 Political Science 
Quarterly, XLIII (December, 1928), p. 497. 
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ends. The end set up by the McNary-Haugenites is to increase the pur-
chasing power of farm income . If the measure will accomplish this, 
then on such a basis it i s economically sound . . . . If economic sound-
ness implies the value of the ends, then reasons enough in terms of broad 
national policy can easily be found for asking the cities to subsidize the 
country a little for a few years. If it has been good policy to subsidize 
industrial developments for so long, why is it not good policy to subsi-
dize agriculture for a change, in view of its recent history and present 
status? 1 
Although sympathetic to a degree, Black was not unmindful of 
possible consequences of the plan. While he felt that there was not any 
fallacy about the equalization fee i dea, he questioned whether it could be 
made to work as smoothly as was planned. 11 ••• the plan may work so 
badly as to discredit the whole farmers I movement for a generation, and 
therefore the plan should be simplified and toned down . . . before it is 
approved. 11 2 He was confident, however, that if it could be made to work, 
it would attain its ends. "The attendant consequence most to be feared, " 
he warned, "would be expansion of production in the newly subsidized 
lines, followed by abandonment of the plan, leaving the growers in worse 
plight than now. 113 
Another well known economist, B. H. Hibbard of the University of 
Wisconsin, was of the opinion t hat the McNary-Haugen scheme was not 
adequate to fit the complexities of the market. He was practicularly 
concerned with the many kinds and grades of farm commodities for 
1 John D. Black, "The McNary-Haugen Movement, 11 American 
Economic Review, XVIII (September, 1928) , pp. 425-427. 
2 Ibid., p. 427. 
3 John D. Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States, p. 254. 
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which index relationships would have·to be figured. 11There would have to 
be index relationships figured on all of these separately, 11 he said,. "and 
no provision is made, and hardly could be made, allowing for variations 
among grades. ,,.l 
If prices were raised on a few selected commodities, as provided 
in the McNary-Haugen proposal, he believed that the growers of other 
products would also demand the di.rect benefit of the measure. °Carried 
to its logical limit, 11 he said, 11it means that the government shall extend 
protection to all, which in logic is paradoxical. n2 He believed the passage 
of the bill tt ••• would prove to be the insertion of the camel's nose under 
the tent . . . and the government of the United States would become the 
greatest dealer of the world ... in agricultur·al products. u3 
Two well known economists, Joseph S. Davis and Alonzo E. Taylor, 
were highly skeptical of the net outcome of the proposal. They argued 
that the price differential provided i.n the bill would stimulate expansion 
of wheat acreage, and that this expansion would have important reactions 
upon wheat prices. 4 In fad, they regarded the effect upon wheat acreage 
1 Benjamin H. Hibbard, "Legislative Interference with .Agricultural 
Prices. 11 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XI (January, 
1925), p. 42. 
2 Ibid., p. 44. 
3 Ibid., p. 45. -------
4 Alonzo E. Taylor and Joseph S. Davi.s, "The McNary-Haugen 
Plan as Applied to Whe.at: Operating Problems and Economic Conse-
quences, n Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, III (February, 
1927), p. 220. 
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'as the crucial point of the entire propos ition. They felt that the adoption 
of the policy 
... would afford a profound stimulus to expansion of acreage. The 
greater the initial success in administrati on, the less the opposition 
from consumers, the higher the satisfaction of the grower with the 
enhanced price, the greater would be the influence upon wheat acreage 
. . . . The result might easily be that within a few years, the net price 
received by American wheat growers, would be little or no higher, 
[because of greater exportable surplus, lower world prices, and 
increased equalization fees to cover the resulting higher losses], and 
might even be lower, under the operation of the scheme than if no such 
measures were adopted . . . . Its net outcome ... would be to the 
serious disadvantage of wheat growers and would create fresh maladjust-
ments in American agriculture. 1 
They concluded with the warning that the greater the early success 
of the proposed plan, the greater would be the prospect for its ultimate 
failure to achieve the desired results, and the necessity for painful 
readjustment after the disappointment was recognized and admitted. 2 
Trends in the McNary-Haugen Bills 
Writing in 1928, John D. Black expressed the opinion that "the 
seriousness of this movement has not been realized generally. It is 
inadequately discussed in terms of economics only; its s i gnificance is 
far more political than economic. 113 Black further stated: 
The issue involved is more fundamental than McNary-Haugenism 
itself. It is agriculture 1's stand agai nst the domination of its affairs 
l Ibid. , p. 234. 
2 Ibid. , p. 234. 
3 John D. Black, "The McNary-H.augen Movement," American 
~conomic Review, XVIII, p. 405. 
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and the affairs of the country by the commercial and industrial interests 
. . . . The agricultural interests of the country for a long time have 
fe lt the need of pr ot ecting themselves politically against the bus iness 
interests. The for mation of the "agricultural bloc" in May, 1921 , was 
a visible expression of that feeling. But the bloc needed some vigorous 
measure around which to rally the forces of agriculture. The McNary-
Haugen plan proved to be that measure. 1 
The chief trends in the McNary-Haugen Bills, from the first in 
1924 to the fifth in 1928, were as follows : 
The first bills were emergency measures whereas the later ones 
suggest ed a permanent policy; the equalization fee remained the basic 
feature, although cooperative marketing was added in 1926; all impor-
tant agricultural products were finally brought into the plan; the callee -
tion of the fee was shifted closer to the export market; there was a 
working away from the charge of price fixing; reference t o tariff effec-
tiveness was replaced with emphasis on orderly marketing; and, in the 
later bills, more recognition was given to the probable necessity of 
controlled production. 2 
Enduring Effects of the Debates on Agriculture 
Although agriculture's major programs were rejected in the 19201s, 
the debate on the agricultural problem was not without important results. 
The rural credit system was strengthened and agricultural experiment 
stations received more support for economic research under the Purnell 
Act, 1925. Packer and stockyard companies and the grain exchanges 
were brought under more effective c ontrol. The highway system was 
l Ibid., p . 405. 
2 Darwin N. Kelley, "McNary-Haugen Bills, 1924-1928," Agri -
cultural History , XIV (October, 1940), p. 175. For a more complete 
comparison of the first and last versions of the Mc Nary-Haugen Bill and 
the significant trends that developed see John D . Black, Agricultural 
Reform in the United States, pp. 252-254. 
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greatly enlarged and improved, particular improvement being made in 
farm to market roads. Farmer cooperatives were strengthened, and a 
start was made in the dissemination of outlook material. Probably more 
importanf than these gains was the awakening of the public to the reali.,.. 
zation that agriculture':s problems carried effects reaching fa.r beyond 
the farmer and his family. It was not until 1932, however, that the 
nation in general., and the farmers in particular. recognized that some 
governmental program for the relief and rehabilitation of agriculture 
was necessary to save the agricultural industry from a complete collapse 
during the more critical depression which had developed. 
The McNary-Haugen movement, though defeated, accomplished 
more than was realized at the time. The effort to make the tariff effec-
tive for agriculture gave farmers a sense of unity and brought them to 
realize, that with proper organization and a common cause, they could 
win the attention of Congress and thus have an effective voice in national 
agricultur1:;1.l policy. At the same time, the movement brought to the 
surface conflicting interests wUh:in agriculture. Indicative of this was 
the failure of the cotton farmers to give unlimited support to ''tariff 
equality. " 1 Probably the most important accomplishment of the McNary-
Haugen movement was that it imbued the thinking of many farm leader"s, 
1 Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in 
t!J.e Middle West (Madison, 1951), p. 553. For additional discussion of · 
this point .see Henry C. Wallace, Our Debt and Duty to the Fµrmer, 
p'p. 206-2.07. . 
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as well as others, with the two-price idea. It laid a foundation for a 
new philosophy regarding the role of government in the economic affairs 
of agriculture. 1 
1 For an additional appraisal of the McNary-Haugen plan, see 
Infra., Appendix. 
CHAPTER V 
OTHER PRICE-RAISING PLANS 
The Export Debenture Plan 1 
Although the McNary-Haugen movement was the dominating farm 
proposal during the 1920's, several other price-raising ideas were for-
mulated during this period. While none of these ideas were enacted into 
laws, some not even voted upon, they became, to a degree , seeds for 
agricultural legislative pr-ograms in the early 1930 rs. 
The second most popular plan of these years was the export 
debenture proposal of Professor Charles L, Stewart of the University of 
Illinois. Stewart, who modeled his work upon a German plan, had out-
lined and discussed its main features in university lectures as early as 
May, 1924. A bill embodying the essential features of this plan was 
brought to the attention of Congress in the form of the McKinley-Adkins 
bills in 1926. 2 
1 For a detailed exposition and analysis of the export debenture 
plan see Joseph S. Davis, The Farm E~port Debenture Plan (Stanford 
California, 1929). 
2 Joseph S. Davis, "The Export Debenture Plan for Aid to Agri-
culture, 11 Quarterly Journal of Economics, XLIII (February, 1929), 
p. 250 ; Theodore Saloutos and John D. l!icks, Agricultural Discontent 
in the Middle West 1900-1939 (Madison, 1951), p. 390; John D. Black, 
riThe McNary-Haugen Movement, 11 American Economic Review, XVIII 
(September, 1928), p. 424. 
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The debenture plan was based upon practically the same philosophy 
as the McNary-Haugen plan. Both plans viewed our agricultural diffi-
culties as being fundamentally due to price disparities caused by the 
fact that American farmers had to sell on a world market and had to 
buy in a protected market . Furthermore, both plans were devised to 
resolve those difficulties by raising domestic prices of agricultural 
commodities of which we produced an export surplus. 1 
The essential feature of the export debenture plan was the paying 
of a bounty on exports of surplus farm products in the form of nego-
tiable instruments called "debentures" which could be used by importers 
in paying customs duties. Under this plan the price of domesti c agri-
cultural products was to be raised to the extent of the bounty. 2 The 
plan did not provide for purchasing and sto.ring of any surplus. 
Exporters were to be given government debentures having face 
values equ_al to all or part of the difference between the value of the 
farm commodity in the world market and a domestic value based on 
the world market price plus the tariff on the product. The exporters 
might sell these debentures to importers bringing in foreign commodi -
ties who, in turn, could present them in payment of tariffs levied on 
1 See Joseph S. Davis, "The Export Debenture Plan for Aid to 
Agriculture, " Quarterly Journal of Economics, XLIII, p . 251 . For a 
discussion of how the export debenture plan would work see Journal of 
Farm Economics, X (January, 1928), discussion by Charles L. Stewart, 
pp. 28-32. 
2 John D. Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States (New 
York, 1929), p. 255. 
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goods imported. It was believed that the debentures would sell for 
approximately their face value, unless more than enough of them were 
issued to pay all import duties. Exporters of farm products were 
expected to pay a domestic market price equal to world price plus the 
value of the debentures issued to them. 1 
Proponents of the plan claimed for it such advantages as these: 
1. That the principle of this bill- -that of an export bounty on 
agricultural products--was originally suggested by 
Alexander Hamilton as an organic part of the scheme for 
a protective tariff. 
2. That the plan is simple and direct, requiring the collection 
of no fees, and no Government appropriations except a 
small one for the expenses of the board, which is an 
~ officio body. 
3. That rates are adjustable to meet conditions. 
4. That it is not a subsidy but is comparable to the drawback 
or the differential provisions of the present tariff. That 
the lessened receipts from the tariffs would not be large 
as compared with total Federal income, and that, anyway, 
the principle of the existing tariff system is not income 
but protection. 
5. That it would not encourage overproduction, because the 
bill provi des for reducing or removing the debenture on 
a crop that i s overplanted. 
1 Murray R. Benedict, Farm P olicies of the United States, 1790-
1950 (New York, 1953), pp. 226-227 . 
6. That it is not only constitutional but follows established 
practice in tariff administration, that of the drawback. 1 
76 
The export debenture plan was sponsored by the National Grange 
and received a great amount of active support from that organization. 
The nearest this proposal came to being enacted into law was on a 
motion in the House on May 3, 1928, to substitute it for the McNary-
Haugen Bill. The motion was defeated by 39 votes. 2 
The Domestic Allotment Plan 
The domestic allotment plan was another version of the two-price 
idea. It was proposed prominently after the export debenture and 
McNary-Haugen plans had been set aside by the creation of the Federal 
Farm Board. 3 This plan had been presented and briefly discussed 
during the last stages of the struggle over the McNary-Haugen proposals, 
but was widely discussed during the years in which the Federal Farm 
Board was in operation. 
This plan, based upon ideas supplied by Dr . W. J . Spill.man of the 
United States Department of Agriculture, was first presented in February, 
1 Kenyon L . Butterfield, "The Farmers ' Problems and Proposed 
Solutions, 11 Current History, XXIX (November, 1928), pp . 269-270 . 
There was no express limitation on the amount of debentures issuable 
in any one year. However, provisions were made to reduce debenture 
rates in order to check a possible stimulus to production of any one 
commodity. See Joseph S. Davis , "The Export Debenture Plan for Aid 
to Agriculture, " Quarterly Journal of Economics, XLIII, pp . 254-255. 
2 Black, irThe McNary-Haugen Movement," American Economic 
Review, XVIII, p. 425 . 
3 The Federal Farm Board is discussed in a subsequent section. 
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1926, by Harry N. Owen, editor of Farm, Stock and Home, Minneapolis, 
in an article in that journal called II Getting the Tariff to the Farmer. nl 
Dr. Spillman's final version of the plan appeared in his Balancing the 
Farm Output, which was published in January, 1927. 2 Spillman 
referred to his proposal as the "limited debenture" plan. 
Professor John D. Black of Harvard University became interested 
in the plan and presented his version of it in detail in his Agricultural 
Reform in the United States. 3 Black referred to his plan as the 
"transferable rights n plan. 4 
According to Black'l s analysis: 
The essential principle of the domestic allotment plan i s paying 
producers a free-trade price plus the tariff duty for the part of their 
crop which is consumed in the United States and thi s price without the 
tariff duty for the part of it that is exported, this to be arranged by 
a system of allotments to individual producers of rights to sell the 
domestic part of the crop in the domestic market. 5 
1 Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States, p. 271. 
2 Ibid., p. 271. 
3 See John D. Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States 
(New York, 1929), chapter 10. Black first brought the ''transferable 
rights plan" to public attention in testimony before House and Senate 
Committees on Agricultur.~ in the spring of 1929. Joseph Stancliffe 
Davis, Wheat and the AAA (Washington, 1935), pp. 30-31 ; Theodore 
Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West 
1900-1939 (Madison, 1951 ), pp. 453-454. 
4 Subsequently, the transferable rights plan was acknowledged to 
have been originated by Beardsley Ruml who was then director of the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Foundation. It resembled an 
earlier plan presented unofficially by W. J. Spillman of the Department 
of Agriculture. Davis, Wheat and the AAA, p. 30. 
5 Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States, p. 271 (italics 
omitted). 
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The general outline of Black's version of the plan, 1 at least as 
applied to wheat, was that an administrative agency would determine 
periodically the probable quantity of wheat which would be consumed in 
the domestic market at a price equivalent to the free-trade price plus 
the tariff. Through a system of allotments individual producers would 
be issued certificates giving them the right to produce up to the amount 
allotted. The allotments would be determined upon the basis of their 
past production; yields would be more important than acreages. 
These allotment rights would be transfer able and would be salable 
to millers for approximately the amount of the tariff duty. Millers 
would be required to show allotment rights for all domestic wheat m illed 
and sold as wheat products in the domestic market. If too few allotment 
rights were issued, millers would import actual wheat, paying the duty 
upon it, to supplement the domestic supply. Since the allotment r ights 
would sell for approximately the amount of the tariff duty, the cost of 
the imported wheat would be comparable to that of the domestic wheat 
purchased plus the cost of the allotment rights. On the other hand, if 
too many allotment rights were issued,. they would se 11 at a discount 
and wheat imports would cease. Wheat not covered by a llotment rights 
would be sold at the free-trade price on the world m arket. 
Thus, while the general objective was similar to that of the McNary 
Haugen plan, the mechanics were different. In the event that production 
1 
See Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States, chapter 10. 
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was greater than would be needed for domestic consumption, under 
either plan, wheat growers would not receive the world price plus the 
tariff for their entire crop. In both instances the average price received 
by growers would be less than that amount. However, in instances of 
surplus production under the McNary-Haugen plan, the entire crop 
would move in domestic channels at the free-trade price plus the tariff. 
The export subsidy was to be met through the assessment of an equaliza-
tion fee on each bushel of wheat entering the marketing channel. 1 
The domestic allotment plan would have required elaborate 
administrative machinery, including an "allotment commissionll in each 
wheat-growing state and, also, county and township "allotment com-
mittees." These agencies were to determine, on the basis of past 
acreages and production, the base sales allocation for each wheat 
grower. Each producer would subsequently receive allotment rights for 
the portion of his base allocation as would accord with his proportionate 
share of the domestic market. 2 Such allocations would not ha:ve been 
necessary under the McNary-Haugen plan. Each grower, under that 
plan, would have been free to sell any amount he chose to market, all 
of it on the same basis. 
The domestic allotment plan offered partial insurance against poor 
crops or crop failure. Since allotment rights would be issued in relation 
1 See Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, 
p. 268. 
2 Black, Agricultural Reform in the United States, pp. 272-274. 
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to nor~al expectatiOns, any grower h:aving a complete or partial crop 
failure would still have allotment rights to sell and, therefor·e, some 
income regardless of the yield. Also, if total production wa.s so large 
that prices would be depressed to a low point, the .a.ddition of the tariff 
(42 cents per bushel at the time of the proposal) to the wheat grower:t's 
allotted pr-oduction would have caused a smaller proportional reduction 
in the price he received. Thus there· wquld be insurance against price 
dec;:line as well as against crop failure. 1 
The .domestic allotment plan did not provide the stimulus to 
increase production which was charactertstic of the other plans. In 
contr.ast, it involved rigid control of domestic allotments and therefore 
provided the farmer with a stimulus to control production. However, 
farmers were not ready at the time and it did not receive serious 
consideration in Congress. For the time being it was set aside but it 
1 . Ib~.d. 1 p. 285. 
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was resurrected and incorporated, at least in part, in subsequent 
legislation to attack the more critically acute depression of agricultural 
prices in the 1930Ys. 1 
1 Merle Fainsod and Lincoln Gordon, Government and the American 
Economy (New York, 1941), p. 114. 
During 1931 and 1932 the domestic allotment plan was widely pub-
licized by M. L. Wilson of Montana State College, and was largely l;l,~so-
ciated with his name. Wilson headed a group that came forward with a 
radically different version of the Ruml-Black transferable-rights plan, 
which became known as the nvoluntary domestic allotment'' plan. W.ilson 
became adviser on agricultural matters to Franklin D. Roosevelt and was 
influential in formulating administration policy in regard to agriculture 
throughout the early New Deal period. See Saloutos and Hicks, Agricul-
tural Discontent in the Middle West 1900~1939~ pp. 454-457. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FARM BOARP VENTURE 
The Business Ments Commission on Agriculture 
While Congress was debating the McNary-Haugen proposals, the 
export debenture plan, and other farm legislation, agrarian dissatis-
faction continued to mount to ever higher levels. The burden of mort-
gages and other debts contracted when prices were higher reached 
intolerable limits with the falling prices of 1929. The passage of the 
I 
Hawley-Smoot Tariff, July, 1930, further complicated the situation by 
restricting the flow of trade between the United States and the world 
markets and therefore reducing the demand for United States farm pro-
ducts in those markets. t This resulted from both the reduced purchas-
ing power of the importing nations a.nd the retaliatory measures on the 
part of their governments. The concurrent deterioration of foreign and 
domestic demand contributed to a further widening of the gap between 
farm and nonfarm prices. As in the 1920i s Congress continued to 
search for a remedy. 
During the campaign of 1928 Herbert Hoover promised, if elected, 
to call a special session of the Congress in the spring of 1929. Fulfilling 
1 The Hawley-Smoot Tariff raised the general level of protection 
by about 7 per cent. For a discussion of this tariff see John D. Hicks, 
The American Nation (Boston, 1949), pp. 581-583. 
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thfs promise, Congress met on April 15, 1929, to consider measures 
for agricultural relief and limited changes. in the tariff. President 
Hoover believed that the primary assistance which government could 
render agriculture was through improvement in marketing machinery. 1 
It was evident that Hoover was following the suggestions embodied 
in the report of the Business Men r.s Commission on Agriculture . This 
Commission had been organized and financed jointly by the National 
Industrial Conference Board and the United Stat es Chamber of Commerce. 
The Commission recommended the establishment of a Federal Farm 
Board to aid in the stabilization of prices and production in agriculture 
by advising farmers and farm organizations fully and promptly regard-
ing the planning of production and the marketing of crops. It also 
recommended the establishment of stabilization corporations to engage 
in the buying and selling of farm products for the purpose of stabilizing 
prices. The Commission believed that eventually it might be possible 
for these corpor.ations to announce a specific forward price at which it 
would stand ready to purchase any surplus of specified crops. The 
announcement would be made in advance of planting, would apply only 
to cotton, wheat, and perhaps corn and the purchase would be made only 
1 Merle Fain.sod and Lincoln Gordon, Government and the American 
Economy (New York, 1941), pp. 114-115. 
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aft'er the current harvest of the crops. This price w.as to be one that 
would induce the desired production of each of the crops concerned. 1 
The Commission condemned legislative action which would arti-
ficially and arbitrarily alter the relation between supply and demand in 
agricultural commodities and affect the market for them. The Com-
mission found 
. : . it impossible to support any of the legislative proposals of the 
type represented by the McNary-Haugen bill ... which, by artificially 
restricting the supply of agricultural products in the home market, or 
by the payment of export bounties on farm products, aim to raise the 
domestic price of agricultural commodities above the world market 
price. 2 
The new Congress was sympathetic with the PresidenPs views 
on farm relief, and in two-months:r: time had embodied his recommend.a-
tions in a comprehensive marketing plan which, in the main, placed 
reliance upon farmer controlled cooperative associations for solving the 
farm problem. 
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 declared i.t to be the policy 
of the Congress 
. . . to promote the effective merchandising of agricultural commoditie§ 
in interstate and foreign commerce, so that the industry of agriculture 
1 For a discussion of these proposals see Business Men's Com-
mission on Agriculture, The Condition of Agriculture in the United States 
and Measures for Its Improvement (New York and Washington, 1927), 
pp. 32-33, 176~188. 
2 Ibid., pp . 162-163. 
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will be placed on a basis of economic equality with other industries, 
and to that end to protect, control, and stabilize the currents of inter-
state and foreign commerce in the marketing of agricultural commodi-
ties and their food products . . . . 1 
Four broad methods were specified to attain these ends: 
(1) minimizing speculation, (2) preventing inefficient and wasteful 
methods of distribution, (3) encouraging the organization of cooperative 
associations, and (4) '' ... aiding in preventing and controlling sur-
pluses ... through orderly production and distribution .... 11 2 
The Act cr·eated a Federal Farm Board of eight members, and 
provided it with a $ 500 million revolving fund from which it could lend 
to cooperative associations to assist in: (1) the effective merchandising 
of agricultural commodities, (2) the construction or acquisition of 
physical marketing facilities, (3) the formation of clearing house 
associations, (4) extending membership of the cooperative associations, 
and (5) enabling the cooperative association applying for the loan to 
advance to its members a greater share of the m_arket price of the 
commodity delivered to the association than could be provided through 
other credit agencies. 3 
The Board was also authorized to make loans to any stabilization 
corporations it might set up for the purpose of buying, storing, and 
1 U. S. Federal Farm Board, First Annual Report for the Year 
Ending June 30, 1930 (Washington, 1930), p. 64. 
2 Ibid. , p. 64. 
3 Ibid., sec. 7, p. 66. 
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selling surpluses. If earnings and reserves of such a corporation were 
not adequate to repay the loan, the amount of the delinquency would be 
carried by the Board as a continuing loan from the revolving fund. 1 
The Federal Farm Board in Operation 
During the first few months of its existence the Board's efforts 
were directed to the creation of a series of national cooperative selling 
agencies organized along commodity lines. It was believed that the 
agencies would facilitate producer bargaining power through control of 
volume and through sound merchandising policies, would get for their 
members the full market value of their products . 
The first of these selling agencies was the Farmers National Grain 
Corporation, which was incorporated on October 29, 1929. 2 This agency 
sought to unite under a central board of directors three types of existing 
grain marketing cooperatives , namely: farmers' e le vator associations, 
terminal sales agencies , and grain pools. In regions where no large-
scale cooperatives exi sted, regional cooperatives were formed by the 
producers of those regions with the assistance of the Far mers National 
1 Ibid., sec. 9, pp. 67-68. 
2 Ibid., p. 7. This corporation was farmer-owned and farmer-
controlled within the definition of the Capper-Volstead Act. Its main 
office was in Chicago, Illinois, but branch offices were establi shed in all 
of the principal terminal markets. The corporation had an export depart-
ment, which made possible the control of farmers I grain until it reached 
the purchaser in a foreign country. Storage facilities were acquired in 
most of the principal domestic markets. Ibid,, pp. 8-9. 
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Grain Corporation. In some localities existing agencies consolidated 
and formed new regionals. 1 
Wheat Stabilization Measures 2 
I 
In its first year of operation the Board took several steps to pre-
vent "undue and unwarranted depression" of wheat prices. Early in 
August, 1929, a sharp fall occurred in both cash and futures prices of 
wheat. The Board felt that this was due, primarily, to unprecedented 
marketings of wheat in this country causing congestion at terminals. 
The Board urged farmers not to rush their wheat to market and, 
temporarily, the decline in price was checked. 
In view of the outloo:k for an enlarged world supply, the Board, in 
. September, offered qualifiet:l grain cooperatives supplemental commodity 
loans as an aid in holding grain off the market. The price of wheat, 
however, continued to decline . From October 15 to October 25 wheat 
declined 15 cents a bushel and on a single day, October 24, it dropped 
10 cents. In. an effort to prevent a disastrous decline i n prices, the 
Board, on October 26, offered loans to cooperatives at approximately 
l Ibid., p. 8. 
2 The material in this section is drawn largely from the following 
reports of the U. S. Federal Farm Board: First Annual Report for the 
Year Ending June 30, 1930; Second Annual Report for the Year Ending 
June 30, 1931; Third Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1932. 
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the closing prices for October 25. 1 For a short time thi.s move appeared 
to be successful. Wheat prices made a partial recovery in the next two 
months, but weakened again in January and February of 1930. 
In January, 1930, the Farmers National Grain Corporation began 
buying country~run wheat at the loan value. 2 These purchases served 
for a time to partially support wheat prices to farmers. However, by 
February it could be seen that the Farmers National Grain Corporation 
had too great a burden to carry. The Grain Stabilizat ion Corporation, 
on the recommendation of the Wheat Advisory Committee, was activated 
1 These prices were: $1. 15 per bushel for No . 1 Hard Winter, 
basis, Kansas City and Omaha; $1. 25 per bushel for No. 1 Northern 
Spring, basis, Minneapolis ; and appropriate prices at other markets. 
U. S. Federal Farm Board, First Annual Report for the Year Ending 
June 30, 1930, p. 27. 
2 The Farmers National Grain Corporation fi rst offered to buy 
wheat at the loan value on December 19, 1929, but no wheat was 
obtained. In January, when the offer was repeated, some wheat was 
acquired. U. S. Federal Farm Board, First Annual Report for the 
Year Ending June 30, 1930, p. 28. 
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and authorized to purchase wheat. Also, efforts were made to ease t he 
pressure on the cash grain market. 1 
Influenced by market news and new-crop prospects, wheat prices 
in world markets advanced from the middle of March until late in April. 
Under the influence of this recovery, prices in the United States again 
fell into line with world markets. This recovery appeared to justify the 
general policy of the Board and the actions of the Grain Stabilizat ion 
Corporation. Also, it permitted the corporati on to reduce its holdings 
somewhat. 
As a consequence of wheat stabilization operati ons in 1929-1930, 
the Grain Stabilization Corporation held on June 30, 1930, a total of 
some 65 million bushels of cash wheat and contracts for fut ure delivery. 
In spite of stabilization measures, wheat prices decl.ined heavily in June 
1 Shortly after the Grain Stabilization Corporation started buying 
wheat it was discovered " ... that others than producers were taking 
advantage of this type of buying, and some who earlier had purchased 
wheat from the farmer and hedged it were selling it to the Grain Stabili-
zation Corporation at an unwarranted profit. 11 Ibid., p . 29 . Thi s 
brought a sharp reaction from the Farm Board and "thereupon, such 
general purchasing was discontinued, and for a brief period, ending 
March 1, the purchases of country-run wheat were made only from 
qualified cooperatives and their members. 11 Ibid., pp. 29-30. In the 
meantime the stabilization corporation undertook to support the market 
by buying cash wheat at market prices and by buying May futur es. 
The Grain Stabilization Corporation was faced with an acute storage 
problem. In order to cope with this situation, the aid of m illers was 
sought " ... to permit the Grain Stabilization Corporation to place wheat 
in positions where it would presumably be used rather than have it concen-
trate at terminal markets, such as Chicago. Cooperation under this agree-
ment was an important factor in reducing the volume of wheat on which 
deliveries had to be accepted in Chicago in May, in preventing uneconomical 
movements of wheat and in averting threatened congestion at Chicago. " 
Ibid., p. 31. 
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and July as new winter wheat began to move to market. In July prices 
reached lower levels than had prevailed since before World War r.1 
Nineteen-thirty was an extremely dry year and a serious shortage 
of all feed crops was anticipated in many parts of the country. The 
Board expected that large quantities of wheat, as well as other grains, 
would need to be shipped into drought areas. However, the additional 
demand for feed grains did not develop to the extent that had been antici-
pated and the Board continued to be burdened with heavy stocks of wheat. 2 
1 During July, 1930, the average cash price of No. 2 Hard Winter 
wheat in Kansas City was 80 cents' per bushel. This was the lowest it 
had been since July, 1914, when the average price was 78 cents. See 
United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, The Wheat Situation (Washington, January-February, 1950), 
p. 22. 
2 As late as August, 1930, adequate organization for drought relief 
did not exist, but there was ample evidence that such organization would 
have to be effected. While it was not intended that the Grain Stabilization 
Corporation should function as a drought-relief agency, the Board wished 
to place it in a position to cooperate effectively with any agencies that 
might be organized for relief purposes. With this thought in mind, the 
Board authprized the Grain Stabilization Corporation to accumulate stocks 
of cash grain at certain strategic points. In September, 1930, after 
reaching the conclusion that the Stabilization Corporation could not appro-
priately undertake to sell grain other than wheat, the Farmers National 
Grain Corporation was authorized to organize a Drought-Relief Depart-
ment. This department did not have any connection with the normal opera-
tion of the Farmers National Grain Corporation and was financed by 
special loan commitments from the Board. The newly organized depart-
ment immediately took over the grain accumulated for drought-relief pur-
poses. Additional demands for feed grains, however, did not develop to 
the extend that had been anticipated and the· Drought-Relief Department 
was able to sell only small quantities of coarse grains. In the spring of 
1931 it was requested to liquidate its holdings and make an accounting to 
, the Board. The losses incurred in this operation were nearly $ 790, 000. 
See U. S. Federal Farm Board, Second Annual Report for the Year 
Ending June 30, 1931 (Washington, 1931), p. 38. 
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A further collapse of world wheat prices developed in the latter 
months of 1930. 1 World supplies of wheat were at high levels and many 
countries had more wheat than their domestic markets could handle . 
' 
Several European countries increased their import duties and intensified 
milling restrictions in an effort to protect their own growers from the 
pressures of low world prices. Shipments to the principal European 
markets from overseas were exceptionally heavy. Australia, especially, 
was exporting large quantities of wheat at that time. 
The Danube countries and Russ ia were also shipping large quantit ies 
of wheat to European ports. Much of this wheat was shipped on consign-
ment and, for a considerable length of time, remained unsold. This 
resulted in a congestion of European ports with great quantities of wheat 
and a further demoralization of the already glutted world markets. The 
end result was a virtual collapse of world wheat prices . By November, 
contract wheat at Chicago was down to 70 cents in contrast to a corre-
sponding quotation of over a dollar a few months earlier. The sharp 
break in world prices convinced the Farm Board t hat an emergency 
existed which, if domestic prices were to be prevented from furthe r 
decline, could be met only by increased stabilization purchases. 
1 Due to the severe drought, corn prices advanced sharply in late 
July and early August, 1930. In view of the prospect that large quantities 
of wheat would be substituted for corn, wheat prices also advanced some-
what at that time. However, wheat prices did not hold at higher levels 
long and were soon experiencing further declines . Ibid., p. 38. 
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The Stabilization Corporation, in the hope that it could check the 
decline in price, purchased large quantities of wheat during the week 
ending November 15, 1930. This move did not have the desired effect, 
consequently the Board decided that more drastic action must be 
employed if the domestic market was to be saved from the effects of the 
collapse in the world wheat market. It was the opinion of the Board that 
additional declines in our wheat prices were unwarranted by domestic 
conditions and, despite weak world markets, domestic prices could be 
checked from further decline . On '.November 16, 1930, the Stabilization 
Corporation was authorized to purchase as much wheat as was needed in 
order to prevent further price declines. 1 
In February, 1931, the Board took more drastic steps to ease the 
wheat situation. Thirty-five million bushels of wheat had accumulated 
at Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific ports. This wheat had to be moved in 
order to make room for the new crop which would soon be arriving. 
Approximately 21. 5 million bushels of this wheat were sold on the 
world market during the next four months. 2 
Wheat prices on the world market continued to decline during 1931 
and 1932. The Farm Board continued its attempt to maintain domestic 
prices, but it was a losing battle. However, there is clear evidence 
that domestic prices were held much above the usual relationship to 
l Ibid., p . 40. 
2 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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Liverpool prices for a few months. From the latter part of November, 
1930, when the Board began its stabilization program on a large scale, 
until the latter part of June, 1931, Kansas City wheat prices gained 
relative to Liverpool prices and even exceeded them during the first six 
months of 1931. 1 
On July 1, 1931, the Stabilization Corporation held 257 million 
bushels of wheat, 65 million bushels of which had been acquired in the 
previous season. 2 This surplus amounted to nearly one - third of a 
normal year's crop and its ownership constituted a grave responsibility 
on the part of the Farm Board. The Board was not bound to any definite 
sales policy and was, therefore, free to dispose of the surplus it had 
acquired according to its own judgment. Thus, actually, these stocks 
were not completely withdrawn from the market. Private trade could 
never be certain just when part, or all, of this surplus might be sold. 
This atmosphere of uncertainty tended to dampen the price-supporting 
effects of the stabilization measures. 
In view of its limited resources, the Board decided that wheat 
farmers had been given as much assistance through stabilization 
1 See Ibid., pp . 42-46; U. S. Federal Farm Board, Third Annual 
Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1932 {Wasp.ington, 1932), pp. 64-66. 
2 This was not the total of all wheat purchased by the Stabili zation 
Corporation. Purchases up to July 1, 1931, totaled 329, 641,052 bushels . 
Sales for export, milling, and other purposes, totaled 72, 504, 481 
bushels, leaving 257, 136, 571 bushels owned by the Cor por,at ion on June 
30, 1931. U. S. Federal Farm Board, Sec ond Annual R e port for the 
Year Ending June 30, 1931, p . 43 . 
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purchases as was possible and, on March 23, announced that no purchases 
from the 1931 crop would be authorized. This decision became effective 
on June 3, when the new harvest had begun and sales of new c r op wheat 
were being made at country points. Domestic prices dropped sharply 
from a level above that of Liverpool prices to one somewhat below them. 1 
From approximately 52 cents in June, the average farm price dropped to 
about 36 cents in July and slightly lower in August and September. 2 
In an effort to minimize the effects of this change in policy, the 
Farm Board announced on June 30, 1931, that sales of stabilization 
stocks would be made in a manner that would impose as small a burden 
as possible upon domestic and world prices. The sales policy adopted 
by the Board tended to control the movement of wheat . On the one hand 
it restricted sales to those commercial channels in which they would not 
depress the domestic price, and on the other hand it negotiated sales to 
foreign governments in countries which would not otherwise use our 
wheat. 3 Sales in the open market from July 1, 1931 , to July 1, 1932, 
were to be limited to 5 million bushels per month. 4 
1 U. S . Federal Farm Board, Third Annual Report for the Year 
Ending June 30, 1932, figure No . 1, p. 65 . 
2 U. S. Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situation, September-
December, 1949, p. 21. 
3 U. S. Federal Farm Board, Third Annual Report for the Year 
Eriding June 30, 1932, p . 66 . 
4 Sales to foreign governments which would move American wheat 
into consumptive channels which it could not otherwise reach were not 
subject to this restriction. U. S . Federal Farm B~ard, Second Annual 
Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1931, pp . 42-43 . 
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The Board m.ade unusual eff6rts to flnd outlets for whe;a.t held by 
the Grain S.tabilization Co.rporation. A Brazilian transa:ctio:n, in 1931, 
called for' an exchange of wheat for coffee. The Grain Stabilization 
CorpoI,"ation :received 1, 050, OOJ) bags of coffee in exchange for 25., QOO, QOO 
bushels of wheat. 1 This transaction proved profit.able to the Stabilization 
Corporation~ i Fifteen million bushels of wheat were sold to China and 
7. 5 million bushels to Oerma:ny against long .. term notes. 3 Under Public 
Resolution No. 12 of the Seventy-second Congress, 40 million bushel$ . 
were donat.ecl to the American NatJ.onal Red Cross for .~elief purposes. 4 
1 U. S. Far'.m Credit Administration, First A:rumal Repod, 1933 
(Washington, Janu~ry 25; 1934), p, 56, 
2 Under the terms of the Bra~ilip.,n'. tran~actio~, .25, 000, 000 bushel$ 
of wheat valued at the current market price were to be paid for in coffee 
valued at its current :market price. The coffee was to be delivered to 
New York with :stor·13.ge paid until November 1,. 1932. The Stabilization 
Corporation, beginning in September-, 1932, sold the coffee at the rate 
of 6?, 500 bags per month,. The first .sales, i:d September, October,· and 
Nov. ember. __ nette. d t. he Sta .. bilization CorporaUop. more than it would ha. v_e 
r~c_.eived from the cash sale of the w_heat ,at th~ time the ex:ch,ange w~s 
,ar~anged. See tJ. S. Federal Fa.rm Board, Third Annual Report fqt' t.he 
Yeai:- Ending June 3·0, 1932, p~ 68~ 
3 u. S. Farm Credit ,A1dmini~tration, First Annual Report. 1933, 
p. 57; 
4 Ibid .• p. 57. Fol"'~ c()py of the text of the Resolution see U. s~ 
Fede:r'al:e'arm 13.oard, Thir:d Annu;al R~port for the Year F.lnding J.une 30, 
19:32~ p. 82. - . 
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By the end of June, 1932, unsold stocks had been reduced to 108 m illion 
bushels, but the carry-over was at a record level. 1 A second donation 
to the Red Cross reduced wheat stocks an additi onal 45 m i llion bushels. 2 
During its last period of operation, July 1, 1932, to May 26, 1933, 
the Board was relatively inactive. Little in the way of constructive 
action was possible during this period of operation. Nearly all of the 
half-billion-dollar r~volving fund was tied up i n farm products, having 
been committed during the first three years of operation. Consequently 
there was little the Board could do in further support of prices . 
The farm depression had been bad before 1930, but after that year 
it had grown much worse. The domestic demand for agricultural 
1 For details of the disposition and inventory of stabilization 
supplies at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1932, see Ibid., p. 70 . 
It seems that the United States wheat carry-over would have 
reached its peak in the middle of 1931 when the Grain Stabilization Cor-
poration ceased purchasing wheat; however, such i s not the case. The 
peak was reached in July, 1932, after the Board had liquidated 147 
million bushels of its holdings. In July, 1933, when stabilizat ion hold-
ings had been completely liquidated, stocks were only s lightly below the 
1932 peak. 
As the Farm Board liquidated its holdings in 1931, other holders 
took up the burden of carrying wheat. Many farmers, merchants, and 
speculators preferred to hold wheat rather than to sell freely at prices 
that seemed too low. Wheat prices rose above the extremely low levels 
of July, August, and September, 1931, and stood too high to permit 
liberal exports. This resulted in a carry-over of 400 m illion bushel,s. 
Again in 1932-33, as the Grain Stabilization Corporation continued 
its liquidation, other holders took up the burden. Once more our wheat 
prices were not low enough to permit liberal exports, and our net exports 
plus shipments to our possessions shrank to 36. 5 million bushels, the 
smallest since 1868-69. See Joseph Stancliffe Davi s, Wheat and the AAA 
(Washington, 1935), pp. 24-27. 
2 U. S. Farm Credit Administration, F i rst Annual Report, 1933, 
p. 57. 
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products had fallen off sharply as the depression affected industry, and 
prices of most farm products had reached levels that had not been seen 
since the depression of the 1890's. 1 
Farmers received an average price of only 31. 6 cents per bushel 
for wheat on December 15, 1932, and the average for the crop year 
was but 37. 5 cents. 2 The farm value of the crop was put at $ 283. 75 
million, the lowest since 1895 . 3 Meanwhile, industrial prices declined 
far less sharply than agricultural prices . By February, 1933, the 
exchange value of farm products for industrial goods was only 50 per 
cent of the pre-war average, and thei.r value in terms of taxes and 
interest was even less. 4 It became evident that the c ountry was faced 
with a very serious agricultural crisis. Under such c onditions as these, 
it was virtually a certainty that further farm legi s lation would be 
enacted soon. 
The Federal Farm Board Is Abolished 
The stage was set for large-scale government i nt ervention when 
the Democratic administration took office in March, 1933. In a 
1 Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 264. 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situation 
(Washington, September-December, 1949), p. 21. 
3 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1936, (Washington, D. C., 1936), pp. 5-6 . 
4 Chester C. Davis, "The Development of Agricultural Policy Since 
the End of the World War," Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940 (Washington, 
1940), p. 313. 
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presidential order of May 26, 1933, the Federal Farm Board was 
abolished and on May 27, the Farm Credit Administration was organized. 
The executive order creating the Farm Credit Administration pro-
vided that the powers and functions of all Federal agencies dealing 
primarily with agricultural credit should be consolidated within the new 
agency. 1 The function of financing cooperatives and the remaining assets 
of the Farm Board were taken over by the Farm Credit Administration. 
The asrsets remaining in the Agricultural Marketing Act revolving fund 
were used in capitalizing the newly created banks for cooperatives, and 
in establishing a loan fund for their use. Thus, although the Farm Board 
was abolished and its stabilization corporations placed in liquidation, the 
function of making commodity, facility, and operating loans to coopera-
tives wa.s preserved. 2 
The Farm Board in Retrospect 
Unfortunately, the Federal Farm Board experiment was launched 
at the worst possible time, with the occurrence of the financial panic of 
1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression. Furthermore, the 
Canadian Wheat Pool for several years had been trying to maintain 
world wheat prices by withholding supplies from the market and the 
1 U. S. Farm Credit Administration, First Annual Report, 1933, 
p. 4. 
2 Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 264. 
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consequent substantial surpluses from this source overhung the market 
when the Farm Board experiment was started. 1 
The Farm Board program was predicated on the view that agricul-
ture ts principal need was for a better organized marketing system 
developed along cooperative lines. Measures for surplus control and 
prevention were to be of secondary importance . However, after one 
year of operation the Board had become convinced that production 
control was essential if farm prices and farm incomes were to be 
stabilized. In its first annual report the Board stated: 
... the board regards measures for prevention of surpluses, through 
control of excessive production, as absolutely essential to stabilizing 
farm prices and farm incomes. Cooperative associations and stabili-
zation corporations, supplemented by other devices , may prove able 
to deal with temporary or occasional surpluses. But none of these, nor 
all together, nor any government agency can protect farmers from the 
consequences of repeated or continuous production in excess of market 
requirements . Adjustments of production to market requirements are 
indispensable, in agriculture as in industry, to the solution of surplus 
probiems. 2 
After two additional years of experience with surplus control 
methods, particularly through "stabilization" operation& to hold com-
modities off the market, the Board was even more convinced that pro.:. 
duction control measures were needed to make the program effective. 
In its third, and last, report the Board concluded: 
1 Fainsod and Gordon, Government and the American Economy, 
p. 115 . 
2 U. S. Federal Farm Board, First Annual Report for the Year 
Ending June 30, 1930, pp. 25-26. 
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Experience with stabilization . . . demonstrates that no measure 
for improving the price of farm products other than increasing the 
demand of consumers can be effective over a period of years unless it 
provides a more definite control of production than has been achieved 
so far . . . . For the great staple products . . . the problem still 
remains for future solution. 1 
Although the Farm Board was not able to obtain its objective of 
placing the agricultural industry on a basis of economic equality with 
other industry, it is not fair to pronounce its program a failure, cer-
tainly not a complete failure. As previously stated, the Farm Board 
program was launched at the. worst possible time, therefore its outcome 
was partly due to unfortunate timing. At that time no one could forsee 
the deteriorating economic conditions and the multitudinous problems 
that were to be brought about by the Great Depression. 
The Board's funds were too small. If Congress had voted it 
additional funds, perhaps it could have carried some of the bumper 
wheat crop of 1931 over into the less productive years of 1933-1936. 
But at that time the American public had not yet become accustomed to 
thinking of appropriations for farm programs or any domestic programs 
short of war, in terms of billions of dollars. Even one-half billion 
dollars was a startling amount to be used for such purposes. 
The Board experienced a huge dollar loss , but as Professor 
Schickele states, "from the viewpoint of the economy as a whole, no 
real losses were suffered ... , since all the surpluses were actually 
1 U. S. Federal Farm Board, Third Annual Report for the Year 
Ending June 30, 1932, p. 62. 
5 
i01 
·· ~ha:nneled irilo a'f)propriat.e u.ses. ul The progra,m, i11adequ~te to achieve 
its objective:. demonstr.a,ted the futility Qf ~tempti:ng lo control pri'2~s 
through marketing adjustments without eff eetive authority to contro1 
production. This belief became the ba,si.s for succeeding legisl~fion~ 
By 1933, Congress, businessmen, farmers, and the general public were 
ready to abandon .orthodox approaches to the agricultural dilemrQ.a., such 
a.s those m~de by the Farm Bo.ard, and were wilting to ~ccept an 1.3.g;ri ... 
cultural program of unprecedented proportion$. 
1 Ra:;i.ner Schickele, Agri.cuttural Policy: Fa:rm P.rogr~ms ~:qd 
NationalWelfare (New York, 1954), p.· Hf(). 
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CHAPTER VII 
FROM THE AAA OF 1933 TO WORLD WAR II 
PART I 
THE AAA OF 1933 
The Plight of the Farmer 
The agricultural situation had reached near crisis proportions .by 
1932. Fa:rmersl' purchasing power had been drastically decreased, and 
they were struggling with the lowest pri¢es in decades.. Many people 
believed that our agricultural e,conomy was about to collapse. Jndusttial 
workers a:nd busi.nessmen were also facing difficult situations. F;;l'.rm 
prices, however,. had fallen further th~n tho.se of nonfarm goods .a:nd 
.services. In 1932, using the 1910"."1914 base as H)O, the prices of !,arm 
products stood at 65~ A mere three years earlier, 1929, they had stood 
at 148--over twice as high. On the other h.and, the prices of things . . . . . 
bought by farmers for pro.duction and famity maintenance had f~llen cmly 
about one third, from 15Q to lQ~, during the same pe:riod. The ratto of 
prfoes received by. farmers to prices pa.id, using the 1910,,.J4 base ~s 
100, stood at 58. 1 
The plight of the farmer and the need for taking immediate action 
for his relief was empha.tically depicted by :au~iness Week. The f~rmer 
1 . . .. 
United St.ates Department of Agric~Iture, Agri~ultu:r.al Statistics, 






was pictured as a ttworn veteran" in misfortune 1s army alongside whom 
businessmen were but mere nraw recruits. 11 Relief had to come quickly 
if the farmer were to be saved. Among the more specific remedies 
advanced were: shifting taxes from the farmer's back; mortoria on tax, 
interest, and mortgage payments; writing down of mortgages; credit for 
crop production; stabilization of crop prices at higher levels . These 
things, the editorial continued, 11 must be done - -through sound measures 
if possible, through less worthy schemes if no better can be contrived 
quickly enough. 11 1 
A New Farm Pla.n 
Shortly after the inauguration of President Roosevelt, the new 
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace, called a meeting of farm 
leaders to draft a farm-relief bill. Farm leaders representing every 
.( 
shade of opinion, every commodity, and every locality, descended' on 
Washington. There were nearly as many "remedies" offered for relief 
as there were groups present. And to add to the complexity of the 
gathering there came 11 ••• the forces of opposition--the grain dealers, 
the meat packers, the millers, the cotton converters, and the hundreds 
of business elements that ... 5'ver~ affected by farm legislation. 11 2 
A wide diversity of opinions was represented, and it was almost 
impossible to reach a final agreement among the various conflicting 
1 "Three Farm Roads, u Business Week (February 15, 1933), p. 32. 
2 "Farm Dictator Too?" Business Week (March 22, 1933), p . 13 . 
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elements. There was support for practically every relief scheme ever · 
suggested in the past. Some groups were so bold as to suggest that the 
President should be given coercive power to fix prices on the chief farm 
products, for it was argued that dictatorship was better than starvation. 1 
The bill that finally emerged met with some opposition in Congress, 
especially the Senate, and its passage required the enlistment of support 
from various groups not interested in the original proposal. 2 There was, 
however, unification in respect to at least one point--action. There was 
general agreement that it was necessary to do something for the farming 
population, and to do it quickly. Even those who did not believe the 
program was fundamentally sound did not object vigorously, but they did 
t . 't . d 3 ques 10n 1 s w1s om. 
On May 12, 1933, about two months after the new Administration 
had taken office, the bill became a law under the title Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. 4 Considering the complexity of the problems involved, 
this was a remarkably short time. The terms of the new legislation 
gave the administration broad powers and a wide choice of methods for 
1 Carl T. Schmidt, American Farmers in the World Crisis (New 
York, 1941), p. 120. 
2 Ibid., p. 121. Also see Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, 
Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-1939 (Madison, 1951), 
pp. 467-470. 
3 t'Farm Dole, 11 Business Week (March 29, 1933) , p . 32. 
4 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Public No. 10, U. S. Statutes at 
Large, 73 Congress, 1 sess., XLVIII (May 12, 1933), p. 31. 
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meeting the agrlcultu~a,1 emergency. rt wa.s, to say the least, ~ sta:rtling 
and ambitious program .. A new et"a had, arrived. 
The Act 
The Agrj.cultur·a1 Adjustment Aet (AAA), which was concerned w'ith 
improving the financial position of agriculture in general, involved 
:sweeping innovations in the Qovez-,nmenf(s relation to agriculture~ The 
philosophy unde):"lying the ,Act was similgl" to that which underlay earlier 
plans. Agriculture was regarded as ali industry of fundamental illipor;;.c 
tance which h~d been effectively di.scriminated against. "Surplust'- farm 
commodities weI"e yiewed as the heart of the difficulty, and govef:nm,ental 
aid wa..s considered ess~ntial if farme.rs wer·e to get their 11fair share't of 
the national income. 1 
This Act ~arked a distinct departu:r:e from th.e Agricultur.;al M:BJ:"ket--
i,ng -:Act of 1929. It was much mor~ specific in its objectives and in the 
' ' 
measures necessary to bring them about. For example, the commodity 
loans under the AAA" in e·ontt"~st t9 tho.s.e under th~ Feder;al Fat'm B,Ol.iI"d, .. 
were made tq. fa:rmers upon t.he condition that they pa.rticipate in a. 
1 Jo~~ph S .. ~avis, Wheat and the AAA (Wa.shingto.n, 1935), p. 38. 
I ·,,· 
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production control program whenever such a program was in effect for 
the respective commodity. 1 This was an outright attempt to boost prices 
by restricting production. The Act authorized a fresh attack on the prob-
lem of increasing the purchasing power of farmers by raising the prices 
of farm products. The McNary-Haugen bills, the export debenture plan, 
the domestic allotment plan, and the Agricultural Marketing Act all had 
been designed to solve this same problem. 
The Act proper began with a "Declaration of Emergency" which 
stated that the acute economic emergency in agriculture was 11 •• • in 
part the consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between the 
prices of agricultural and other commodities, . .. n which had seriously 
impaired the farmers .' purchasing power and resulted in a breakdown of 
the orderly exchange of commoditi.es. These conditions, in turn, had 
affected transactions in agricultural commodities with a national public 
interest and had burdened and obstructed the normal currents of 
commerce, calling for the enactment of legislation. 2 
1 The original Agricultural Adjustment Act did not stress com-
modity loans . However, shortly after the passage of the Act, the pres-
sure for immediate and effective price support became so great that a 
loan program for specified commodities was announced in the fall of 
1933 . The Commodity Cr-edit Corporation (CCC) was created by execu-
tive order on October 16, 1933, for the purpose of making nonrecourse 
commodity loans to farmers. It acquired legal status under the 74th 
Congress in January, 1935. Rainer Schickele, Agricultural'PoUcy 
(New York, 1954), p. 191 ; Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis, and 
John D . Black, Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administra -
tion (Washington, 1937), pp. 151-157. 
2 Agricultur'al Adjustment Act, Public No. 10, U. S. Statutes at 
Large, p. 31. 
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The objectives of the Act, in part, were : 
( 1) To establish . . . such balance betwe en the production and 
consumption of agricultural commodities . . . as will 
reestablish prices to farmers at a level that wi ll give agri-
cultural commodities a purchas ing power with respect to 
articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing 
power of agricultural commodit ies in the base period. The 
base period in the case of all agricultural commodities 
except tobacco shall be the pr ewar period, August 1909-
July 1914 .... 
(2) To approach such equality of purchasing power by gradual 
correction of the pr esent inequalities the r e in at as rapid a 
rate as is deemed fea s ible ... . 
(3 ) To protect the consumers r interest by readjust ing farm pro-
duction at such le ve l as wi ll not increase the percentage of 
the consumers 1 retail expendit ur es for agricultural commod-
ities, or products derived therefrom, which is returned to 
the farmer , ab ove the percentage which was returned to the 
farmer in the prewar per iod, August 1909-July 1914. 1 
In view of the thoughts s et forth in the above quoted passages and 
the Declaration of Emergency, it i s evident that the framers of the Act 
were convinced that : (1) agriculture was a (o r the) ''bas ic industry" ; 
(2) the depressed condition of agriculture was part of the cause of 
general depression; (3) general economic recovery was dependent upon 
government aid to agri culture ; (4) the heart of the trouble was the exist-
ing disparity between the prices of agricultural and other commodities; 
(5) the national emergency c a lled for emergency measures t o deal with 
these problems. 2 
l Ibid., p . 32. 
2 For discuss ion of these poi nts, see Davis, Wheat and the AAA, 
pp. 40-41. 
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act was not limited to a definite 
duration, nor was it a permanent act . It was subject to termination 
whenever the President proclaimed the national economic emergency in 
relation to agriculture had ended. 1 The Act was primarily an emergency 
measure and gave little or no emphasis to long-range agricultural plan-
ning. "It is clearly impossible to find a philosophy of long-run economic 
planning for agriculture explicit or even p lainly implicit in the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act as it became law on May 12, 1933 . 11 2 
In order to make possible an adjustment in production, Section 8 
of the Act empowered the Secretary of Agriculture : 
... To provide for reduction in acreage or reduction in the pro-
duction for market, or both, of any basic agricultural commodity, through 
agreements with producers or by other voluntary methods, and to provide 
for rental or benefit payments in connection therewith or upon that part of 
the production of any basic agricultural commodity required for domestic 
1 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Public No. 10, U. S. Statutes at 
Large, p . 39. 
2 Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, p . 27. It soon became clear that longer-term 
economic plans and more settled policies were needed. This led to the 
development of a Program Planning Division. At first the Division gave 
its main attention to assembling and analyzing statistics relating to the 
program, but it later shifted emphasis to longer-term objectives and 
methods . Murray R . Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 
1790-1950 (New York, 1953), pp. 302-303, 346-348. 
For a discussion of this Act as an emergency measure and as a 
long-range plan, see Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, pp. 20-31. 
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consumption, in such amounts as the Secretary deems fair and reason-
able, to be paid out of any moneys available for such payments. 1 
Money for benefit payments was to be obtained mainly from a 
"processing tax" levied on the marketing of the basic commodities. The 
tax was to be levied, assessed and collected upon the first domestic 
processing of each commodity or product.~ In the case of wheat, it was 
to be collected from flour millers. 3 The amount of the tax was to be the 
difference between the prevailing average price of the commodity and its 
fair exchange value, unless the Secretary should determine, after appro-
priate hearings, that the levying of a tax of that magnitude would reduce 
consumption unduly. 4 
1 Agricultural Adjustment Act, · Public No. 10, U. S. Statutes at 
Large, p. 34. The basic commodities were wheat, cotton, fi.eld corn, 
hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk and its products . Ibid., p . 38. An 
amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Jones-Connally Act 
of April 7, 1934, added rye, flax, barley, grain sorghums, cattle, and 
peanuts. An additional amendment (May 9, 1934) brought into this 
classification, sugar beets and sugar cane, and the Warren Potato Act, 
included in the amendments of August 24, 1935, added potatoes to the 
list. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 302. 
2 Agricultural Adjustment Act , Public No. 10, U. S. Statutes at 
Large, p. 35. 
3 Ibid., p. 36. Wheat milled for the producer's own use (and the 
use of his household) was exempt from the tax, and the tax was refunded 
on products milled from wheat if they were turned over to some recog-
nized agency for distribution among the needy unemployed. The tax was 
also refunded on flour which was exported. No tax was imposed upon the 
processing of wheat for feed for livestock. For a discussion of these 
points, see United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration, Agricultural Adjustment, A Report of Administra-
tion of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, May, 1933 to February, 1934 
(Washington, 1934), p . 60 . 
4 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Public No. 10, U. S. Statutes at 
Large, p . 36. 
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Interest Centers on Wheat 
Throughout the evolution of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, wheat 
and wheat growers he ld the center of interest. Davis reports that 
many of the provisions were considered most fully in advance as they 
might apply to wheat, and wheat was named first on the restricted list 
of 11basic n agricultural commodities to which alone certain outstanding 
provisi ons could be applied . 1 
L . J . Tabor, Master of the Nat ional Gran~e, voicing a common 
view of the wheat growersJ support of the Act and their enthusiasm for 
I 
the adoption of a wheat program, stat ed: 
... Wheat is the keystone in the food arch of our civilization. It 
is also basic in much of the agriculture of the nation. Lift ing wheat 
prices and increasing the purchas ing power of the wheat-producing 
farmer will have the larger effect of influencing favorably general agri-
cultural prices . Wheat has been for centuries not only essential in the ~· 
l ife of much of the world 1s population, but it has also been a symbol of 
value. The positi ve effect of lift ing wheat prices would be far-reaching, 
and the indirect benefits accruing to agriculture would also be 
substantial. 2 
The Wheat Progr am 
The wheat program was the first commodity pr ogram to be 
announced under the new Act . The wheat adjustment plar.i, June 16, 1933 , 
offered wheat growers three years of allotment benefits and two years of 
acreage restrictions under contr act s by indiv idual farmers with the 
1 Davi s, Wheat and the AAA , p . 28 . 
2 Ibid. , p . 28, citing Minutes of Informal Public Conference of 
Wheat Growers, Ha ndlers , and Processors (held by the AAA, May 26, 
1933), p . 31. This statement was submitted after t he close of the 
conference . 
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Secretary of Agriculture. 1 In order to be eligible for benefit payments, 
the individual wheat grower had to sign a contract whereby he agreed not 
to plant to wheat more than a specified percentage of his corr esponding 
planted acreage in a given base period. Thi s percentage was set by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. The restriction on the acreage was an attempt 
to prevent the hoped for increase in income to wheat growers from 
stimulating an expansion of production and thus defeating the objectives 
of the program. 
In 1935 a second contract was offered to wheat growers to cover 
the harvest years 1936-1939. In 1936 growers were permitted to plant 
up to 95 per cent of their base acreage , but the Secretary was authorized 
to set this figure as low as 75 per cent in later years . The s i gn-up was 
nearly completed when, on January 6, 1936, this form of contractual 
1 Benefit payments, which were made out of funds der ived from 
processing taxes, were made only to those producers who co-operated 
in restricting acreage. For 1933-34, eli gible growers were offered a 
benefit payment of from 28 to 30 cents per bushel on an allotment repre-
senting 54 per cent of the average production on the ir wheat land in 
1928-1932. To be eligible for this, however, they had t o restrict the ir 
wheat acreage (sown) to 85 per cent of the average sown on their land 
for the crops of 1930-1932. They were also offered the prospect of 
further payments in 1934-35 and 1935-36, but with the understanding 
that they might be required to restrict their ac r eage sown for 1935 by 
not more than 20 per cent of the average for 1930-1932. Although for 
the 1935 crop the percentage under the contract m ight have been set by 
the Secretary of the Agriculture as low as 80 per cent of the -acreage 
planted during the base period, it was actually put at 90 per cent for 
that year and 95 per cent for 1936. Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three 
Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, pp. 93-95; Davis, 
w.heat and the AAA, pp. 60 - 61. For a more det ailed discussion of 
allotments and acreage requirements for 1933-34 and 1934-35, see Ibid., 
pp. 6 3 - 7 0 and 13 7 -14 0. 
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production control was declared uncpnstitutional by the SupremeLCourt 
of the United States. 1 However, ;lt"rangements were eventu,ally made 
whereby those signers who had observed these provisions in their fall 
sowings of wheat prior to the Supreme Courfts ruling, could receive 
benefit payments upon certification of complLa.nce. 2 
Effect of Crop Controls and Drought 
on Production and Price 
First year sign-ups for acreage reductions in wheat covered about 
75 per cent of the acreage in the ba.se period. Full compliance would 
have reduced the total acreage sown in 1934 to a level about 12 per cent 
below the 1930-32 average. provided nonsigners did not change their 
. . 
acreages sown. The total acreage sown for 1934, however, was only 
about 4 per cent under the 1930-32 ayerage. This resulted from :reduc ... 
tions of more than the required 15 per cent by the wheat growers under 
contract~ accompanied by increases on the part of many nonsigners~ 
some of whom were 11ew growers. 3 
1 The production-adjustment contract program for wheat was dis.,. 
continued as a result of the decision of the United States Supreme Cou.rt 
in the Hoosa:c Mills case on January 6, 1931:L This case is discussed . 
subsequently. 
2 ~upplemental Appropriation Act, Public No. 440, U. S. Statutes 
~t Large, 74 Congi-ess, 2 sess .• XLIX. (February 11, 1936), p. 1117.; 
3 Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Ye.ars of the Agricultural 
Adjui:;tment Administration, p. 125. · 
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The severe drought of 1934 (extremely severe in most of the wheat 
and corn areas) led to relaxation of restrictions on production and made 
it virtually impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy how much 
change in production was due to the AAA program and how much was the 
result of weather conditions . 1 In regard to this point, Nourse, Davis, 
and Black conclude that: 
In the absence of the AAA contraction efforts, the crop of 1934 would 
probably have been about as large as in 1933 whereas it was actually 
25 to 30 million bushels less . . . . Nature was primarily responsible 
for reduc ing the crop ... below the 1928-1932 a verage. 2 
The 1935 wheat crop was nearly 240 m illion bushels below the 1928-
1932 average. Almost all of this net reduction has been attributed to 
adverse weather conditions. 3 Contract signers had been required to hold 
their acreage seeded down to 90 per cent of thei r base acreage, but the 
aggregate of nons i gners increased the i.r sown acreage by more than 
contract signers reduced theirs. As a result, the overall acreage seeded 
to wheat (winter and spring) exceeded the 1930-32 a verage . 4 In the 
spring of 1935, when haryest prospects were poor, con~ract terms were 
greatly relaxed. Thi s permitt ed wint er wheat growers t o harvest whatever 
1 Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p . 312. 
2 Nourse, Davis , and Black, Three Years of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administrati on, pp. 125-126. See Infra., Appendix, Table I. 
For additional and more detailed discussion on this point, see Davis, 
Wheat and the AAA, pp. 347-354. 
3 Nourse, Davi s, and Black, Three Year s of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, p. 126. 
4 See Infra., Appendix, Table I. 
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they had sown, providing that they agreed to make a relatively larger 
reduction in acreage seeded the following year. 1 
Nourse and his colleagues report that if the AAA program had not 
been in force, somewhat more hard winter wheat would have been sown 
for harvest in 1935. But they are doubtful if the total crop of 1935 would 
have been more than about 20 million bushels larger than it actually was. 2 
Furthermore, they considered it quite improbable that the AAA could have 
achieved a net reduction of the wheat crop averaging over, or even as 
much as, 160 million bushels a year without resort to coercive measures. 3 
Summarizing the net results of crop controls during the first three 
years of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, these authors, on the basis of 
their comprehensive study of the AAA program, conclude that: 
. . . the experience with production control in 1933-35, so far as we can 
observe it through the dust of the drought is that the effectiveness of 
these devices is such as to make them practicable in emergency periods. 
Should crises of similar magnitude reappear in the future and could 
constitutional barriers be avoided or removed, such efforts could again 
be used to advantage for a period of two or three years. The experience 
does not, however, give support to the belief that s im ilar controls could 
be made practicable as a means of holding the course of production over 
the years close to a line laid out in accordance with a continuously 
operating economic plan. 4 
1 Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of the Agri cultural 
Adjustment Administration, p. 126 . 
2 Ibid., p. 127. 
3 Ibid., p. 128. 
4 Ibid., p . 150. 
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The all-farm-products index, which had dropped to 65 in 1932, 
advanced to 70 in 1933 and increased sharply, to 114, by 1936. 1 . The 
average price received by farmers in 1932 for wheat was 37. 5 cents per 
bushel. This price advanced to 73. 6 cents in 1933, 83. 9 cents in 1934, 
and stood at 82. 7 cents at the end of 1935. This was an increase from 
the i_932 level of better than 100 per cent. 2 It would he extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. to estimate the exact reason or reasons for 
these price advancements. Recovery in the nonfarm sector of the 
economy and heavy expenditures for relief gave support to farm prices. 
The overall priee increase during the period 1933 to 1936, however, 
appears to hc1.ve been mainly the result of short crops brought about by 
the severe drought. Benefit pc1.yments undoubtedly ne.lped many farmers 
to maintain ownership of their farm.s. but they amounted to only $1, 437 
million during this four-year period. This was less than 5 per cent of 
farmersl'.. total cash receipts. 3 
Indirect Effects of the Program 
Discussing the indirect effects of the farm program during the 
1933-1936 period, Benedict st~.tes: 
l United States Department of Agricultu:re, Agric:ultu.ral Statistics, 
1952, p. 682. 
~
2 United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situ.ation 
(Washington, February. 1955), p. 2. 
3 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statisli.ca.J Abstract of the Uaj.ted. 
States, t948 (Washington, D. C., 19.48), p. 622. 
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The record does not indicate any significant effect from the farm 
program i.n serving as a stimulus to recovery in the economy as a whole. 
For the most part the additional direct payments to farmers constituted 
comparable reductions in the spendable incomes of consumers since the 
funds were raised by means of processing taxes which, in the main, were 
passed on to the ultimate consumer. Money supplied in the form of loans 
was more generally created through deficit financing, and thus constituted 
new buying power . Much of it merely enabled farmers to pay off or 
refinance debts . . . . Broadly speaking, the farm and nonfarm segments 
of the economy seem to have advanced concurrently, with the nonfarm seg-
ment leading the way. There is ... some indication that if the droughts 
of this period had not curtailed farm production and facilitated liquidation 
of the accumulated stocks of farm products, agriculture might have 
lagged behind much as it did in the 1920 1s . 1 
Thus Benedict questions the s ignificance of the effects of the farm 
program as a stimulus to general economic recovery. Although he feels 
that the program was undoubtedly helpful in some respects, he . is inclined 
to believe that other factors were more significant . 
There is general agreement that the processing tax on wheat caused 
consumers' expenditures to be increased by approximately the total 
amount of the tax. Since the tax was not shifted t o producers in the form 
of lower prices, benefit payments represented net additions to the incomes 
of wheat growers participating in the agricultural program. However, this 
was not true in the case of processi ng taxes on pork. Consumer demand 
for pork, for which ther'e are many alternatives, is relatively more 
e lastic than it is for wheat. An increase in pork prices will therefore 
encourage consumers to turn to substitutes for which prices are lower. 
Neither beef or poultry products, both of which are pork substitutes, 
were subject to processing taxes. 
1 Benedict, Farm Polic ies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 315 . 
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Benedict is not in complete agreement with Nourse, Davis, and 
Black. They feel that the AAA exerted a significant influence toward 
accelerating the release of purchasing power into the general market. 
They state that "there would seem to be no reason to question the validity 
of the assertion that benefit payments and other forms of enhanced farm 
income moved briskly into circulation. 111 They conclude their discussion 
of this point with the fo llowing statement: "The experience discredited 
those who believe that agricultural relief could bring ab out complete 
general recovery, but support those who maintain that it was an i mportant 
positive element in a co-ordinated recovery program .... 11 2 
The AAA Declared Unconstit utional 
The Supreme Court decision in the Hoosac Mi lls case in January, 
1936, brought the production-control features of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act to a sharp halt. The Court held that the use made of the pro-
ceeds of a processing tax levied under the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
1 Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, pp. 432 "-433. 
2 Ibid., p. 448. For a detailed discussion of the contribution of 
the 1933 AAA program toward general economic recovery through 
increased agricultural purchasing power, see United States Department 
of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Agricultural 
Adjustment, A Report of Administration of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, May, 1933 to February, 1934, pp. 261-270. Also, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 
Agricultural Adjustment 1934, A Report of Administ ration of the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act, February 15, 1934 to December 31, 1934 
(Washington, 1935) , pp . _271-284. 
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constituted "control of agricultural productionu and was therefore 
unconstitutional because it was an invapi.on of rights reserved to the 
states. 1 
At first f al:'m leaders were stunned by the Court's decision. 
Efforts were promptly made, however, to find some way of continuing 
benefit payments which would be unaffected by the Hoosac Mill,s deciE>ion. 
A new approach was found in a shift in emphasis from acreage control to 
soil conservation. 
PART II 
THE SOIL CONSERVATION AND 
DOMESTIC ALLOTMENT ACT 
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the Hoosac Mills 
case, Congress quickly enacted Sections 7 to 17, inclusive, of the Soil 
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. 2 This Act led to emphasis 
upon soil conservation as the core of the agricultural control prograni. 
Even before the Hoosac Mills deci.sion, severe drought and dust storms 
had dramatically demonstrated .a definite need for soil conservation~ 
1 United States v. William M. Butler e.t al.. Receivers of Hoosac 
Mills Corporation.,, 297 u. S. 1 (1936), 
2 Soil Conservation c3.nd Domestic Allotment Act; Public No. 461, 
U. S. Statutes at Large, 74 Congress, 2 sess., XLIX (February 29, 
1936), p. 1148. TeGhnically this Act was a.n Amendment to the Soil 
Erosion Act of 1935. 
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The Soil Erosion Act of 1935 was a forward step in soil conservation 
legislation, but it was not designed and did not satisfy the demand for 
additional income. 
The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act stemmed, in 
part, from long-time research and planning and probably somewhat 
similar legislation would have been enacted irrespective of the Hoosac 
Mills case. However, the decisi on in that case undoubt edly hastened 
the enactment of the new legi slation and influenced the income enhance-
ment feature of the Act. According to the 1936 r eport of the Adminis-
trator of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, thi s legi slation 
had been originally planned in late 1934 and represented a 11 • • • transi-
tion from the temporary emergency phase of the adjustment programs 
to a long-time phase which would give a larger place to soil 
t . "1 conserva 10n .... 
Objectives of the Act 
The declared objectives of the Act were to promote the economic 
use and conservation of the land, preserve and i mprove the fertility of 
the soil, diminish exploitation of soil resources, protect rivers and 
harbors against the results of soil erosion, and finally to reestablish 
... at as rapid a rate as the Secretary of Agriculture determines to be 
practicable and in the general public interest, . . . the rat i o between 
the purchasing power of the net income per person on farms and that of 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, Agricultural Conservation 1936, A Report of the Activities 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, 1937), p . 1. 
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the income per person not·on farms that prevailed during the fiv.e year· 
period .August 1909'.'"July 1914 ... ~ 1 
The latter objective wa.s in contrast to the major objective of the 
Act of 1933 to ". . . reestablish prices to farmers at a level that will 
give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with r.espect to 
articles that farmers buy. equivalent to the purchasing power of agri-
cultural commodities in the base period. ,,2 
Thus there was a stated change in emphasis from a np.arity pricen 
objective to a ''parity income" objective, which was undoubtedly a. sounder 
goal to wo:t'k toward. With uincome parity)!' .as an objective. as contrasted 
with "price parity, rr prices of farm products might fluctuate above and 
below thei:t:" parity levels without violating the policy objective, Since 
income is dependent upon both price a_nd volume, either a large c:rop ;;:tt 
a lower price or a smaller crop at a higher price could be equal to ~n 
aver.age crop at ''par'ity price. ri The goal .of trincome parity. 11 however. 
was not attained through this Act. 
Procedure of Payments 
Under the Soil C onserv~Ltion Act, no distinction was made between 
' 1basicu and ':fnonbasic'' commodities as had been .done under the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Instead, crops were classified 
1 Soil Conservl:ttion and Domestic Allotment Act, Public No. 461, ' 
U. S. ·Statutes at Large. p. 1148. 
2 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Public N;o. 10, U. S. StaJq.tes .at 
Large, p. 32. · 
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into two general categories, ltsoil-depleting•t and 11 soi1-conserving. H 
Although the general classification varied considerably among regions, 
generally .speaking the "soil-depletingn. crops were the intensively culti"'.' 
v.ated row crops such as corn. cotton, and tobacco, and the small grains 
such a.s wheat and oats all of which were in hel;lvy, price-depressing 
supply. Grasses., legumes. and green..,.manure crops were classifi.ed as 
nsoile:conserving'1 crops. 1 
Farmers were paid for shifting acreages from soil.,..depleting to 
soil-conserving crops. The p:a.y.ments for sh:iJting land out of whe.a.t 
production averaged about .$10 per ac.re. The maximum acreage on 
which such payments were made was limited to 15 per cent of the ba.se 
acreage of a farm. 2 Seventy::-three per; cent of the cropland in the wheat 
region was under the p,rogram1 and consequently. practicaUy all of the · 
diverted acreage in that region was diverted from wheat. 3 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Conse.:rva.-
tion 1936, p. 42. Certain uses of land were classified as neutral. 
Included in such classification were: Tree fruits. vineyards, nut tte.es, 
idle cropland, etc. See Ibid. , p. 42. 
-· --· 
2 Ibid., p. 43. For an explana,tion of the establishment of acreage 
bases, see Ibid. • p. 41. 
3 Ibid .. • p. 48. The program was financed by funds appropriated by 
the Con-gress from the Treasury. The Act authorized annuai appropria-
Uons of not mor,e than $ 500 million. Soii Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act, Public NQ,. 461, U. S. St,a.tutes ~t Large, P·. 1151. 
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Prices and 'Production 
As a result of the combined effects of the AAA acreage res.trictio·ns 
and the extreme drought, wheat production was relatively low during the 
per-iod 1933 through 1936. 1 Prices received by farmers for whe.at in 1936 
showed conside.rable improvement and re,ached their highest levels since 
1928. 2 Unsatisfactory levels of income from wheat farming in 1936 wei:-e, 
therefore, more a result of low production than they were of low prices. 
The acre~ge seeded for the 1937 harvest rose markediy over that 
seeded the previous year, and total wheat production increased nea.r-ly 
40 per eent over that of 1936. 3 The return of 11normat1 growing conc{i .... 
tions and better than average yields revealed some of the limitations. of 
the conservation progr:am~ The large er.op of 1937, along with a: la:,rge 
seeded acreage and excellent crop conditions. for 1938, again brought 
wheat growers face to face with a ~mrplus problem and low prices. 
Once more the Administration was forced to rec·onsider its program, 
and once again farmers were impelled to turn to plans for more ;rigid 
' . 
control of production. 
1 See Infra .• Appendix, Table I. 
2 See Inf,ta. ,. Appendix, Table IL 
3 ' ' . ,' 
See Infra~, Appendix, Table L 
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Comparison with AAA of 1933 
The conservation program of 1936 a:nd the AAA of 1933 were alike · 
in some respects. They both sought to achieve immediate improvement. 
in farming conditions. To attain this objective, both plans made pay-
ments to farmers which, in both instances, were conditioned upon 
farmers' making adjustments in acreage as compared to a base which 
was intended to approximate nnormal. n 
There were differences. however, between the two approaches. 
The earlier plan aimed at parity of price, while the conservation plan 
claimed its major purpose to be conservation of soil resources. The 
writer does not accept this. as the chief aim of the Soil Conservation 
Act. The new program had much to commend it as a means. of stimulating 
farmer interest in conservation of soil resources, but it seems that the 
major intent of the legislation was to cut down production of major ca;sh 
crops, enhance price and increase income to farmers. 
There wer<e also differences in the methods of making payments 
under the two Acts. Under the AAA, payments were arranged through· 
contracts with individual producers. Under the conservation plan con-
tracts were not used. Instead, the rates of payment .and the conditions 
under which they could be made were simply announced to farmers. 
Payments were then made when it was e.st.ablished that the prescribed 
conditions had been fulfilled. 
Other differences between the two programs were: (1) Production 
adjustment under the AAA inv<>lved the use of processing taxes where.as 
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the conservation plan was financed from the Federa,l Treasury. (2) The 
soil-conservation plan applied to all farms and to all commodities, but 
the produ~tion-adjustment plan, in contrast, :applied only to the Gommodi· 
ties designated as basic. Since the p):"odu.c·er was permitted to deteI'mine 
the crop in which reduction should be made, the conservation plan wa.s 
more flexible in its adaptation to individual farm conditions. On the 
other hand, this feature made it largely incapable of securing 
predetermined adjustments in the total output of any given commodity. 
PART III 
TUE AAA O!i' 1938 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 became a law on February 
16 of that year. 1 The background of that Act consisted primarily of four 
factors: (1) drought" which in 1934 and 1936 ,showed the nee.d for con-
trolled reserves of wheat and corn for food .and feed; (2) the record 
crop of 1937 and the prospect of a large crop in 1938, a situation which 
threatened to ruin farmers with surpluses ,again; (3) the Hoosac Mills 
decision, which invalidated product,ion control as a means of protecting 
farm prices; and (4) the inadeq:uacy of. the Soil Conservation. and Domestic 
Allotment Act of 19{36 as the means for attacking the total problem~ 
' . . . . 
1 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193.81 . Public No. 430, U. s~ 
Statutes .at Large, ·75 Congress. 3 sess,, LH (February 16, 1938)/ p~. 31. 
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Parity Payments 
Section 3()3 of the Act authorized the Se.cretary of l\grtculture to 
continue to make "parity'·l payments to producers of wheat on their 
. . 
•tnorma1111 prod{iction insofar as funds might be appropriated for that 
purpose. That is, if sufficient funds were available, cooperating 
1 nNormal productionn was defined by the Act as the nnorm~l 
yield11 per acre for the farm times the numb.er of acres. The "nor'malH 
yield for .any fal"m was def'i;ned as the a:ve~a,ge yield pe.:r acre of whe,at 
for the farm, adjusted for abnormal weather conditions and for .tr-ends. 
in yields during the ten Galend~ ye:ars imme<iiately preceding the year 
for which such not'mal yi~ld was to be used in any compufa.tion 
authorized by the Act. Ibid~,. pp. 41.-42. 
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producers were eligible for direct payments in amounts that would make 
up the differenc~ between the prices received in the market and "parity" 
. 1 prices. 
1 Parity price as defined in the Act of 1938 differed from the 
definition used between 1933 and 1936. In addition to the commodities 
that farmers buy, parity price was also to " ... reflect current interest 
payments per acre on farm indebtedness secured by real estate, tax 
payments per acre on farm real estate, and freight rates, as contrasted 
with such interest payments, tax payments, and freight rates during· the 
base period. The base period in the case of all agricultural commodities 
except tobacco shall be the period August 1909 to July 1914 .... n 
Ibid., p. 38. 
This is in contrast to the 1933 Act under which parity price was 
one " ... that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power 
with respect [onli) to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the pur-
chasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period. ,r Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act, Public No. 10, U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 32. 
(Italics not in the original.) 
Thus if the various additional payments included in the 1938 parity 
computation had risen more than had the prices of commodities bought 
by farmers, the effect of the change would be to make the "parity" price 
higher than it would have been under the Act of 193 3. 
"Parity inQome 11 was defined as 11 ••• that per capita net income 
of individuals on farms from farming operations that bears to the per 
capita net income of individuals not on farms the same relation as pre-
vailed during the period from August 1909 to July 1914. n Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938, Public No. 430, U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 38. 
This is only a more precise formulation of the parity income definition 
of the 1936 Act which had used the expression" ; .. ratio between the 
purchasing power of net income per person on farms and that of the 
income per person not on farms . . ,r, Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotme,nt Act, Public No. 461, U S. Statutes at Large, p. 1148. 
Acreage Allotments and Soil Conservation 
Features as Applied to Wheat 
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Title I of the 1938 Act consisted of amendments to the Soil Conser-
vation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. 1 The aggregate amount of 
conservation payments was retained at $ 500 million. Participation in 
the program remained voluntary, and specific conservation standards 
had to be met before farmers were eligible for benefit payments. Wheat 
growers were required to plant within their assigned acreage allotments 
in order to qualify for benefit payments under the conservation program. 
Deductions from these benefit payments, and loss of eligibility for 
maximum commodity loans and for parity payments were provided for in 
cases of planting beyond the acreage allotments. 2 
National wheat acreage allotments, which were calculated to meet 
domestic, export, and reserve needs, were to be announced each year 
not later than July 15. These allotments were then broken down by 
states, counties, and individual farms . The national acreage allotment 
for any crop of wheat was defined by the Act as the acreage which at 
average yields would produce, with the carry-over from the previous 
year, not less than 130 per cent of a year's normal domestic consumption 
and export requirements. 3 
1 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Public No. 430, U. S. 
Statutes at Large, p. 31. 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment, 
1937 - 38, p. 108. 
3 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938., Public No. 430, U. S. Sta-
tutes at Large, pp. 53-54. 
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It was provided that wheat allotments were to be on the basis of 
11 , • • tillable acres, crop-rotation practices, type of soil, and topog-
raphy. 11 1 Up to 3 per cent of the allotment for a given county might be 
assigned to farms on which wheat had not been planted in the preceding 
years . 2 This provision modified the base-acreage plan of the 1933 Act 
which tended to freeze allotment rights in the hands of those who were 
already in the wheat-growing business. 
Wheat Marketing Quotas 
The Act provided for marketing quotas for wheat, to be effective 
after July 1, 1938 . 3 Thi s was a new feature in AAA legi slation. The 
Secretary of Agriculture was required to determine not later than May 
15 of each year the total United States supply of wheat as of the beginning 
of the next marketing year. If t h i s supply exceeded a normal yearl s 
domestic consumption and export requirements by as much as 35 per 
cent, a national marketing quota indicating the amount that could be 
marketed was to be proclaimed for the following market ing year . 4 
1 Ibi d . , p. 33 . 
2 Ibid., p . 33 . 
3 Ib id . , p. 54. The marketing quota is a device for regulating the 
marketing of specified commodities in the event that supplies become 
excessive . The marketing quota for an individual farm i s , in effect, the 
quantity produced on the acreage allotment . 
4 Ibid., p. 54 . A "normalu year-1s domestic con,sumption in the case 
of wheat was to be the yearly average quantity of the commodity, wherever 
produced, that was consumed in the United States during the ten marketing 
years immediately preceding the marketing year in which such consump-
tion was determined, adjusted for current trends in consumption. Ibid. , 
p . 41. --
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The nation,al m~rketing quota wa:5- to be expressed in terms o! 
.. , . . . . ~ .. 
bushels of wh'8-at ~nd ialtocated to produce~s in terllls of the number of 
acres which, at average :rra:tion~l yields, would produce the ~mOU,ilt of 
the quota. l If carried in.to effect, the quota would mean that each grower 
would be autbprized to sell not more than .a specified amount represent .. 
ing his authorized portion of the total amount that .could be marketed 
without tax. If more than thi.s amount was marketed, the exces.s was 
subject to a penalty tax of 15 cents per bushel. This applied to tu1y 
f.armer., regardless of whethet:' he was .a cooperator in the pJ;'Oduction 
control progr~ or not. 2 
Within a specified date after proclamation of a marketing quota, 
the Secretary was required to conduct .a referendum among the grofaters 
to determine whether they opposed or fa:vored the quota. If mor:e th:roi ~ 
third of the wheat grower-s voting were opposed, the quota would not 
become effective, 3 
Wheat Loans 4 
The 1938 Act authorized the Commodity Cl"edit Corporatio11;, upon 
the recommendation of the $eqretary and with the ,approval of the 
1 Ibid.~'. p. 54. 
2 Agticultu:ral Adjustment Act of 193.8, Public No. 430, l;J". S •. :Sta-.. 
tutes at L.arge, p . .!i5. . .· .. 
3 Ibid .. , p. 55. ~. 




President, to make available to cooperators loans upon wheat providing 
that certain conditions existed. If the price of wheat was below 52 per 
cent of parity on June 15, the close of the crop year, or if the current 
year's estimated production was 1n excess of a normal year vs domestic 
consumption and exports, loans were to be available at not less than 
52 per cent nor more than 7 5 per cent of the parity price of wheat at the 
beginning of the marketing year. The exact point at which the loan was 
to be set was left to the Secretary of Agriculture. Loans were to be 
made only to cooperators in the program except when marketing quotas 
were in effect. In that case noncooperatorsr loans were to be limited to 
60 per cent of the rate applicable to cooperators, and they were to be 
made only on as much of thei.r crop as would be subject to penalty if 
marketed under the marketing quota. In years when supplies reached 
levels at wh:i.ch the application of marketing quotas was authorized by the 
Act, loans were not to be offered if more than one ... thir'd of the wheat 
growers voting in the referendum were opposed to such marketing quotas. 1 
The loans were designed to help hold price-depressing influences 
in check and to enable producers, without financial hardship, to carry 
over supplies from years of unusually large production to be marketed in 
years of crop shortage. It was believed that the carrying over of supplies 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, Agricultural Adjustment 1938-39, A Report of the Activi-
ties Carried on by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Wash-
ington, 1939), p. 33. 
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would help maintain .for donsumers a:n :adequate supply of whe.at at fair 
prices. rt was also believed that .such a program would help .stabilize 
farmersr incomes by avoiding alternate ove):"gupplies anci Sc_al'citi.e_s with 
consequent severe price fluctuations~ 1 
The loans were to be of the no.nrecourse type. That is, if the 
market price ro.se .sufficiently, and the 1armer could pay the storage on 
his wheat and the interest on, the loan, he could sell it and realize the 
resulting profit on the transaction. On the other hand, if the price fell 
below the suppe:rt level, the ho,;r,"rowet" could surrender_ his whep.t in 
satisfaction of the loan and would not be liable for ,any lo.ss tha:t might 
accrue to the government if the value of the security surrende:red ~as . . ! . . . . 
insufficien:t to ~over the amount of t.he loa:tt. This arrangement afforded 
protection to the wheat g:r?Ower in the ev;ent of either a: declining or .a 
rising market. 
Crop Insur;1nte for Wheat 2 
Title V of the Act c:reated a Feder,al Crop In~mrance Cqrpo:r:a.tiC>n 
which was authorized to offer, crop insurance to whea.t fiirmers, .b_egin;;-
ning with whe;at harvested in 1939. Pre:rniurns altd losses were to .be 
c~lcu1ated in ter-m_s of bushels of wheat, a,nd payments of either could 
1 Uni.ted States DepaI"tment of Agriculture, Agricultural 1\djusttnent 
i 9 3 7 .;. 3 8.. pp'. 118-119 ~ .. . . . 
·2 Ibid • ., pp. 116."7117. For details of th.is part of the Act,, s~e: Agr-i-
cultural Adjus.tmep.t Act .al 1938, Public No, 430,: tr. s. Statutes at L~;rge, 
PP~ 72-77. 
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be made in wheat or in cash. During the first three years of operations, 
contracts were not to be for more than one ye.ar at a time, and farmers 
could insure for either 50 per cent or 75 per cent of their average yield. 
The Board, in December, 1944, was authorized to limit the issuance of 
insurance by specifying that insurance could not be offered in any county 
unless a certain minimum number of applications for insurance was 
received from farmers in that county. This was, no doubt, to avoid the 
inconvenience and resulting high costs of administering widely scattered 
contracts. 
The results of crop insurance were disappointing. Loss claims 
paid during all of the first three years of operation amounted to more 
than premiums collected. This was true even though national yields in 
these years exceeded the fifteen-year average by 2, 14, and 32 per cent 
respectively. 1 
In 1941 the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation's Board of Directors 
decided to enlist the services of an outside, disinterested committee to 
study the operations of the Corporation and make recommendations. 
Approximately a year later the committee submitted its report, stressing 
the following criticisms and recommendations: 
Contracts should be for more than one year to avoid adverse 
selection in prospective ly bad years. Termination should be permitted 
only after a fairly long advance notice, also for the purpose of avoiding 
adverse selectivity in coverage. The farm data available were not 
adequate . Alternate plans of coverage should be offered and publicized. 
1 Benedict,. Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, p. 383. 
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The committee also recommended that farmers participating in 
any of the wheat programs be required to carry crop insurance. Though 
favoring operation through the county AAA committees it urged increased 
control by the Corporation over the state crop insurance supervisors and 
closer supervision of the formulae and procedures in checking yields. 1 
In 1948 a plan fo:r "investment insurance" was offered on wheat. 
Insurance coverage was set at levels not to exceed the investment in 
the crop. Coverage and premium rates were expressed in dollars and 
cents per acre . If the average yield multiplied by the price spec ified in 
the contract was less than the insured value, the farmer would receive 
an indemnity . 
Sincere efforts have been made to make all-risk crop insurance 
work, but r ·esults have been disappointing. There is considerable doubt 
that er.op insurance can be designed to attract the large majority of 
farmers and that it can be made self-supporting over several years r 
operations. It is generally believed that actuarial structures are the 
basic difficulty. 2 
Carry-overs of Wheat Increase 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 failed largely in its 
attempt to achieve production control in the wheat industry. 3 Large 
1 Ibid. , p. 384. 
2 For additional discussion of crop insurance see: Harold G . 
Halcrow, Agricultural Policy of the United States (New York, 1953) 
pp. 407-420 and "Actuarial Structures for Cr-op Insurance , " Journal 
of Farm·Economics, XXXI (August , 1949), pp. 418-443. 
3 For an excellent discu_ssion of why acreage reduction may have 
only a small effect upon total crop production, see Rainer Schickele, 
Agricultural Policy (New York, 1954), pp. 202-205 . 
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stocks of wheat overhung fhe market when the Act was passed. Despite· 
reductions in acreage, they continued to rise and, with a carry,-over of 
250 million bushels, the 11ever-normal'' granary was well filled when 
World War II began in 1939 .. 1 The ca!"ry-over had risen to 632 million 
bushels in 1942, much g;reater than it had been at a.ny time during the 
Federal Farm Bo:ard regime. 2 Without the supporting influence of 
C ornmodity Credit Corporation logn.s in 1942, prices probably would 
have dropped to the levels of 1931 and 1932. 
The Commodity C:t"edit Cqrporation was originally designed to 
ease the impact on prices from abnor:ma.Ily high production or severe 
decreases in demand. Eventually it came to have a second function of 
maintaining prices continuqusly .at fa:vorable levels. It is obvious that the 
two functions were not compatible. Thi$ s.econd function wa.s the un<ie:r,-
lying cause of the large accumulation of wheat stocks in the late 1930ls 
and early l 940Xs. Without the heavy demand for f.arm products that grew 
out of the war, the CCC could easily ha:ve suffered :the fate of the Federal 
Farm Board. 
1 United States Department of Agt'iculture, AgriculturaJ StatJst:ics, 
1945 (Washington, 1945), p~ 19. 




The farm depression had been bad before 1930J but after that year 
it grew considerably worse. As the depression affected industry, the 
domestic demand for many agricultural commodities fell off sharply. 
The loss of foreign markets further complicated the problems facing 
agriculture. Agricultural prices, compared with prices of industrial 
products, were disadvantaged and farm commodities moved only at 
extremely low price levels. As long as these "pri.ce disparitiesn con-
tinued agriculture was unable to regain a favorable economic position. 
There was widespread belief that public action was desirable. Govern-
mental aid was regarded as essential, both to correct the economic 
pressure on agriculture and to strengthen the complete national economy, 
"Surplusesn of important farm commodities were viewed to be the heart 
of the problem. 
In an attempt to cope with this problem, the Government placed 
chief reliance on a combination of subsidies and efforts to control agri-
cultural output. This program undoubtedly resulted in some benefits 
for agriculture. Although prices received by farmers did not show 
consistent improvement during the 1930'ts, the cash fa:rm income 
situation improved considerably and in 1940 was only about 20 per cent 
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below that of 1929. 1 Debt burdens were also lightened and ipiproved land 
use and increased farm efficiency were promoted. 
Despite monetary gains and other benefits, the over-all problem 
of providing an adequate commercial outlet for the existing productive 
capacity of United Statesl' agriculture remained unsolved. New technical 
developments in farming continued to be introduced, and it became 
increasingly apparent that fewer farmers, cultivating fewer ac r es, wer e 
able to supply the market available to United States t producers . 
"Surplusn and marginal farmers , bolstered by subsidies, r emained 
on the farm. They had practically no alternative; agricultural policy wa s 
not directed toward shifting them into other occupations. At that par-
ticular time other segments of the ec.onomy were not i n a posit i on to 
absorb additional workers. Therefore, shifting marginal farmers to 
u rgan "occupationsr1 probably would have meant supporting them entirely 
by relief funds . By giving them aid on the farm they could, in part, 
support themselves . by subsistence farming. 
Legislation in the latter part of the 1930"s eviden ced a gradual 
transition from an emergency policy of cushioning the agricultural 
market against severe price declines to a more permanent one of price 
pe gging above the leve l of the free market . Acreage restriction 
programs were not able to reduce production much, and s t or a ge s t oc ks 
1 U . S . Bureau of the C ens us , Stat ist ical Abstract of the United 
States, 1949 (Washington, D . C., 1949), p . 641. 
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under,Commo.di(y Credit Corpor.ation loin. or owned by the Corporatfon 
accumulAted ~apidl;y. Whe.at _stoeks' h~d tis.en to ovel;"' 600 million 
bushels in 1942. 1 Howeyer, becl;luse of the g.reat demand for wheat 
during World War II and the postwar period,, these large stocks did not 
prove to be emba:rrassing. Rather-' they tU::J:"ned out to he a material 
asset in the W'f4r' effort. 
1 United States Depa'.t'tment of AgrtcuLture •. The Wheat Situatio;n, 
Februat-y, 1955,.. p~ 2:0. . .· . .. . . · ... 
CHAPTER VIII 
WHEAT LEGISLATION, 1940-1954 
PART I 
THE WORLD WAR II PERIOD 
In the early years of World War II the Government did not 
especially encourage wheat production. 1 Since 193 8 the wheat m arket 
had been burdened with heavy surpluses, and in the ear ly days of the warr 
farmers were receiving unsatisfactory prices . Congressmen and AAA 
administrators were more concerned with overproducti on than they were 
with the possibility of shortages . In early 1940 the war seemed remote, 
and in view of rapidly mounting wheat stocks it was thei r policy to- li-mit 
rather than to expand wheat acreage . The points of view and the laws 
developed during the 1930 ' s were not easily cast asi de . However, 
despite heavy surpluses, Congressmen continued to press for hi gher 
prices for wheat growers . 
1 This was a marked contrast to the World War I period when 
expansion in the wheat industry was a major' item in the war-food -pr ogram. 
However, production in the World War II period exceeded that of W-0rld 
War I. Yields per acre were considerably higher in the latter perl-od. 
These were probably due to two factors : (1) weather conditions, and (2) 
better seed, more fertilization, and more mechani zati on. For stati s tic s 
on production and yields during these two periods, see: United Stat es 
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 1952 (Washington, 
1952) , p. 2 . 
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Support Raised to 85 Per Cent of Parity 
On May 26, 1941, Congress approved legislation which direct ed 
the Commodity Credit Corporation to make loans on wheat at 85 per cent 
of parity. This higher loan rate applied to the 1941 and subsequent crops 
providing marketing quotas were not disapproved. 1 This new legi s lati on 
required the Commodity Credit Corporation loan rate on whea t in 1941 t o 
increase 48 per cent over the 1940 rate . 2 
The Steagall Amendment 
On July 1, 1941, the Steagall Amendment to the Agric ultur al 
Adjustment Act of 1938 was passed. 3 Thi s Act provided that whenever 
dur ing the existing emergency the Secretary of Agriculture found it 
necessary to encourage the expansion of production of an nonbasic4 
agricultural commodity, he should provide support prices at not less 
than 85 per cent of p'arity. Such support activities were to be c ontinued 
until the Secretary had given sufficient public announcement t o per m it 
1 Public Law 74, U. S . Stat ut es at Large, 77 Congress,. 1 sess ., 
L V (May 26, 1941 ), p . 205 . 
2 Walter W. Wilcox, The Farmer in the Sec ond World War (Ames , 
Iowa, 1947), p . 41 . 
3 Public Law 147, U . S. Statut es at Large, 77 Congress, 1 ses s ., 
LV (July 1, 1941 ), Section 4, p . 498. Public Law 147 was an Act 
extending the life and increas ing the credit r esources of the Commodity 
Credit Corporation. Section 4 was a " r ider" sponsored by Respresen-
tative Steagall of Alabama and i s commonly referr ed t o a s the rrs t eagall 
Amendment . " 
4 Nonbasic commodities were t hose other than c or n, wheat, c ott on, 
tobacco, and rice . Ibid., p . 498 . 
140 
producers to make readjustments in pt'o.duction. This amendment 
autho.rized what was in effect a system of forward prices on a s.elective 
1:;lasis. Although it did not contain any clear-cut provision for price 
support after the war. there was an implication that it was intended to 
cushion the shock in the event of a sudden termination of the war. These 
provisions were elaborated and made more specific in later amendments. 
Parity Price is Extended 
On December 26. 1941, the loa.n rate on wheat at 85 per cent of 
parity was extended to cover crops for the year·s 1942 to 1946 inclusive. 1 
This also applied to the other basic commodities and was very important 
legislation inasmuch as it meant that forward price floors were to be in 
effect for basic commodities for a considerable length of time. Therefore. 
farmers were placed in a better posiUo.n to make more definite fa:rm 
plans. 
Emergeney Price Control Act 
In the latter half of 1941 infh:1.tionary influences were be,c.om:i.ng 
evident in the faJ;"m sector of the economy. Spenda.ble ;income in relation 
to available supplies of some food products was increasing rapidly. The 
cost of urban living was advancing at an accelerating rate, and the feat 
of inflation was causing a great deal of unrest among wageworkers, 
1 Public L.aw 374, 11 .. S. Statutes at Large, 777 Congress, 1 sess., 
LV (Deeember 26, 1941), p. 860. 
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This situation resulted in Congressional debate. directed toward price 
control legislation which proposed ceiling prices for farm products. 
Agricultural leaders. however, reflecting over the long years of 
extremely inequitable farm prices as compared with non.farm prtces, 
were reluctant to place ceilings on the prices of farm products. 
Following a rigorous debate of the issue, during which agricultural 
leaders stood their ground, Congress allowed provi.sions in the Erner-" 
gency Price Control Act which stipulated high ceiling prices for agrkul-
tural products. 1 It stipulated that no maximum price could be established 
on any agricultural commodity below the highest of any of the following 
prices: (1) 110 per cent of parity; (2) the market price prevaUi.ng for 
such commodity on October 1, 1941; (3) the market price preva.Hi.ng for 
such commodity on December 15, 1941; (4) the average price for such 
commodity during the period, July 1, 1919 to June 30, 1929.2 
Stabilization Act of October 1942 
In the fall of 1942, President Roosevelt appealed to Congress to 
pass legislation to protect farm prices against the possibility of sudden 
and disastrous price declines in the period following the close of the 
war. He al.so asked for a lowering of pri.ce ceUings on. f11rm pro.ducts'. 
It was the belief of many that if proper action were taken in respect to 
1 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Public No. 421, U. $. 
Statutes at Large, 77 Congress, 2 sess., LVI (January 30, · 194;2}, p, 23. 
2. Ib:id, , p. 27. 
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agricultural production and prices, a.nd taken soon enough, a price 
collapse such as that which foltowed World War I could be prevented. 
Stimulated by these points of view, Congress passed Public Law 
729, usually referred to as the Stabilization Act. 1 With respect to price 
ceilings, Section 3 of the Act provided that no maximum price was to be 
established for any agricultural commodity below a price which would 
reflect to producers of agricultural commodities the higher of the follow-
ing prices: (1) The parity price for the commodity or {2) the highest 
price received by producers for the commodity between January 1, 1942, 
and September 15, 1942, 2 There was, however, a clause which per,.. 
mitted the President, without regard to the limitation contained in the 
second of these criteria, to adjust any maximum price to the extent 
necessary to correct gross inequities, providing it did :not lower the 
price of the commodity below its parity price. 3 
With respect to postwar price guarantees on wheat, the Act pro-
vided that lo.ans would be provided by the Commodity Credit Corporation 
at 90 per cent of the parity pri.ce of wheat during the two·-yea:r period 
beginning the first day of January following a presidential or cong:t"essional 
1 Public Law 729, U. S. Statutes at Large, 77 Congress, 2 ses.s .• 
LVI (October 2, 1942), p. 765. · The officialtitle is 11An Act to amend 
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, to a:i.d in preventing inflation, 
and for other purposes. n Ibid., p. 765. 
2 Ibid,, p. 766. 
3 Ibid. , 766. p. 
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declaration that hostilities had terminated. Loans at this level were to 
be limited to wheat growers who were operating in accordance with 
acreage allotments and/ or marketing quotas announced by the Secretary 
of Agriculture and accepted by the growers. 1 
The Act also contained measures which applied to the 11nonbasic n 
commodities. Section 9 was an amendment to the Steagall Amendment of 
July 1, 1941 (Public Law 147). This amendment ratsed the support 
level on the nonbasic commodHies, often referred to as Steagall commodi-
ties, from 85 to 90 per cent of the:i.r respective parity prkes. It also 
extended to these commodities the same type of two-year postwar guar-
antee that it had prov:i.ded for the 11basic 11 commodities. 2 
The Wheat Program Changes 
In July 1942, wheat suppUes were overtaxing· storage facilities. 
Stocks were at an all-time high of 632 million bushels, 3 and the current 
crop of 969 million bushels4 was the second largest produced up to that 
date. In view of the heavy stocks on hand, it seemed altogether reason-
able that the AAA administrators were more concerned with. the 
1 
Ibid,, p. 767, This section also applied to basic commodities 
other than wheaL 
2 Ibid., p. 768. 
3 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statlstics, 
1945, (Washington, 1945), p. 19. 
4 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1952, p. 2. 
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continuation of the prewar acreage-adjustment programs than with an all 
out effort to accumulate still larger stocks of wheat as insurance against 
possible war needs. The demand for wheat, however, was soon to change.· 
During the last half of 1942 and the early part of 1943, as a result 
of heavy feeding of wheat to livestock and its use in the production of 
alcohol, it appeared that the wheat surplus would soon be eliminated. 1 
In February 1943, when it became evident that larger and larger 
quantities of wheat would be needed for Hvestock feed and for the pro-
duction of alcohol, acreage and marketing restrllctions were dispensed 
with for that yearls crop. 2 Acreage allotments were not effected again 
until the 1950 crop, and marketing quotas were abandoned until the 1954 
crop.3 
The relaxation of production controls came none too soon. Although 
we had 632 million bushels of old-crop wheat carried over in 1942 and 
approximately 5. 1 million bushels harvested from the crops of 1942 to 
1 Claude H. Wickard, Report of the Secretary of Agricu1ture, 1943 
(Washington, 1944), pp. 135-136" 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, The Wheat Situation (Washington, August, 1943), p. 5. 
3 United St.ates Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, The Wheat Situation (Washington, June 30, 1954), p. 13. 
Acreage allotments for wheat have been in effect eight times since 
1938, as follows: 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1950, 1954, and 1955. 
Marketing quotas have been in effect only for the 1941, 1942, 1954, and 
1955 crops of wheat. Ibid., p. 13; United States Department of Agricul-
ture, The Wheat Situa~ August, 1954, p. 3. 
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1946, inclusive, the carry-over on July 1, 1947 was.only 83.8 million 
bushels. 1 Fortunately, the 1947 crop was extremely bountiful. Without 
the favorable yields from 1942 through 1947, we would have been unable 
to provide adequate supplies of wheat for our Allies and, latet\ a needy 
populace in liberated areas. We also would have been forced to apply 
stringent restrictions on domestic uses. 2 However yields were favor ... 
able, a.nd we exported approximately L 7 billion bushels of wheat from 
1945 through 1948. The two outstanding years in export volume were 
1947 and 1948, when 480 and 505 million bushels, respeetively, were 
exported. 3 
Wartime Guarantees End 
The .Stabilization Act of 1942, as discussed previously, had 
provided th~t loans would be allowed fox wheat at 90 per cent of parity 
for a two-year period beginning the first day of January immediately 
following a presidential or congressional declaration that hostilities had 
ended. President Truman, on December 31, 1946, by proclamation 
declared that hos.tilities had ended, thus automatically terminating the 
wartime price guarantee of wheat as of December 31, 1948. 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultur~l Statistics, 
19 5 3. pp. 1, 12. 
2 For. a dis.cussion of the significance of favorable wheat yields· 
during the war years. see Benedict. Farm Policies of the United StEltes, 
1790-1950, pp. 447-449. 
3 United States Department of Agricultur·e, Agricultu:r-al Statistics, 
1953, p. 1. 
PART I.I 
THE AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 
1948 RELATIVE TO WHEAT 
a·eneral Conditions 
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1\merican farmers were in a much more favorable situation after 
World War II than they were in the period immediately following World 
War I. Not only were f~rm prices protected by government guarantees, 
but agriculture as a whole was in the strongest financial position it had 
evel" known. Price supports had become a part of far'mers'f:' thinking 
and of national farm policy. The c:3.gricultural sector of the economy 
hoped to establish a long-term farm po.licy which would permit it to 
retain in peacetime the high earnings of the war yea?'s. Although there 
was general agreement that new farm legislation was necessary, there 
was considerable disagreement within the farm group as to the degree 
that the government should control agricultural prices and production. 
Some wanted a shift toward a freer economy, others preferred the 
assumed security of high-level p.tice supports .and relatively rigid 
governmental control. As a result of these .sharply divided opinions, 
a long and bitter. 11battle1' was waged in the Congress befqre an agreement 
was reached. 
The Agricultural Act of 1948, wh!ch w;;is limited ma.inly to a price 
support program, was essentially a compromi,Se between~ u:long-ranget-1' 
program desived by the Senate and a ,,rstopgap" measure desired by the. 
House. The House ve:rsion of the bill (Title I of the Act) 111{as to become 
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effective January 1, 1949. The Senate version (Titles II and III of the 
Act), consisting of long-time flexible farm price support measures, was 
to become effective January 1, 1950. 1 
Title I 
Title I of the Act provided that the price of wheat to cooperating 
wheat growers was to be supported .at 90 per cent of parity until June 30, 
1950, providing producers had not disapproved marketing quotas for 
wheat for the marketing year· beginning in the calen.dar year in whkh 
the crop was harvested. The price support to noncooperato:rs was to be 
at a rate of 60 per cent of the rate to cooperators and only on that 
portion of the crop subject to penaity if marketed. 2 All loan and price -
support provisions authorized in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938, as amended, were to be applicable in. carrying out this policy. 3 
' ' 
Title II 
In reference to wheat, Title II of the Act amended and/or changed 
several sections of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. 4 It .amended 
1 In the ca.se of wheat, Title I remained in effect until June 30, 
1950. 
2 Agricultural Act of 1948, Public No. 897, U. S. Statutes at Large, 
80 Congress, 2 sess., LXII (July 3, 1948), pp. 1247-1248. There were 
no wheat marketing quotas or acreage allotments for the 1949-50 wheat 
production and marketing year. 
3 Ibid. , p. 1248. 
4 . Ibid., Title II, pp. 1250-1257. 
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the parity-prj.ce formula and changed the definitions of carry-over, 
normal supply, and total supply. It also provided a new set of support-
price schedules and conditions for the period beginning July 1, 1950. 
The New Parity Formula 
The "new'' parity formula was designed to reduce parity prices for 
some of the major crops and to increase those for most livestock products, 
leaving the average level of parity prices for all commodities unchanged. 1 
The purpose of the "new" formula was to bring the relationships among 
parity prices of the various farm products more nearly in line with the 
relation between actual prices of these products in recent years. For 
example, the cost of producing wheat had been greatly reduced, in real 
terms, by extensive mechanization. Similar cost reductions had not been 
achieved in the production of beef, but the domestic demand for beef had 
increased greatly. If prices were to be increased in the same ratio for 
both of these products, the tendency would be to make wheat growing 
very profitable, and to discourage, relatively, the production of livestock 
products which were in short supply. 
To overcome this difficulty, the revised parity price formula 
provided that "parity" price for any agri.cultural commodity, as of any 
date, would be the adjusted base price of the commodity multiplied by 
, 1 Charles F. Brannan, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 
1948 (Washington, 1949), p . 39. 
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the parity index as of the date of computation. 1 The adjusted base price 
was to be the average of the prices received by farmers for the com-
modity during the preceding ten years divided by the ratio of the general 
level of prices received by farmers in this ten year period to the general 
level of prices received by farmers in the period January 1910 to Decem-
ber 1914, inclusive. 2 In other words, the adjusted base price was to be 
obtained by dividing the average price of the commodity in the ten pre-
ceding years by the average of the indexes of prices received by farmers 
for all commodities during the same period. 
For example, under the "new11 formula the parity price of wheat on 
June 15, 1948, would have been calculated as follows : During the ten-year 
period, 1938-1947, the average price for wheat received by farmers was 
$1. 22 per bushel. The index of prices received by farmers averaged 
168 for this same period. Dividing $1. 22 by 168 gives 72. 6 cents, the 
adjusted base price. Multiplying 72. 6 cents by 251, the index of prices 
paid by farmers, gives $1 . 82, which would have been the parity price for 
wheat on that date. 3 
Under the "old" formula, the parity price of wheat on the same date 
was calculated in the following manner . The index of prices paid by 
1 Agricultural Act of 1948, Public No. 897, U. S. Statutes at Large, 
p. 1250. 
2 Ibid., p. 1250. 
3 C . Kyle Randall, HMany Changes in New Farm Act, tt The Agri-
cultural Situation, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States 
Department of Agriculture, XXXII (Washington, August, 1948), pp. 1, 3. 
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farmer·s, 251, was multipled by 88. 4 cents, the average price received 
by fa~mers for wheat during the years 1910-1914. This gave $2. 22, the 
parity price per bushel for wheat on th,at date. 1 
If the "new" formula had been applied, the parity l~vel for wheat 
would have dropped because wheat prices in the ten years immediately 
preceding 1948 were lower relative to other farm prices tha_n they had 
been in the ba.se period August 1909-July 1914. By lowering the price to 
$1. 82, the new formula would have brought the parity price more n-e~rly 
in line with the actual prices of wheat during the te·n years immediately 
preceding 1.948. 
Transitional Parity 
Tra.nsitional parity prices were provided for th:ise commodities, 
such as wh:eat, for whic.h the parity prices under tlae new formula were 
much below the parity prices under the old formula. Thi.s provision w.as 
to prevent any downward price adjustment from causing too sharp declines 
in parity prices at one time. If, after January 1, 1950, the parity price 
for a.ny commodity as computed by the new for·mula was more than 5 per 
cent less than .that as computed under the old formula, the change was to 
be made in transitional steps. In such an instance, the parity price was 
to be computed by the old formula, and the transitional pal"ity was to be 
this price less 5 per cent for e_ach calendar year after January 1, 1950, 
l Ibid., pp. 1, 3. -
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until it resulted in a parity price lower than that provided by the new 
formula at which time the new formula would apply. 1 
Flexible Price Supports 
The Act provided that after June 30, 1950, flexible price supports 
for wheat were to be substituted for the flat 90 per cent of parity support 
which had been so vigorously advocated and defended throughout the pre-
ceding years. These supports were to be tied to the supply factor. Wheat 
price supports to "cooperators" were to be determined according to a 
schedule of minimum price supports with a moving floor ranging from 
60 to 90 per cent of parity. 2 
When the total supply was not more than 70 per cent of the normal 
supply, the level of support was to be 90 per cent of the parity price . 
For each increase of 2 points in the supply percentage, the minimum 
price support was to be reduced by one point. Whenever the total supply 
increased to a level which was more than 130 per cent of the normal 
supply, the support price was to be not less than 60 per cent of the parity 
price. When the total supply was equal to the normal supply, the minimum 
support price was to be 75 per cent of parity. 3 
1 Agricultural Act of 1948, Public No. 897, U. S. Statutes at Large, 
p. 1250. 
2 Ibid . , pp. 1252 - 1253. 
3 
See~., Appendix, Table III. 
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Notwithstanding these provisions for flexible supports, if acreage 
allotments were in effect at the beginning of the planting season, or if 
marketing quotas were in effect at the beginning of the marketing year, 
the minimum support price was to be automatically increased by 20 per 
cent. In no case, however, was the support to exceed 90 per cent of 
parity. 1 In other words, with acreage or marketing controls in effect, 
the minimum support level would be 72 per cent and the maximum 90 
per cent of parity. In the event that marketing quotas were voted down 
by producers, supports would be set at 50 per cent of parity regardless 
of the supply percentage. Thus the over-all provision for price support 
on wheat worked out to an absolute floor of 50 per cent and an absolute 
maximum of 90 per cent, except that a higher percentage could be 
authorized in case of emergency needs. 
The level of the support price for wheat under this plan depended 
primarily upon how the "normal supply" was defined, also upon the 
definition of ''total supply. " In the case of wheat, normal supply for 
any marketing year was defined as ( 1) the estimated domestic consump-
tion for the preceding year, plus (2) the estimated wheat exports for the 
current year, plus (3) an allowance for carry-over. The carry-over 
allowance for wheat was to be 15 per cent of the consumption in the 
previous year plus estimated exports for the current year. 2 
l Ibid., p. 1253. 
2 Ibid., p. 1251. 
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Total supply for any marketing year was defined as (1) the total 
carry-over at the beginning of the marketing year, plus (2) the estimated 
production of the year, plus (3) the estimated prospective imports during 
the marketing year. 1 
In the event of a business recession, with these definitions .and 
price limitations in effect, the normal supply probably would go down 
and the carry-over component of the total supply would probably increase. 
This would mean .a high tot.al supply percentage relative to normal supply, 
and a low support level relative to parity. On the other hand, in the 
event of a general upward price swing, "normal supply'' would increase, 
but total supply might remain at a high peI"centage level for a number· of 
years as a result of accumulated heavy carry-overs. In this event sup-
port prices could remain below parity for a considerable period of time. 
Thus, under the circumstances described above, it does not appear that 
this plan would give wheat growers much protection against short-term 
price declines, even though they would reduce production. However, at 
least it would provide a floor at some level below which market prices 
are not likely to remain by any large margin. This is in contrast to the 
complete absence of any calculated floor in preloan days. 
1 Ibid., pp. 1251-1252. 
PART III 
THE AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 
1949 RELATIVE TO WHEAT 
The long-term ·features of the Agricultural Act of 1948 had 
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reflected, to some degree, the thinking of those who wanted to return to 
a freer agricultural economy with less dependence on government. With 
the passage of the Act it was generally assumed that the first steps had 
been taken in that direction. Many felt confident that after January 1, 
1950, the effective date for the long-term features of the Act, more 
reliance would be placed on free-market prices as guides to production. 
The congressional elections in the fall of 1948, however, replaced many 
of the supporters of more moderate proposals with leadet-s who cham-
pioned high-level price supports for farm products. As a t''esult, Title II 
of the Agricultural Act of 1948 was replaced by the Agricultural Act of 
1949 before it could become effective. 
As a substitute for the flexible-price provision of the 1948 Act, a 
plan was presented by Secretary of Agriculture Branpan which would 
relate price supports for the basic commodities directly to national farm 
income statistics and wruld allow perishable commodities to find their 
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free-market prices which would be supplemented by deficiency payments 
from the Federal Treasury. This plan created a political furor and was 
rejected by both political parites. 1 
Provisions of the 1949 Act 
The Agricultural Act of 1949 became a law on October 31, 1949. 2 
The new legislation retained in principle the flexible price-support 
features of the Act of 1948, but with so many modifications that it 
resulted in higher levels of support. 
The provisions of price support for wheat in 1950 were as follows : 
(1) Ninety per cent of parity was mandatory to cooperators, 3 providing 
marketing quotas had not been disapproved and providing acreage allot-
ments or marketing quotas were in effect . (2) If producers disapproved 
1 The so-called Brannan Plan was first presented to Congress in the 
form of a statement by Secretary Brannan. See: U. S. Congress, Senate, 
Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 sess. (April 7, 1949), pp. 4035-
4040. 
For a general discussion of the Brannan Plan, see: Benedict, Farm 
Policies of the United States, 1790-1950, pp. 484-490; Rainer Schickele, 
Agricultural Policy, pp. 183-186; Harold G . Halcrow, Agricultural Policy 
of the United States (New York, 1953), pp. 327-331. · 
For a short analytical treatment of this plan, see: Theodore Schultz, 
"That Turbulent Brannan Plan," Farm Policy Forum, III (F ebruary, 1950), 
pp. 5-8. 
2 Agricultural Act of 1949, Public No. 439, U. S. Statutes at Large, 
81 Congress, 1 sess., LXIII (October 31, 1949) , p. 1051. 
3 A ''cooperator'' with respect to wheat was a producer who did not 
knowingly exceed his acreage allotment. Ibid. , p. 1055. 
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marketing quotas, supports at 50 per cent of parity were to be available 
to producers who complied with acreage allotments. 1 
The level of support to cooperators for the 1951 crop was to be not 
less than 80 per cent of parity nor more than 90 per cent of parity, pro-
viding producers had not disapproved marketing quotas . In the event 
marketing quotas were disapproved, support at 50 per cent of parity was 
to be available to producers who had compiied with acreage allotments. 2 
Beginning with the 1952 crop, the Act provided that price-support 
levels were to be determined by a sliding scale similar to that provided 
in the Act of 1948. The scale provided a price-support range of 75 to 
90 per cent of parity for wheat on supplies ranging from 130 per cent 
down to 102 per cent of "normalir as defined by the 1948 Act. 3 In the 
Act of 1948 the range in support price was to be from only 60 to 90 per 
cent of parity on supplies ranging from 130 per cent of normal down to 
70 per cent. The higher levels of support in the Act of 1949 were, how-
ever, more apparent than real because the Act of 1948 had provided that 
minimum support levels would be increased 20 per cent, but not to 
exceed 90 per cent of parity, if acreage allotments and/ or marketing 
quotas were in effect. 
1 Ibid., p. 1052. 
2 Ibid., p. 1052. 
3 Ibid., p. 1051. For the various levels of support provided by the 
sliding scale see Infra., Appendix, Table IV. 
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When the total supply was less than 102 per cent of the '1 normal" 
supply, the level of support was to be 90 per cent of the parity price. 
For each increase of 2 points in the supply percentage, the minimum 
price support was to be reduced by one point. Whenever the total supply 
increased to a level which was more than 130 per cent of the "normal" 
supply, the support price was to be not less than 7 5 per cent of the 
parity price. Section 402 of the 1949 Act authorized the Secretary of 
Agriculture, after proper hearings, to support any agricultural com-
modity at a level in excess of the maximum prescribed in the Act in 
order to prevent or alleviate a shortage involving national welfare or 
defense needs. 1 
In the event marketing quotas were disapproved, support at 50 per 
cent of parity was to be available to producers who had complied with 
acreage allotments. Price supports were to be made available to non-
cooperators .at such levels , not in excess of the level of price support 
to cooperators, as the Secretary of Agriculture determined to be neces-
sary to facilitate the effective operation of the program. 2 The latter 
provision was also effective for the 1950 and the 1951 crops. 
Section 406 of the Act contained forward price provisions. This 
section provided that the Secretary, insofar as practicable, was to 
announce the level of price support for field crops in advance of the 
1 . 
Ibid., p. 1054. 
2 Ibid., p. 1052. 
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planting season. The level of price support so announced was not to 
exceed the estimated maximum level specified in the Act. However, the 
announced level of price support was not to be reduced even though the 
maximum level, when determined, was less than the level announced. 1 
The "new" parity formula provided in the Act of 1948 was amended 
to include wages paid hired farm labor and incorporated in the Act of 
1949 . The 1949 legislation, however, provided for use of both the old 
and the new formulas . During the four year period beginning January 1, 
1950, the parity price for any basic2 agricultural commodity was " ... 
not to be less than its parity price computed in the manner used prior to 
the enactment of the Agricultural Act of 1949. 11 3 
The "new" parity price formula provision of the Act of 1948 was 
contained in Title II and had not come into use by the time the Act of 
1949 became effective, January 1, 1950. This meant that for any par-
ticular basic commodity, such as wheat, the old formula would apply if 
it would bring about a higher parity price than the new formula. 
i 
Additional Provisions 
In addition to the provisions discussed above, the Act contained the 
routine items of definition and implementation. There was, also, a new 
1 Ibid., p. 1055. 
2 The basic commodities under the 1949 Act were corn, cotton, rice, 
peanuts, tobacco, and wheat. Ibid., p. 1056. 
3 Ibid., pp. 1056-1057. 
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section, 417. which amended the Far:m Credit Act of 1933. 1 The 
amendment authorized the District Banks for Cooperatives and the 
Central Bank for Cooperatives to :make loans to cooperative associations, 
in amounts up to a maximum of 80 pet cent of the cost. for the construe-
tion of facilities for storing agricultural commodities. The foregoing 
pertained to structures other than those providing refrigerated cold 
storage or structures in areas in which existing stor~ge facilities were 
adequate. This authorization was to apply only if the Commodity Credit 
Corporation m.ade a commitment to lease, or to guarantee utilization of 
a minimum of 75 per cent of the storage space, for a period of at least 
three years if independent structures, or two years if they consisted of 
additions to previously existing structures. 2 
PART IV 
WHEAT PROVISIONS OF THE 
AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1954 
Wheat Surpluses 
In 1950 there was a growing concern over surpluses of wheat. 
Effective demand was failing to keep abreast of farmers'' ability to pr-c>-
duce, _and the Government was confronted by large quantities of whe.at 
acquired under price-support programs. The wheat carry-over on 
1 Ibid., p. 1058~ 
2 Ibid., pp. 1058-1059. 
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July 1 of that year amounted to nearly 425 million bushels, over twice 
as large as it had been two years earlier . 1 
The outbreak of war in Korea in June, 1950, abruptly changed this 
situation. The Government soon became more concerned with the possi-
bility of wheat deficits than it was with surpluses. Farmers were urged 
to increase production so as to meet current additional requirements and 
build surpluses as a safeguard in the event of a large-scale and prolonged 
war . In order to encourage production it was announced that there would 
be no marketing quotas or acreage allotments on the 1951 crop of wheat . 
They were also dispensed with for the 1952 and 1953 crops . 2 Further-
more, the price of wheat was not to be limited to less than its parity 
price, as determined by the Secretary in accordance with the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, or the highest price paid 
between May 24 and June 24, 1950, whichever was higher . 3 
Farmers responded favorably to the Government' s request for 
greater agricultural production. The acreage seeded to wheat increased 
from 71.3 million acres in 1950 to 78 million in 1951. It further 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situation, 
August, 1954, p. 27. 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situation, 
June, 1954, p. 13. Acreage allotments had been proclaimed for the 
1951 crop but were terminated by the Secretary of Agriculture after the 
winter wheat crop had been planted. 
3 Defense Production Act of 1950, Public No . 774, U. S. Statutes 
at Large, 81 Congress, 2 sess . , LXIV (September 8, 1950), p. 805. 
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increased to 78. 4 million in 1952 and reached a peak of 78. 8 million 
acres in 1953. 1 
Yields in 1951 were the lowest since 1939 and, despite an increase 
in seeded acreage, total production was smaller than it had been the 
previous year. The crops of 1952 and 1953 were much better; total 
production for those years was 1, 299 million and 1, 169 million bushels 
respectively. 2 These amounts compared favorably with the bumper crops 
of 1944-1950. 
The Korean conflict did not develop into a large-scale and pro-
longed war as had been feared. Production goals for wheat proved to be 
larger than effective demand could substantiate, and once again the 
Government was facing a surplus wheat situation. The temporary 
increase in demand had caused the wheat carry-over to drop to 255. 6 
million bushels in 1952, but it rose to 562 million the following year . 
On July 1, 1954, it reached a record high of approximately 902 million 
bushels . 3 
These large supplies were not because of a ny lack of planning on 
the part of wheat growers. Rather, they were the result of definite 
planning based upon practical experience gained during World War II 
and the immediate postwar years . R egardless of the r ea s on for the 
1 United States Department of Agriculture~ The Wheat Si tuation, 
April, 1955, p. 20 . 
2 Ibid., p. 20. 
3 Ibid., p . 22 . 
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great surpluses, it was evident that measures were needed to discourage 
the further accumulation of surpluses to higher and more burdensome 
levels . However the legislation which was passed to modify the 1949 Act 
contained provisions which in fact enlarged the wheat-production base in 
several ways. 
The "New" Act 
The Agricultural Act of 1954 which became a law on August 28 of 
that year contained many important features. 1 Among them were the 
following: (1) The establishment of a "set aside" of not less than 40-0 
or more than 500 million bushels of wheat, which was to be excluded 
from the computation of "carry-over" for the purpose of determining 
the price support level; (2) a 5 per cent per year limitation on the down-
ward price adjustment in moving from the ''old" to the "new" parity price; 
(3) the establishment of minimum 1955 farm acreage allotments on c-er-
tain summer fallow farms; (4) an increase in the allowance for carry-
over from 15 to 20 per cent of the domestic consumption and exports in 
the computation of "normal supply;" (5) the authorization of t.he Secretary 
of Agriculture to designate a commercial wheat area; and (6) provision 
for flexible price supports . 2 
1 Agricultural Act of 1954, Public No. 690, U. S. Statutes at Large, 
83 Congress, 2 sess., LXVIII (August 28, 1954), p. 897 . 
2 United States Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situation, 
August, 1954, pp. 4, 17. 
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Commodity Set Aside 
The Act provided that the Commodity Credit Corporation, as 
rapidly as the Secretary of Agriculture determined to be practicable, was 
to set aside within its inventories not less than 400 million bushels and 
not more than 500 million bushels of wheat . 1 
The primary purpose of the "set aside" was to cushion the depres-
sing effect on price support levels of existing surpluses, and to provide 
time for emergency measures to dispose of them. It was considered 
imperative for the "set aside tr stocks to be disposed of in an orderly 
manner as rapidly as possible without serious impact on prices in order 
to eliminate their depressing effect upon wheat prices. 
Wheat stocks set aside were to be excluded from the computation 
of 11carry-over'r for the purpose of determining the price support level. 
Such stocks, however, were to be included in the computation of the total 
supplies for the purpose of determining acreage allotments and market-
ing quotas. 2 This was ne.cessary in order to avoid piling up more 
surpluses. 
This wheat was to be disposed of only in ways which would not 
disturb normal trade in either domestic or foreign markets. Section 
103 of the Act provided that such stocks could be disposed of only for 
(1) foreign relief purposes, (2) developing new or expanding markets, 
1 Agricultural Act of 1954, Public No . 690, U. S. Statutes at Large, 
p. 897. 
2 Ibid., p. 898. 
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(3) don.ation to s chool-lunch pr ograms, (4) t ransfer to the'. national 
stockp~le, (5) research, experimental, or educational purposes, 
(6) disaster relief purposes in the United States, and (7) sales to meet 
the need for increased supplies, in which case the sales price was not 
to be l~ss than 105 per cent of the parity price. 1 
Commercial Wheat-Producing Area 
The Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture discretionary authority 
to establish a commercial wheat-producing area. If, for any marketing 
year, the acreage allotment for wheat for any 'state was 25, 000 acres 
or less, the Secretary could designate such state as outside the com-
mercial wheat-producing area for that marketing year. No farm market-
ing quota or acreage allotment, with respect to wheat , was to be appli-
cable in any area outside the commercial wheat-producing area. Also, 
the allotment for other states was not to be increased by the elimination 
of any state from the commercial area. 2 
Acreage Allotments 
The Act provided for the release and reapportionment of any part 
of _any 1955 farm wheat acreage allotment on which wheat was not to be 
planted and which was voluntarily surrendered to the county committee. 
In the :reapportionment preference was to he given to farms in the same 
county. If all of the allotted acreage voluntarily surrendered was not 
1 Ibid. , p. 897. 
2 Ibid. , p. 903. 
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needed in the county, the county committee was authorized to surrender 
the excess acreage to the state committee to be used for nnew 11 farm 
allotments. 1 
It also provided that any part of any 1955 farm acreage allotment 
might be permanently released in writing to the county committee by the 
owner and operator of the farm. In such an instance, the acreage sur-
rendered was to be credited to the state and county in which it was 
reapportioned in determining future acreage allotments. 2 
The final date for proclaiming the, national ac::reage allotment for 
wheat was changed from july 15 to May 15. 3 The Act also changed the 
date for proclaiming the national marketing quota~ from July 1 to May 15, 4 
Flexible Price Supports 
Mandatory price supports for wheat at 90 per cent of parity were 
allowed to expire with the 1954 crop. The new legislation permitted 
supports to cooperators, providing marketing quotas had not been digap-
proved, to range between 82. 5 and 90 per cent of parity for the 1955 
wheat crop. Thereafter price supports ranging from 75 to 90 per' cent 
of parity, according to supply percentEtges as of the beginning of the 
1 903. Ibiq.. , p~ -
2 Ibid.;., p. 903. 
3 Ibid., p. 903. 
4 Ibid .• P~ 903. 
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marketing year, wer·e to go into effe ct. In the event that a state was 
designated as outside the commercial wheat-producing area for any 
croP' of wheat, the level of price support for cooperators in such wheat-
producing area was to be 75 per cent of the level of price support in the 
commercial wheat ... producing area. 1 
Transitional Parity Price 
Section 301 of the Act provided that after Janu.ary 1, 1956, the 
parity price for wheat was to be adjusted downward each year by 5 per 
cent of the "old" pa:itY price until the "transitional" parity reached the 
level of Hnew" parity. 2 The "old11 parity was based on the price relation-
ship which existed prior to World War I; the •cnewn parity took account of 
price relationships during the most recent ten years. 3 
Total Supply, Normal Supply, and Carry -Over 
The provisions with respect to "total supply'' and "normal supply" 
remained unchanged. 4 The allowance for carry-over, however, was 
1 ' Ibid., p. 899. 
2 Ibid., p. 902. 
3 For a comparison of the "oldl' and the "new" parity formulas, see 
Part II of this chapter. 
4 For definitions of "normal supply'' .and '.'total supply, 11 see Part 
II of this chapter. 
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changed. It was to be 20 per cent of the consumption and exports used 
in computing ttnormal supply11 instead of 15 per cent under the previous 
legislation. 1 
Minimum Allotments on Summer Fallow Farms 
The new Act provided for an upward adjustment of acreage allot-
ments for farms on which a summer fallow crop rotation of wheat was 
practiced for the 1952 and the 1953 crops of wheat. Thi.s provision was 
to apply only in areas where summer fallow crop rotation of wheat wa.s 
a common practice, and it was to be effective for the 1955 crop only. 
The minimum allotment adjustment was to be applied to not more than 
50 per cent of the cropland on the farm well suited for the production of 
wheat, or 640 acres, whichever was the smaller. It was not to apply 
to any acreage which in the opinion of the S~cretary of Agriculture would 
become an undue erosion hazard under continued farming. The limitation 
to 50 per cent of the cropland was not to apply to farms on which at least 
90 per cent of the ac:reage of wheat for the calendar years 1952 .and 1953 
was seeded on land which was summer fallowed during the year.s 1951 
~nd 1952, respeetively, and fol" which a definite and regular alternate 
wheat and summer fallow crop rotation pracqce had been determined. 2 
1 - . . 
Agricultural AdJustment Act of 1954., Public No. 690, U. S. Sta-
tutes at Large, p. 902. 
2. 
Ibid., p. 905. --· .. 
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Other Provisions 
The Act provided for more stringent conditions of eligibility for 
payments unde:r the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. 
Beginning in 1955 any person who knowingly harvested wheat on his farm 
' 
which h.ad been determined by the Secretary of Agriculture to be in excess 
of the farm acreage allotment for wheat was not to be eligible for any 
soil conservation payment for that year. 1 
Provision was made whereby producers could adjust their planted 
acres of wheat at a "reasonable11 time prior to harvest if the planted 
acres were found to be in excess of the allotment. 2 
Section 312 ·provided that if the Secretary had reason to believe 
that, because of a national emergency or because of a material increase 
in export demand, any national marketing quota or acreage .allotment 
for wheat should.be increased or terminated, he had authority to make 
the necessary increase or termination, as the case might be. 3 
PA~T V 
SUMMARY 
After the outbreak of war in September, 1939, there was a growing 
awareness that the need for United States,i'. agricultural production 
l Ibid. , p. 904. --· 
2 Ibid., p. 904. 
3 Ibid., pp. 904-905. 
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eventually would increase. Supplies of t he major farm products, how-
ever, were so plentiful and production prospects were so good that little 
concern was felt about the ability of the United States I farmers to meet 
any demands likely to be made upon them for food and fiber. This out-
loo}<. was somewhat modified after the passage of the Lend..,Lease Act in 
March, 1941. It then became evident that more foodstuffs and fiber 
would be needed to satisfy the growing demands of quickened export and 
domestic markets. However, in view of abnormally large carry-over 
stocks of some commodities such as wheat, agricultural leaders were 
reluctant to expand production at that time. 
Heavy spending under the lend-lease program for military equip-
ment and industrial supplies created additional employment and brought 
about higher earnings for industrial workers. Although farm commodity 
prices had shown some advancement, Congressmen and farm leaders 
pressed for still higher prices for agricultural products so that farmers 
would participate fully in the general price rise which accompanied the 
upsurge in national out put. From the standpoint of those responsible 
for the success of the war effort, it also appeared essential that farmers 
should be given price inducements that would assure an ample supply of 
farm products to meet increases in wartime demand which, for many 
agricultural products , was creating a change from surpluses to shortages. 
Steps were immediately taken to encourage production for World 
War II and the postwar rehabilitation peri.od. Farmers were asked to 
make an all-out production effort, and they did. In order t o make the 
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war production program more effective and to protect farmers against 
the risk of unsalable war surpluses, high- level postwar price guarantees 
were established for farm products for which output expansion during 
the emergency was requested by the Secretary of Agriculture. These 
postwar price guarantees were effective incentives to farmers to meet 
high production goals. 
The guarantee theory, however, was continued after the designated 
postwar period and with it came a growing surplus problem. During the 
war and early postwar period, the United States gave billions of dollars 
to friendly countries. Much of this economic aid was used by these 
countries to buy food in the United States. This, along with an increase 
in domestic demand, helped keep farm prices at high levels without any 
"strain" on the price support program. However, as the economic 
rehabilitation of these countries advanced, they pr ogressively met more 
and more of their own food needs . The United States continued to extend 
economic aid to them but they spent fewer United States ' dollars for food 
than for other import items. This resulted in a decline in export demand 
for United States I food and consequent decreases in American food exports. 
This deterioration of demand in the face of large supplies left the prices 
of many agricultural products below their support levels. This was a 
different situati on from that which had existed in the early postwar period. 
The high-level agricultural price supports provided by the World 
War II legislation were to expire on December 31, 1948. High-level 
price supports, however, die hard. The agricultural sector of the 
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economy had been enjoying the inflationary price s ituation and hoped to 
retain in peacetime the high earnings of the war years. Many agricul-
tural leaders were fearful of the economic and political risks involved 
if supports were lowered. Proposals for a return to the more competi-
tive pattern of free markets were not warmly recieved. The high-level 
supports, with some modificati ons, were extended .for another year by 
the Agricultural Act of 1948. 
Title II of this Act contained what Congress intended to be more 
or less "permanent" farm legislation. This legislation constituted an 
attempt to recede to some extent from the high, wart ime levels of 
support. It provided, effective January 1, 1950, for more reliance on 
commodity prices in the free market as guides to the use of resources 
in agricultural production. Sentiment for higher level supports, how-
ever, was so strong that this part of the 1948 Act was replaced before 
its adequacy could be demonstrated. 
The succeeding legislation, Agricultural Act of 1949, retained in 
principle the flexible price-support features provided in Title II of the 
preceding act, but with so many modifications that they resulted in 
higher levels of support. As a result of continuing high-level supports, 
large quantities of farm commodities were soon confronting the Govern-
ment. Then came the Korean conflict calling for more farm production. 
As a result of this emergency period, the return to farm business as 
usual was again postponed. The foreign a i d program, which had been 
tapering off, was quickly revived and surpluses of some commodities 
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were lowered. Production goals were set hi gh and farmers did an 
admirable job in meeting them. Because the magnitude of the Korean 
affair was not sufficient t o sustain a full wart ime demand for farm 
products, the Government once again faced surplus supplies of some 
agricultural commodities. Congress responded to this situation by 
passing the Agricultural Act of 1954, which again directed the agricul-
tural industry away from high, rigid supports and controls and guided 
it toward free-market regulation. 
The use of high-level price supports in a wartime economy is 
proper if such supports are necessary to induce farmers to produce in 
abundance those commodities needed for the war effort. However, high-
level price supports, along wi th their peaceti me companion- -rigid-supply 
controls, are not des i gned for a peacetime economy. The effective use 
of agricultural resources necessitates price adjustments both upward 
and downward in accordance with t he needs and desires of soc iety. In a 
wartime economy, as in any controlled economy, government planning 
for resource use is implied. However, in a peacetime, free-enterprise 
economy the price system may be utilized t o perform thi s funct i on. The 
needs and desires of soc iety change over time. Resource use must also 
change if the goods and services needed by society are to be available. 
Any attempt to keep prices related t o each other in accordance with rigid, 
preconceived plans will curb the freedom of farmers and encumber thei r 
efforts to utilize scarce resources efficiently. In so far as resources are 
not utilized at optimum levels the total want-satisfaction from their use 
i s reduced . 
CHAPTER IX 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GENERAL TYPES OF 
PRICE-SUPPORT PROGRAMS 
There are approximately 6 million farm families in the United 
States. In general, each individual farm product is produced by a 
great number of farmers. As a consequence an individual farmer does 
not produce enough of any one product to affect its market price by a 
measurable amount. For example, one wheat farmer's production 
does not have much effect upon the market price of wheat. He is able 
to produce only such a small part of the total quantity of wheat that the 
demand for his wheat is infinitely elastic. Thus, he can sell all he 
produces without depressing the market price. This does not hold true, 
however, for the aggregate of wheat producers because the demand for 
all wheat, as will be discussed later, is highly inelastic. 
The demand schedules for an individual wheat producer and for 
all wheat producers are illustrated in Figure 1. Equilibrium in the wheat 
industy is attained at point E. For the price at this point the amount 
demanded, DD, and the amount that farmers are willing to supply, SS, 
are exactly equal. A quantity of wheat equal to OQ would be exchanged 
at the price OP. 
The demand for the individual wheat producerts production is 
represented by the horizontal line, dd. As mentioned previously, the 
influence of the individual producer's wheat on the total wheat market 
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is so small that it cannot be measured by the price mechanism of the 
market. Consequently, at price OP the individual producer would be 
able to sell 100, 1,000, 10,000 or more bushels of wheat without 
affecting the market price. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of Demand Curves Facing One Producer 
and All Producers Under Pure Competition 
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If the price of wheat fell, farmers might cut down on the amount 
of fertilizer, hired labor, and other variable inputs used. Variable 
costs, however, represent such a small proportion of total costs that 
the amount of reduction in wheat motivated by cost reduction would be 
small. Even though farmers are not able to cover all costs, they would 
continue to farm their land and to make use of other fixed factors .so 
long as they could cover their variable costs. If returns were not 
sufficient to cover variable costs, downward adjustments in production 
schedules probably would be made. Over a long period of time, however, 
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returns must be sufficient to cover all costs if farmers are to continue 
to operate their farmso 
Wheat farmers are confronted with relatively high fixed costs. 
They have investments in land, machinery, buildings, and equipment 
which during periods of general depression they usually cannot liqui-
date without sizeable monetary losseso Farm fami.ly labor to a great 
extent is also a fixed cosL Wheat farmers and their families are not 
easily transferred out of their chosen enterpriseo Thi.s is especially 
true in times of general economic depression. If they can in some way 
meet their variable costs, they will continue to farm. In many instances 
the farm does not offer many alternatives. In case of general economic 
depression there probably would not be other jobs for them to move to, 
even if they wanted to move from the farm. Furthermore, if they are 
middle -aged or older, and especially if they are not skilled in a trade, 
they are almost certain to remain on the farn1o They cannot afford to 
keep their hands, lands, or their fixed capital idle even at low prices. 
Given few choices, as is usually the case, they prefer to raise a crop 
even if they can expect no return on their fixed investment and a poor 
reward. for their labor. Thus the reaction of farmers to general 
economic depression tends to drive falling commodity prices to still 
lower levels 0 
Many sections of the wheat-growing regions of the United States 
are suited to the production of few crops other than wheat. In some 
areas practically no alternatives are offered; consequently, farmers in 
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such areas have an extremely limited opportunity to shift from the 
production of wheat to that of other crops. However, even those 
farmers in geographic areas which afford opportunities to produce crops 
other than wheat may not be able to switch quickly to the production of 
those crops because their farming equipment may be highly specialized 
and limited to wheat farming. An added limitation to their inflexibility 
of adjustment is that it may take a year or more before crop adjustments 
can be made. 
The relatively inelastic demand for wheat may be attributed chiefly 
to the lack of a close substitute for wheat flour in the American diet. In 
contrast, the demand for pork or beef is much less inelastic. For 
example, if the price of beef should increase 25 per cent, and other 
food products did not change in price, many housewives would substitute 
pork or mutton for beef. This does not hold true, however, in the case 
of wheat flour. If the price of flour should increase 25 per cent, 
housewives would continue to buy almost as much flour and/ or bread as 
they did previous to the price increase. 
Voluntary Reduction Plan 
Assuming an inelastic demand for wheat, a relatively small cha,nge 
in the amount of wheat placed on the market will bring about a relatively 
large change in wheat prices. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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The production of wheat for any given crop year is a given amount; 
. therefore, the supply curve for that year will be perfectly inelastic. 1 
With the supply curve equal to SS and the demand curve equal to DD • 
. equilibrium would be attained at point E, price would be equal to OP, 
and OS quantity of wheat would be removed from the market. Suppose. 
however, that producers are not satisfied with the market price and 
ask for Government advice to secure a higher market price for their 
wheat. Suppose further that the Government suggests that they reduce 
production and that producers follow this advice. 
~ 











Quantity (100, 000, 000 bushels) 
Figure 2. Effects of Change in Wheat Supply on 
Pr·ice, Inelastic Demand 
l The supply curves SS and S1S" represent the total quantity of 
wheat in e~ist~nc,e and actually offered for sale without reservation price. 
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A reduction from OS to OS' in the amount of wheat supplied would 
raise the price from OP to OP1 • The smaller supply of wheat, OS\ 
would be worth more to producers than the larger crop, OS. This is 
true because the decrease in wheat production, OS to OS 1, would bring 
about a more than proportional increase in price, OP to OP 1• 
The fact that the demand for wheat for human consumption is 
relatively inelastic--a relatively large change in the price of wheat 
makes little change in the quantity of flour produces for food purposes- -
has important implications for agricultural policy. Government pro-
duction control programs involving wheat acreage allotments and 
marketing quotas are based on assumptions of inelastic demand. 
It the Government should persuade farmers to reduce production 
from OS to OS', total expenditures by consumers for wheat would be 
larger and total farm income from wheat would be somewhat higher .. 
Consumers, however, would have less wheat available for consumption. 
If the Government were expected to pay farmers who voluntarily reduced 
wheat acreage because of an acreage-restriction program, as was the 
case in the early AAA programs, this would not be the end of the matter. 
The taxpayers would have to pay a subsidy to farmers for not producing 
the quantity of wheat OS to OS'. The end result: There would be fewer 
bushels of wheat available for consu'mers to buy, they would have to 
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pay a higher price per bushel for the amounts they purchased, and 
taxpayers would be out the amount of the subsidy. 1 
Surplus-Purchase Plan 
Instead of attempting to raise prices by restricting production, the 
Government could place a "price floor'' under wheat by guaranteeing 
,. 
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Quantity (100, 000, 000 bushels) 
Figure 3. Effects of 11Price Floor" on Farms, 
Government, and Consumers 
In the absence of Government support, price would be equal to OP 
for quantity OS. Suppose however that the Government, without 
1 In the analysis presented in this chapter the writer has for 
simplicity's sake neglected the administrative costs of the various 
price-support plans discussed. 
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production control has guaranteed a price to farmers equal to OP '. a 
higher price than the free-market price. Consumers would not take all 
the wheat offered at so high a price. They would be willing to buy only 
an amount equal to OS' . This would leave a surplus of unsold wheat 
equal to BC. Without Government action the price would fall t o poi nt E , 
which is below the support price OP'. 
In order to maintain price at op v, the Gove r nmen would have to 
acquire the unsold amount bet ween B and C . It pr obably would e ither 
purchase the wheat outright or else p lace it i n s t orage under nonrec ourse 
loans. The price of wheat to the farmers would be inc rea s ed from OP 
to OP' . In this case it is assumed that the Gove rnment wi ll take all 
surplus wheat at this price so that farmers would be a llowed t o sell all 
they cared to at price OPl. Thus the increase in price , OP to OP 1, 
would be a windfall to them. Consumers would pa y a highe r price for 
wheat and would buy a smaller amount than they would in the absence 
of the high "pri ce floor. " They would now face the demand curve at 
point B and would take a quantity equal to os r. They would be obliged 
to pay an increase in price from P to P' . Thus thei r position would not 
have improved over that presented by the voluntary r eduction p lan 
illustrated in Figure 2 . F a rme r s , howe ve r , would be recei vi ng more 
total revenue than they were in the for mer case beca u s e they would 
have enjoyed the increase in price without having t o r estrict supply. 
The Gove rnment would ha ve a greater expe nse than would have 
resulted had a subsidy been paid in the supply a nd price s it uation 
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illustrated under the voluntary reduction plan, Figure 2. In the case of 
the surplus-purchase plan the Government would make a payment to 
farmers equal to the number of bushels they would have to buy or loan 
upon, .S'S, times the guaranteed price, OP'. The total Government pay-
ment would be equal to the area of the rectangle S'-BCS. If price OP'· 
were to be maintained, assuming supply remained constant, the only 
way the Government's payment could be lessened would be for the 
demand curve to shift upward and to the right. If it moved to the extent 
that it intersected the supply curve at point C or any point above point C, 
the Government would, of course. no longer have to purchase any wheat 
in order to maintain the market pri.ce at point pi. 
The wheat programs under the Federal Farm Board and the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Acts of 1938, 1948, 1949, and 1954 an were 
designed to operate according to the principles illustrated in the surplus-
purchase plan. The McNary-Haugen plan was a surplus removal program 
but it did not involve purchase payments from the National Treasury. 
The surplus-purchase plan has important implications for policy. 
If the guaranteed price were set at a sufficiently high level, it would 
lead to an expansion of wheat production and would cause greater 
Government payments in order to ~aintain the price at the guaranteed 
level. Therefore a guaranteed price would probably be conditioned 
upon the farmersf participation in a production control program. 
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Deficiency-Payments Plan 
The Government could guarantee wheat farmers the same price 
that it did under the plan just discussed, but handle the surplus wheat 
in a different manner. Instead of the Government buying the surplus 
outright and/ or placing it in storage under nonrecourse loans, it would 
be sold to the public at whatever m.arket price it would bring. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4. Again it is assumed that the elasticity of 















Quantity (100,000, 000 bushels) 
Figure 4. Effects of Price-Deficiency Payments on 
Government, Farmers, and Consumers 
All wheat produced, as is shown by the SS supply curve, would be 
placed upon the market. The equilibrium price would be OP and con-
sumers would take OS quantity of wheat. However, as in the preceding 
example, producers have been guaranteed a return equivalent to the 
price OP 1 for their entire crop. At this price consumers would face 
the demand curve at point B and, again, a surplus would confront the 
Government. The Government, however, would not purchase the 
surplus as was illustrated in the surplus-purchase plan. Instead, it 
would send wheat growers a check for the difference between the 
guaranteed price and the equilibrium price. The total Government 
payment to all wheat producers would be equal to the area of the 
rectangle PP'CE. 
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Farmers would receive a return equivalent to a price per bushel 
equal to OP'' for all of their wheat. Consumers would purchase the 
entire crop at price OP, and the taxpayers would make up the difference 
by paying each producer an amount equal to his total bushels marketed 
multiplied by the amount P' exceeds P. 
In view of these consequences the price equivalent return could 
not be continued indefinitely without being conditioned upon farmersr 
participation in a production control program, except under the unlikely 
condition that taxpayers would be willing to continue paying the expanding 
subsidy to farmers. 
A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the surplus-
purchase plan and the deficiency-payments plan follows: Under the 
surplus-purchase plan producers would receive a price of OPl for their 
entire wheat crop. Under the deficiency-payments plan they would 
receive a return equivalent to a price per bushel equal to op:r for all of 
their wheat. The surplus-purchase plan would cause consumers to pay 
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a greater total revenue and receive a smaller quantity of wheat than 
would be the case under the deficiency-payments plan. They would be 
able to purchase OS amount of wheat under the deficiency-payments plan 
for a smaller total outlay than they could the smaller quantity. OS\ 
under the surplus-purchase plan. In either instance, producers total 
revenue would be derived from consumer payments plus Government 
payments. Since the deficiency-payments plan would cost consumers 
less total dollars than the surplus-purchase plan. it follows that it would 
cost the Government more. This is true, however, only so long as it 
is assumed that the demand for wheat is relatively inelastic. 
Effects of Demand Elasticity 
Elasticity of demand is a crucial factor in the operation of Govern-
ment price support programs. The more inelastic the demand for a 
commodity with respect to price, the less will be the Government cost 
of surplus-purchase payments. However, when the elasticity is greater 
than unity the Government cost of surplus-purchase programs will be 
greater than the cost of price-deficiency payments. This is indicated 
in Figure 5. 
In each of the diagrams, A and B, the costs of Government 
deficiency payments and the costs of surplus-purchase payments are 
shown. The cost of Government deficiency payments are represented 
by the rectangular areas P 1ABP. The costs of Government surplus-
purchase payments are described by the rectangular areas S 'CAS. 
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In diagram A, suppose that the Government is able to raise the 
price of wheat 25 per cent by purchasing only 10 per cent of the total 
crop. Assuming that a 900,000, 000 bushel crop would sell at $2 per 
bushel and that the Government had guaranteed farmers $ 2. 50 per 
bushel, the Government could bring the market price up to $ 2. 50 per 
bushel by purchasing 90, 000, 000 bushels. If it could sell the wheat 
abroad for $ 2 per bushel, the net cost to the Government would be 
$ 45 million. In contrast, if the Government elected to support wheat 
income at $ 2. 50 per bushel through price-deficiency payments, when 
the free-market price (world price) is $ 2 as above, it would have to 
pay farmers 50 cents per bushel on the whole crop. This would amount 
to $ 45 0 million. 
Diagram A 
























Figure 5. Effects of Demand Elasticity Upon Government Cost, 
Surplus-Purchase Plan and Deficiency-Payments Plan 
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In contrast to the demand for wheat, the demand curve for hogs is 
relatively elastic. This is illustrated in diagram B. Again assume that 
the price could be raised by 25 per cent, but to do so it would be neces-
sary for the Government to purchase 50 per cent of the total supply of 
hogs offered on the market. If hogs were selling on the market at $ 20 
per hundredweight and the supply amounted to 50 million hundredweight, 
the Government would have to purchase 25 million hundredweight at a 
cost of $ 625 million. Assuming that the Government's best alternative 
for disposing of its purchase was for tankage for $ 225 million, the net 
cost to the Government would be $ 400 million. In contrast, deficiency 
payments would cost the Government $ 5 per hundredweight on 50 million 
hundredweight, a total outlay of only $ 250 million. 
Social Costs 
Government outlays for price-support programs are not the only 
costs to be considered. Social costs should also be taken into considera-
tion. The social cost of any Government program is measured by the 
difference between the value of the good produced under the program 
and the value of goods that could have been produced if the resources 
employed could have been allocated to higher productive uses. There-
fore if the use of resources for implementing Government price-raising 
programs results in the sacrifice of other production which would give 
greater total satisfaction to society, then the programs result in a net 
social cost. 
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ALL WHEAT: ACREAGE SEEDED, ACREAGE. HARVESTED, YIELD PER SEEDED ACRE, YIELD 
PER HARVESTED ACRE, PRODUCTION, UNITED STATES, 1919-1955 
Acreage Acreage Yield Per Yield Per 
Seeded~/ Harvested Seeded Harvested 
Year (1000 acres) (1000 acres) Acre Acre 
1919 77,440 73,700 12. 3 12. 9 
1920 67, 977 62,358 12.4 13. 5 
1921 67, 681 64,566 12. 1 12. 7 
1922 67,163 61,397 12. 6 13. 8 
1923 64, 590 56,920 11. 8 13. 3 
1924 55,706 52,463 15. 1 16.0 
1925 61,738 52,443 10. 8 12. 8 
1926 60,712 56, 6.16 13.7 14.7 
1927 65, 661 59, 628 13.3 14.7 
1928 71, 152 59,226 12. 9 15.4 
1~9 67,177 63, 392 12. 3 13. 0 
19 0. 67, 559 62, 637 13. 1 14.2 
1931 66,463 57,704 14.2 16.3 
1932 66, 281 57,851 11. 4 13. 1 
1933 69,009 49,424 8.0 11. 2 
1934 64, 064 43,347 8.2 12. 1 
1935 69,611 51,305 9.0 12.2 
1936 73,970 49,125 8. 5 12. 8 
1937 80, 814 64,169 10. 8 13. 6 
1938 78, 981 69,197 11. 6 13. 3 
1939 62, 802 52,669 11. 8 14. 1 
1940 61, 820 53,273 13.2 15.3 
1941 62, 707 55,935 i5. 0 16.8 
1942 53,000 49,773 18. 3 19.5 
1943 55,984 51,355 15. 1 16.4 
1944 66, 190 59,749 16.0 17. 7 
1945 69, 192 65, 167 16.0 17.0 
1946 71, 578 67,105 16. 1 17. 2 
1947 78, 314 74,519 17.4 18.2 
1948 78, 345 72,418 16.5 17.9 
1949 83, 905 75, 910 13. 1 14.5 
1950 71, 287 61, 610 14.3 16. 5 
1951 78, 048 61,492 12. 6 16.0 
1952 78,337 70, 926 16. 6 18.3 
1953 78, 789 67, 661 14.8 17. 3 
1954 61,971~/ 53,712 15.6~/ 18. 1 
1955 57, 402}./ i i ii ii 
1 / Includes acreage seeded in preceding fall for harvest in the year shown. 
2/ Preliminary. 
3/ April 1 estimate. 
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Source: Acreage seeded, yield per seeded acre, and production, United States Department of Agri-
culture, The Wheat Situation (Washington, D. C., April 27, 1955), p. 20. Acreage harvested and yield per 
harvested acre, all years except 1951 through 1954, United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1952 (Washington, D. C. , 1952), p. 2. Acreage harvested and yield per harvested acre, 1951, 
Ibid. , 1953, p. 1. Acreage harvested and yield per harvested acre, 1952, U. S. Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1954 (Washington, D . C., 1954), p. 675. Acreage harvested and 
yield per harvested acre, 1953 and 1954, United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, Crop Production (Washington, D . C., 1954), p. 57. 
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TABLE II 
ALL WHEAT: AVERAGE PRICE PER BUSHEL RECEIVED BY FARMERS, UNITED STATES, BY MONTHS, 1909-54 
Year 
beginning July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June 
July 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Cents Cents Cents Cents Cents Cents Cents Cents Cents Cents Cents Cents 
1909 114. 0 101. 2 94. 9 97. 2 99. 2 101. 0 104. 2 105. 0 104.8 102. 2 98.8 96.4 
1910 97. 1 97.4 94.8 92. 1 89. 4 88. 4 89. 2 87. 6 84. 6 84. 2 85.4 85.3 
1911 83. 5 83. 8 86. 6 90.0 89. 4 87. 7 89. 2 90.6 91. 6 96. 1 101. 2 100.9 
1912 94.4 87. 8 84. 6 83. 6 79.0 76. 1 78. 0 80. 2 79.8 80.0 81. 8 82. 0 
1913 79. 2 77. 1 77. 5 77. 4 78. 4 80. 4 81. 3 82. 4 83. 6 84. 0 84. 2 80.6 
1914 76. 7 84. 9 93. 4 95. 4 97. 9 103. 2 118. 8 131. 8 132. 6 135. 6 135. 6 117. 2 
1915 104. 6 100. 8 93. 0 92. 0 92. 5 97. 4 108. 4 108. 4 100. 8 100.6 101. 2 96. 5 
1916 100.0 119. 2 133. 8 147. 4 159. 4 155. 3 157. 6 164.6 172. 2 213. 0 247. 2 234. 3 
1917 224. 5 219. 3 205. 2 200. 3 200.4 201. 4 201. 6 202. 0 202. 6 203. 1 203. 0 202. 8 
1918 203. 8 205. 0 205. 7 205.9 205. 1 204. 5 206. 2 207.8 211.1 222. 6 229.8 225. 2 
1919 219. 6 211. 4 207. 6 211. 4 214. 0 223. 4 233. 8 231. 2 230. 3 242. 6 250.8 256.0 
1920 242. 9 225. 4 216. 5 201. 2 165. 8 146. 4 149. 2 148. 2 140. 4 122. 1 119. 0 119. 8 
1921 108. 5 103. 0 103. 4 99. 9 93. 4 93. 0 95. 2 107. 0 117. 0 119. 0 118. 8 109. 6 
1922 99. 8 92. 6 89. 2 94. 1 99. 4 103. 2 104.6 104. 4 106. 0 108. 4 108. 2 100. 8 
1923 89. 6 86. 4 91. 0 94. 2 93. 7 94. 5 96. 7 98. 0 98. 8 95. 8 96. 8 98. 5 
1924 105.8 116.8 114. 2 129. 7 133.6 141. 1 162. 1 169. 8 164. 0 140.5 149. 1 152. 7 
1925 140. 3 150. 4 144.4 136.4 148. 8 153. 7 158. 1 155. 5 146. 0 142.2 142. 1 138. 9 
1926 127. 7 125.1 117. 7 121. 4 123. 6 122. 8 122. 2 122. 8 120. 9 117. 2 123. 2 130.1 
1927 127. 3 123. 5 119. 2 113. 7 111. 4 113. 9 u5.2 116. 2 ,~1. 6 129. 2 144. 3 132. 0 
1928 118. 1 95. 2 94. 4 98. 7 97. 1 98. 2 98. 5 104. 2 104. 7 99. 8 90. 1 86. 8 
1929 101. 6 110. 0 111. 4 110. 7 102. 8 107. 3 107. 5 101. 3 91.9 93. 4 87.5 87. 9 
1930 70. 6 74. 0 70. 3 65. 6 60.0 61. 3 59. 1 58. 7 58. 3 59.2 59. 9 51. 9 
1931 36. 3 35. 4 35. 7 36. 1 50. 5 44. 1 44. 1 44. 0 44. 2 43.1 42.4 37. 3 
1932 35. 6 38. 5 37. 4 34. 6 32. 8 31. 6 32. 9 32. 3 34.5 44.8 59. 0 58. 7 
1933 86. 9 74.7 71.1 63.6 71. 1 67. 3 69.4 72. 0 70.9 68. 7 69. 5 78. 9 
1934 78. 8 89.6 92. 2 88. 5 88. 1 90. 6 89. 3 87. 9 85. 5 90. 2 87. 8 77.3 
1935 76. 4 80. 8 85. 1 94. 8 87. 5 88. 9 92. 0 91. 1 89. 3 85. 4 81. 6 79. 9 
1936 94. 1 104. 8 104. 3 106. 8 106. 4 114. 5 123. 6 124. 9 123. 2 126. 6 118. 3 108. 9 
1937 112. 8 99. 4 93. 0 88. 7 81. 9 83. 6 88. 5 86. 6 80. 3 75. 0 71.4 69. 7 
1938 60.8 50. 7 52.. 5 52. 2 52. 0 53. 6 57. 1 56. 9 56. 7 57. 8 63. 0 62. 5 
1939 55. 7 54. 5 72. 7 70. 3 73. 1 82. 4 84. 5 84. 1 85. 0 88. 9 80. 7 67. 4 
1940 61. 4 60. 1 62. 6 68. 2 72.5 71. 5 73. 0 67. 8 71. 8 76.0 79.4 83. 1 
1941 85. 6 88. 5 95. 8 91. 0 93. 4 102. 2 106. 1 104. 9 105.1 99. 7 99. 8 95. 7 
1942 94. 6 95.4 102. 8 103.5 104. 4 110. 3 117. 5 119. 5 122. 7 122. 3 122.8 124. 0 
1943 126. 0 127. 0 130.0 135. 0 137. 0 143. 0 146. 0 146. 0 146. 0 147. 0 147. 0 143. 0 
1944 139.0 135. 0 135. 0 142. 0 143. 0 145. 0 146. 0 147. 0 148. 0 149. 0 149. 0 150. 0 
1945 146. 0 145. 0 145. 0 151. 0 153. 0 154. 0 154. 0 155.0 158. 0 158.0 110.0.!/ 174. 0 
1946 187. 0 178. 0 179. 0 188. 0 189. 0 193. 0 191. 0 199. 0 244. 0 240. 0 239. 0 21R. 0 
1947 214. 0 210. 0 243. 0 266. 0 274. 0 279. 0 281. 0 212. 0 221. 0 229. 0 222. 0 211. 0 
1948 203.0 196. 0 197. 0 198. 0 204.0 205. 0 202.0 194. 0 198. 0 200.0 200.0 186.0 
1949 182. 0 179. 0 187.0 189. 0 190. 0 193. 0 192. 0 193. 0 198. 0 201. 0 204.0 193. 0 
1950 199. 0 197. 0. 194. 0 190. 0 194. 0 202. 0 209. 0 221. 0 212. 0 214. 0 211. 0 208.0 
1951 205.0 205.0 207.0 210.0 219. 0 222. 0 220. 0 218. O 220.0 218. 0 213. 0 206.0 
1952 198. 0 204. 0 209.0 207. 0 213. 0 212. 0 210. 0 205. 0 210. 0 208. 0 206.0 188. 0 
1953 187. 0 186. 0 192. 0 194. 0 200. 0 201. 0 203.0 206. 0 209.0 206.0 200. 0 191. 0 
1954 200. 0 203.0 207.0 208. 0 212. 0 212. 0 214. 0 
y Does not 'include bonus payment of 30 cents per bushel delivered under the Government purchase program. 
Source: United Stated Department of Agriculture, The Wheat Situation (Washington, February 28, 1955), p. 2. 
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TABLE III 
LEVELS OF PRICE SUPPORTS FOR WHEAT UNDER SLIDING SCALE 
FOR DESIGNATED SUPPLY CONDITIONS, AGRICULTURAL ACT 
OF 1948 
Total Supply as 
Per Cent of Normal Supply 
Not more than 70 
More than 70 but not more than 72 
More than 72 but not more than 74 
More than 7 4 but not more than 76 
More than 7 6 but not more than 78 
More than 7 8 but not more than 80 
More than 80 but not more than 82 
More than 82 but not more than 84 
More than 84 but not more than 86 
More than 86 but not more than 88 
More than 88 but not more than 90 
More than 90 but not more than 92 
More than 92 but not more than 94 
More than 94 but not more than 96 
More than 9 6 but not more than 9 8 
More than 98 but not more than 102 
More than 102 but not more than 104 
More than 104 but not more than 106 
More than 106 but not more than 108 
More than 108 but not more than 110 
More than 110 but not more than 112 
More than 112 but not more than 114 
More than 114 but not more than 116 
More than 116 but not more than 118 
More than 118 but not more than 120 
More than 120 but not more than 122 
More than 122 but not more than 124 
More than 124 but not more than 126 
More than 126 but not more than 128 
More than 128 but not more than 130 
More than 130 
Support Level as 
































* The level of support was t o be not less than the percentages stat ed . 
Source : Agricultural Act of 1948, Public No. 89 7, U. S. Statutes 
at Large, 80 Congress, 2 sess., LXII (July 3, 1948) , p. 1253. 
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TABLE IV 
LEVELS OF PRICE SUPPORTS FOR WHEAT UNDER SLIDING SCALE 
FOR DESIGNATED SUPPLY CONDITIONS, AGRICULTURAL ACT 
OF 1949 
Total Supply as 
Per Cent of Normal Supply 
Not more than 102 
More than 102 but not more than 104 
More than 104 but not more than 106 
More than 106 but not more than 108 
More than 108 but not more than 110 
More than 110 but not more than 112 
More than 112 but not more than 114 
More than 114 but not more than 116 
More than 116 but not more than 118 
More than 118 but not more than 120 
More than 120 but not more than 122 
More than 122 but not more than 124 
More than 124 but not more than 126 
More than 126 but not more than 128 
More than 12 8 but not more than 13 0 
More than 130 
Support Level as 

















* . . ' 
The level of support was to be not less than the percentages stated. 
Source: Agricultural Act of 1949, Public No. 439, U~ S. Statutes 
at Large, 81 Congress, 1 sess .• LXIII (October 31, 1949), p. 1051. 
APPENDIX B 
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BASIC WEAKNESSES OF THE 
McNARY-HAUGEN PLAN 
Wheat growers in the 19201s were conf.ronted with distressing 
conditions principally becau.se of an overexpansion of wheat acreage, 
the loss of fa.reign markets, and i.ncrea:;;ed costs resulting from a pre-
ceding period of monetary inflation and speculation in farm lands. 
Coupled with these factors was a disadvantageous ratio between the 
prices of farm and industrial products. It is extremely doubtful if the 
McNary-Haugen plan would have solved these problems. Indeed, con-
sidered from a long-run viewpoint, it probably would have been more 
harmful than beneficial. 
The successful administration and operation of a plan so complex 
as the McNary-Haugen proposal would have been an extremely difficult 
task and, if successful, an accomplishment in itself. This would have 
been true though applied only to a few commodities or even to wheat 
alone. Granting the possibility of successful administration of the plan, 
it would not have been a contributing factor to the solution of the farm 
problem. 
The proponents of the plan hoped to have wheat sold in the domes-
tic market at a higher price than abroad, at least as far .above the 
foreign price as the tariff would permit. Any other policy would have 
been inconsistent with the demand for ffequality for agriculture." 
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The major purpose of the plan was to raise wheat prices to 
domestic producers. In the absence of an effective control of output, a 
guaranteed favorable price would have stimulated farmers to expand the 
acreage planted to wheat. This would have happened at the very time 
that production was already too large for' the market demand. Wheat 
production. needed to be brought back into adjustment with the demands 
of a peacetime market. 
Overproduction probably would have been the most serious eco"'" 
nomic consequence of the adoption of the p;roposaL Expansion would 
have been partly at the expense of other crops and partly through "new" 
land brought under cultivation. Labor and capital would have been 
drawn from other enterprises and put into the enterprise of wheat farm-
ing. Those who were already producing wheat would have expanded 
operations and many others would have entered the business of raising 
a crop backed by a guaranteed favorable price. This not only would 
have contributed toward a rise in land prices, but land devoted to lower 
uses to which it was normally better suited would have been brought into 
the higher use of producing wheat. 
With the domestic price of wheat set at a level which was high 
enough to assure a monetary gain, some land which under more normal 
conditions was marginal or even subm.arginal for wheat at free -market 
prices would have been brought under cultivation for wheat production, 
This stimulus would have had a tendency to cause land prices to advance. 
Land located at a more distant point from market would also. have been 
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brought into cultivation. These factors would have meant that at least 
a portion of the increased production would have been produced at high 
costs per bushel. In the absence of pertinent regulation they also might 
have contributed toward the production of types and qualities of wheat 
for which there were no advantageous domestic markets. 
These developments would have led to further problems. While 
it is true that the scheme provided for stabilization corporations to take 
surpluses from the market, the scope of the corporations was inadequate 
to cope with the self-perpetuating nature of the wheat surplus problem. 
As a result, large quantities of surplus wheat, especially that of low 
quality and in poor condition, would have been placed for sale on the 
domestic market in competition with feed grains. Corn growers would 
have protested vigorously, even if corn were also under the operation of 
the plan. 
Proponents of the plan claimed that the assessment of the equali-
zation fee at incr·easingly higher levels as production over domestic 
needs increased would have discouraged wheat growers from expanding 
production. It appears highly doubtful that the equalization fee would 
have been a potent enough form of control to measure up to that 
accomplishment. 
Proponents of the equalization fee "scheme" assumed that wheat 
growers would gain more through enhanced wheat prices than they would 
lose through payment of the losses incurred by maintaining the domestic 
wheat price at a level in excess of the world price. For a short period 
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of time this would have been true and. as mentioned previously, would 
have caused expansion in the wheat industry. The more efficiently the 
plan was administered, the greater would have been net wheat price 
returns to farmers, and the greater would have been the stimulus to 
expand wheat acreage. 
What would have happened after the lapse of a longer period of 
time? With a greatly expanded acreage and the resulting increase in 
production, American wheat farmers soon would have been confronted 
with a much greater exportable surplus. This would have been the case 
even after allowance for an increase in domestic uses for wheat. 
According to the plan, the surplus above domestic requirements was to 
be placed on the world market and sold at the world market price. 
Assuming only a normal world crop. rather than a "bumper" one, the 
additional surpl'us wheat from American farms surely would have 
further depressed the world market price. In order to cover the 
increase in spread between the domestic price and the world price, the 
equalization fee would have been increased and farmers' margins above 
the world price would have been narrowed. 
A large world crop in conjunction with increased domestic produc-
tion would have further complicated this situation. Larger world supplies 
would have caused the assessment of a still higher equalization fee and 
the farmers" net price per bushel would have been further lowered. 
Would wheat farmers have decreased the acreage seeded to wheat? 
As long as they were covering their variable costs it seems very 
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doubtful that they would have greatly cut production, The very nature 
of the wheat far~ing industry makes it very difficult for farmers to 
adjust downward when prices are lowered because they are confronted 
with high fixed costs. A large part of their labor, their equipment, 
and their land, which in many cases is not suited to the production of 
other crops, all represent fixed costs. In the short run, reducti,on in 
cost can only be attained through a reduction in variable costs. Since 
variable costs represent such a small proportion of total cost, the 
amount of reduction in wheat motivated by cost reduction would be small. 
In so far as the surplus had continued to expand, the fee would 
have been increased to cover the mounting losses from the sale of addi-
tional surplus wheat on the foreign mar'ket. It is altogether possible 
that the fee would have been increased to the extent that the domestic 
price realized by farmers would have been no greater than the world 
price. Furthermore, in the absence of any counteracting changes in 
demand or in foreign supplies, the world price would have been a 
severely depressed one, This would have placed wheat producers in a 
worse position than that experienced before the adoption of the plan. 
Then, as now, the ill effects of agricultural overproduction could not be 
overcome without the removal of resources from that industry. 
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